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Despite the well-established relationship between corporate failure and corporate 
governance in the agency and resource dependency theories, there are still lack of 
studies on corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance and absence of  
code for corporate governance in Iraq. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the 
relationship between characteristics of board of directors, internal audit, ownership 
structure, external audit and firm performance of companies listed in the Iraqi Stock 
Exchange. This study used secondary data from the listed companies in Iraqi Stock 
Exchange from 2012 to 2015. This study employed agency theory and resource 
dependency theory to investigate the relationship between the variables. The agency 
theory is concerned with the agency problem between principals and agents while  
the resource dependency theory deals with the critical use of the internal resources  
within the firms. A sample of 48 different companies across 7 different sectors was   
selected. This study employed STATA in running Panel Corrected Standard Error 
multivariate regression to test the hypotheses. The empirical investigation found 
positive and significant relationships between board size, board meeting, internal  
audit existence, internal audit training, managerial ownership, local institutional 
ownership, foreign institutional ownership, audit quality and firm performance and 
Tobin’s Q as a measure of performance. However, the results showed insignificant 
relationship between CEO duality, non-executive directors, and individual block 
shareholder and Tobin’s Q. The acceptance of most of the hypotheses through the 
empirical analysis underscores their necessity during the formulation of policy of 
corporate governance. These findings can be used as inputs in the development of a 
code of corporate governance in Iraq. Future research can employ comparative 
studies among Middle East countries to provide more robust findings that may be 
generalized across countries. 
 







Meskipun hubungan di antara kegagalan korporat dan urus tadbir korporat telah jelas 
dalam teori kebergantungan sumber dan agensi, masih kurang kajian berkenaan. 
Mekanisme   urus tadbir korporat dan prestasi firma serta ketiadaan kod untuk tadbir 
urus korporat di Iraq. Oleh yang demikian, kajian ini bertujuan meneliti hubungan 
antara ciri-ciri lembaga pengarah, ciri-ciri jawatankuasa juruaudit, fungsi audit 
dalaman, struktur pemilikan dan audit luar engan prestasi firma untuk firma yang 
tersenarai dalam Bursa Saham Iraq. Kajian ini mengguna pakai data sekunder 
daripada firma  yang  tersenarai  dalam  Bursa  Saham  Iraq dari  tahun  2012  hingga 
2015. Kajian ini bersandarkan kepada teori agensi dan teori pergantungan sumber 
untuk menyelidik hubungan antara pemboleh ubah. Teori agensi melibatkan 
permasalahan agensi antara prinsipal dengan ejen. Manakala teori pergantungan 
sumber menangani penggunaan sumber dalaman secara kritikal di dalam firma itu 
sendiri. Sampel kajian meliputi 48 buah syarikat yang berbeza dan merentasi 7 
sektor yang pelbagai. Bagi menguji hipotesis, kajian ini menggunakan STATA 
dalam melaksanakan regresi multivariat yang menerapkan ‘Panel Corrected 
Standard Error’. Penelitian empirik ini memperlihatkan hubungan positif 
dansignifikan antara saiz lembaga pengarah, mesyuarat lembaga pengarah, 
kewujudan audit dalaman, latihan audit dalaman, pemilikan oleh pengurusan, 
pemilikan oleh institusi tempatan, pemilikan institusi luar, kualiti audit dan prestasi 
firma dengan Tobin’s Q yang bertindak sebagai ukuran prestasi. Walaupun 
demikian, analisis menemui hubungan yang tidak signifikan antara kedualan CEO, 
pengarah bukan eksekutif, dan  pemegang saham oleh individu dengan Tobin's Q.  
Penerimaan kebanyakan hipotesis menerusi analisis empirik menunjukkan keperluan 
merekadalam penetapan dasar dalam tadbir urus korporat. Keputusan kajian ini juga 
boleh dijadikan input dalam pembangunan dasar tadbir urus korporat di Iraq. Kajian 
masa hadapan boleh membuat perbandingan antara negara-negara Timur Tengah 
untuk memperoleh penemuan yang lebih teguh yang boleh diguna-pakai merentas 
negara. 
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BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1     Background of the Study 
The relationship between corporate failure and corporate governance is well 
established in the agency theory. Based on the agency theory, the interest of the 
shareholders and the management is diverged (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).The 
interest divergence creates an incentive for the managers to act in manners that are in 
contrary to the shareholders’ wish. Nevertheless, it provides a substantialpayoff to 
the management. Since shareholders are the residual claimants, they have the 
incentive to institute various governance mechanisms that will drive the management 
to maximize their firm value (Jensen, Murphy & Wruck, 2004). Some of the 
governance mechanisms established by the shareholders are the board of directors, 
external auditing, and those imposed by the market forces, such as block 
shareholders (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Martinez & Moraes, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, despite these mechanisms, the issue of weak corporate governance and 
its negative consequences on firm performance continue to attract the attention of the 
corporate governance researchers. Besides, the survival of the capital market hinges 
on the performance of listed companies also contributes to the increased attention. 
After the Enron debacle, despite several efforts were made throughout the world to 
ensure firm commitment to rigorous corporate governance, such commitment leaves 




Japanese conglomerate (Toshiba) is the most recent business scandal. In Toshiba’s 
case, an investigation was conducted on the 2015 accounting scandal. The 
investigation discovered numerous former diplomats on its audit committee who 
were incompetence. There were allegations of accounting fraud committed by the 
senior managers not less than two years after the top executives were discovered to 
have pressured profit to conceal the poor results for years after the 2008 global 
financial crisis (New Straits Times, 2017). Similarly, the global stock market 
meltdown in 2008 remains a concern despite the strengthening of the code of 
corporate governance in the USA. The financial crisis led to the liquidation of 
renowned corporate financial institutions, such as the Lehman Brothers in the United 
States of America, resulting in the suspension of the global credit market (Erkens, 
Hung & Matos, 2012; Kirkpatrick, 2009). Meanwhile, in the Middle East region, the 
Gulf Market crashed and caused stagnation in listing and trading activities in the 
region. It was claimed that the failure of the instituted corporate governance 
mechanisms was one of the contributing factors of the financial crisis (Erkens, Hung 
& Matos, 2012), further highlighting the need for more stringent corporate 
governance enforcement to protect the shareholders and the public at large. 
 
In the Middle East, corporate governance frameworks development has gained 
substantial attention in the past few years. The effective enforcement of corporate 
governance rules and regulation has surpassed the agenda of policymakers in the 
region (Amico, 2014). In the region, the framework guiding corporate governance is 
made up of the corporate law, the securities law and corporate governance code 
which virtually all the countries in the region have established (Amico, 2014). The 
code of corporate governance mirrored those of the developed markets. 
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In Iraq, the corporate governance mechanisms are not well developed despite there is 
an ongoing government initiative to improve corporate governance practice. 
Generally, the corporate governance requirements governing board composition, the 
conduct of the annual general meeting and reporting to the shareholders are mainly 
regulated by the companies and securities laws. Accordingly, the existing legal and 
regulatory frameworks are devoid of important corporate governance codes, which 
could have assisted in improving the culture of transparent reporting (Hussein, 2018, 
Jazrawi & Khudair, 2014). For example, the definition of the board of directors is 
not clearly addressed in the existing regulatory framework. The Iraqi companies law 
only requires a certain number of directors on board. The existing Iraqi companies 
law does not make a clear provision for the existence of independent directors. 
Furthermore, the majority of the companies listed on the Iraqi Stock Exchange (ISX) 
are dominated by the presence of controlling shareholders in the form of state-owned 
and family-owned enterprises, which exhibit poor corporate governance structure. 
Despite this ownership structure, the existing Iraqi companies law also does not 
make any provision for the protection of shareholder’s right (Obeidi, 2011; 
Alsmmarraie, 2018). 
 
The literature well documents the ineffectiveness of corporate boards and control 
mechanisms in Iraq and its antecedent consequence. As evidenced in the study of 
Hussein (2018), the board of directors of some listed companies failed in their 
monitoring function to prevent and detect management fraud. The failure of the 
board to curb unethical management conduct led to the collapse of many high 




An institutionalized corporate governance framework creates guidelines, principles 
and inculcates discipline into the managers. Undoubtedly, the absence of such a 
framework prompts the existence of ineffective corporate governance in Iraq. In a 
developing country like Iraq, the challenges such as political unrest and dropping in 
oil price, are still posing as hindrances to the diversification of economy to attract 
foreign investment. Similarly, there is a deficiency in legal accounting and low 
standard regulations in relation to the international laws. This leads to the problem of 
agency among the listed companies. A drastic decline in market performance is 
caused by the poor governance culture of the ISX. There is clear evidence that ISX 
has no standard code for corporate governance regulation. As a result, this leads to 
the low performance of the Iraqi firms.  
 
Iraq is an emerging economy in need of sound corporate governance to spur 
investment in the country after years of political instability. It is imperative to adopt 
the best code of corporate governance practice. The research towards this direction is 
important especially when there is a lack of empirical research on corporate 
governance and firm performance in Iraq (Jazrawi & Khudair, 2014; Bakheet, 2013). 
Due to corporate governance initiatives at the international level and the call for 
corporate governance best practices, developing countries like Iraq have initiated 
possible ways to improve corporate governance practices (Horrigan, 2010). Thus, the 
current study examines if corporate governance mechanisms and external audit 




1.2 Problem Statement 
Despite the abundant investment opportunities, the investment climate in Iraq 
continues to encounter serious challenges arising from the problem of political unrest 
which had devastating consequences on oil production and oil price (Bureau of 
Economic & Business Affairs, 2015). For over fifteen years, Iraq has been under 
serious political chaos following the allegation of a weapon possession and mass 
destruction. The subsequent invasion of the country by the US collation force was in 
2003. The US occupation of Iraq lasted until 2009 when the US collation force 
signified the end of combat activities. Subsequent to the US invasion, the 
development indicators dropped to the lowest levels as all economic projects were 
suspended (Jubouri, 2013).  
 
Nevertheless, in 2014, another high-level violence erupted from the activities of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) group that wants to take over power from the 
government installed by the US government. The ISIS attacked oil facilities in the 
northern part of the country, which further reduced oil production. Similarly, the 
political instability resulted in the outward movement of Iraqi wealth abroad and 
further weaken the government in providing developmental projects due to the 
absence of foreign investment (Al-kafagi, 2018).  
 
Being the fifth country with the highest oil reserve in the world and the second 
country in the Middle East (Dozier, 20161), Iraq revenue generates from oil which 
constitutes about 54% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
represents about 93% of the government’s fiscal revenues (see Table 1.1) (Bureau of 





Economic & Business Affairs, 2015). The revenue generated from crude oil 
production continues to be the main pillar sustaining the Iraqi's economy. The 
political chaos in the country disrupted the Iraqi oil sector since the economy of the 
country is tied to oil revenue. As a result, it leads to a significant drop in Iraqi’s oil 
production and export. Thus, it has a devastating effect on the entire economy. The 
oil price (see Table 1.1) dropped significantly between 2014 and 2015. This had a 
significant impact on the economy. 
 
Table 1.1 
Crude Oil Price and its Contribution to Iraqi Budget  
Year Share of oil revenues in the financial budget for 
the period 2004- 2016 
Crude oil price 
(USD / Bbl) 
2004 95.5 % 36.05 
2005 94.7 50.64 
2006 92.8 55.56 
2007 93.0 62.67 
2008 90.6 88.80 
2009 85.4 58.96 
2010 90.8 75.61 
2011 90.3 103 
2012 88.8 106.3 
2013 90.7 103 
2014 92.1 96.8 
2015 83.6 44.7 
2016 85.4 36 
Source: Central Bank of Statistics Annual Statistical Group 2004-2016 
 
Based on Table 1.2, the ISX witnessed a decline in market performance (Abdul 
Hakim & Dalloul, 2011; Asj, 2016; ISX, 2015; Rubaie, 2015; Saadawi, 2016). Table 
1.2 showed there was a sharp decline between the 2013 and 2014 in the volume of 
shares traded and the turnover ratio on the ISX. At the end of 2008, ninety-six 
companies were listed on the ISX, the market capitalization was only 2% of the GDP 






Iraqi Stock Exchange Performance  
Year Traded  Volume (Iraqi 
dinars) 
Turnover Ratio for ISX 
2005 367 billion 1.783 
2006 147 billion 0.750 
2007 427 billion 1.437 
2008 301 billion 1.202 
2009 412 billion 1.408 
2010 400 billion 1.311 
2011 941.2 billion 1.954 
2012 893.8 billion 1.867 
2013 2.8402 trillion 2.021 
2014 898.3 billion 1.165 
2015 456.2 billion 0.695 
Source: ISX reports, 2005-2015 
 
Within this context, the Iraqi Government saw the current fiscal challenge has an 
opportunity to seek reforms in both the public and private sector of the economy so 
as to attract foreign direct investment and diversify its ailing economy (Abdul 
Hakeem & Dalloul, 2009; ISX, 2015; Obeidi, 2011). The Iraqi government is finding 
the possible ways to diversify the economy and attract more foreign investors to 
improve the economy (Abdul Hakeem & Dalloul, 2009; ISX, 2015; Obeidi, 2011). 
An important prerequisite towards this effort is to establish a stable political climate 
and a friendly reporting environment. Iraqi government shows some commitments to 
embark on massive reforms, which include promoting efficient and effective 
corporate governance practice. Such practice is presently a priority due to its 
numerous benefits, such as to improve managerial practices and assist the Iraqi 
capital market to attract foreign investment (Abdratha & Abeed, 2009; Mchaal, 
2015; Mohammed, 2008; Raseed & Zaker, 2013; Tohme, 2013). 
 
Some examples of the new initiatives include the restructuring of the Iraqi capital 
market and the issuance of the new interim law for stock market participants which 
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prohibit shares ownership above 30% to discourage unhealthy competition over 
control of the company (ISX Law 74, 2004). Furthermore, legislation, laws and 
instruction are released periodically to ensure better governance and accountability 
in public listed companies. In November 2006, there was a ministerial order for the 
establishment of committees that will develop a code of ethics for Iraqi companies, 
which has not been implemented. Interestingly, in 2016, the ISX issued an exposure 
draft on the corporate governance, requiring comments and review from the 
stakeholders (Iraqi Securities Commission, 2016). The exposure draft specifically 
limits the ability of the executive management to exploit the company for their 
personal benefit. Therefore, it promotes the confidence in the economy of the state 
and be an indicator of foreign investors on the existence of a fair and transparent 
policy and rules to protect investors. In addition, the draft protects the right of the 
minority shareholders by granting them the right to attend meetings, vote and access 
information and exercise the right to select board members and external auditors. 
Compared to the companies law, the exposure draft promotes the inclusion of at least 
two independent directors to represent on the board of directors and the 
establishment of committees of the board of directors for auditing, risk management 
and governance. The establishment of an internal audit department and a risk 
management department by listed companies are the other corporate governance 
mechanisms recommended in the exposure draft. The duties and responsibilities of 
the internal audit department were also defined in the exposure draft (Iraqi Securities 
Commission, 2016). 
 
Meanwhile, the importance of corporate governance mechanisms in strengthening 
firm performance is well expounded in literature. Several empirical studies have 
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been conducted to investigate issues regarding the corporate governance and firm 
performance. Some variables studied include board independence, independent 
directors, dual leadership (Christensen, Kent & Stewart 2010), board size and 
executive directors (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003), ownership structure, block 
shareholdings and institutional shareholding (Pham, Suchard & Zein, 2007; Welch, 
2003).  
 
The board of directors is a governance structure that protects the interest of the 
company and the shareholders. Since the shareholders are constrained from directly 
monitoring the management, the boards of directors are assigned with the monitoring 
role (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rezaee, 2009). This monitoring role involves among 
others the appraisal of management and approval of managerial compensation. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the board in discharging its responsibilities to 
produce a positive outcome (improved performance) depends on some factors 
(Adams & Mehran, 2012). The board of director consists of an executive director 
and outside non-executive directors who are presumed to be disconnected from the 
daily management of the firm and to enhance independence. For instance, most of 
the times, the board independence is emphasized in the code of corporate governance 
as a factor that improves the board effectiveness in mitigating agency conflict. 
Agency theory suggests that independent non-executive director, the separation of 
CEO and chairperson role will ensure that the board provides independent counsel 
and managerial monitoring (Abdullah, 2004).  
 
The existence of the internal audit is another important monitoring tool. The 
existence of an internal audit improves the confidence of the stakeholders when it 
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supports the governance disclosure (Archambeault, DeZoort & Holt, 2008; Holt & 
Dezoort, 2009; Mercer, 2004). Many fraudulent activities can be exposed through an 
internal audit (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007). It is well documented by (Coram et al. 
2008) that firms with internal audit department have a hedge in detecting fraudulent 
report due to asset misappropriation. Lin et al. (2011) stated that an independent 
assessment of the internal control mechanisms is provided by an internal audit 
department. According to Lenz, Sarens and D’Silva (2014), the management of the 
organization is obliged with the duties of ensuring efficient operations of procedures 
and control and instituting an effective internal control on such financial report 
procedures.  
 
Ownership structure is another mechanism identified in the literature, which reduces 
the agency problem. The managerial and institutional ownership are acclaimed in 
literature to reduce agency cost. As stated in the convergence of interest hypothesis, 
the alignment of interest through stock ownership will incentivize the managers to 
actively protect the interest of the shareholders. Therefore, this leads to an 
improvementin the firm performance (Davies, Hillier, & McColgan, 2005). 
Likewise, another type of ownership structure refers to owning a large unit of shares 
by individuals or institutions (Habbash, 2010). The available evidence suggests that 
the block shareholders are the effects to monitor. This type of shareholders has the 
ability to supervise and influence board structure through voting rights (Persons, 
2006). Large block shareholders create pressure on the managers to improve 




Last but not least, the quality of the external audit service is an important factor that 
should be considered by shareholder and other market participants (Martinez & 
Moraes, 2014). Prior empirical studies by Hay, Knechel, and Wong (2006) and 
Stanley (2011) have sought for an understanding of how the quality of audit service 
affects capital market reaction and value generation indicators of the client’s 
company. The studies of Hay, Knechel and Wong (2006) and Stanley (2011) 
provides empirical evidence, suggesting that the quality of audit service affects firm 
performance. The amount of fees received by the auditor is another proxy used to 
characterize audit quality. The relationship between audit quality and audit fees 
measures was studied by Asthana and Boone (2012).  
 
Despite the discussion above highlights the importance of sound corporate 
governance mechanisms in improving firm performance, there is a conflict in 
empirical findings. The conflict in empirical findings is attributable to different 
theoretical issues being examined in corporate governance literature. In addition, the 
research methodology applied, the conceptualization of performance and the inherent 
nature of individual firms vary. Majority of empirical studies on the corporate 
governance and firm performance derived from the developed countries (see: Garay 
& González 2008, Kim et al. 2012). Very little attention has been given to the 
corporate governance and performance in developing country such as Iraq which has 
experienced a turbulent political environment and yet still striving to improve its 
reporting environment (Rafiee & Sarabdeen, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, the institutional and legal framework arrangement in developed and 
developing economies varies. In a developing market, the institution and legal 
12 
 
frameworks are often very weak compared to the developed economies. Likewise, 
within the emerging economies, the development level of the framework in terms of 
economic growth, business environment, income levels and management practices 
significantly differ (Amico, 2014). For instance, Iraqi security regulation has been 
introduced in 2004 and is considered young, compared to the countries like Jordan 
and Algeria that have long established their securities market. In addition, the stock 
exchange in most of the countries within the region has developed national corporate 
governance codes while Iraq is on the verge of doing (Hussein, 2018; Jazrawi & 
Khudair, 2014).  
 
Similarly, in Iraq, the majority of the companies listed on the stock exchange are 
characterized by the presence of controlling shareholders in the form of government 
investors and founding shareholders such as families (Amico, 2014). The controlling 
shareholding structure affects the influence of the controlling shareholders on the 
decision of the management. Therefore, the agency concerned (Type Two agency 
problem) is the expropriation of small shareholders by large controlling shareholders 
(Sheleifer & Vishhny, 1997). Likewise, most of the management and board of 
directors’ positions are held by family members and the appointment is based on 
personal relationship. As such, the agency problem may not necessarily between the 
managers and shareholders. This could involve minority shareholders and controlling 
shareholders. This is quite different from what is obtainable in developed countries 
where the political terrains and the financial system are stable. Apart from that, the 
ownership structure is widely dispersed. Therefore, the empirical outcomes from 
developed countries may not be necessarily applicable to Iraq (Durnev & Kim, 2007; 
Kouwenberg, 2006; Mueller, 2006).  
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As mentioned earlier, there are only a few studies on corporate governance and the 
corporate control mechanisms are very weak. In spite of this, there are a few 
available studies in Iraq, for example, Abdul Hakim and Dalloul (2009), Ani and 
Azzawi (2007), and Khudair (2012). The studies investigated the importance of 
corporate governance in Iraq. Apart from that, Jebouri (2007), Mashhadani (2009), 
and Rashid (2009) examined the impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance of Iraqi banking sectors. All of the mentioned studies established a 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance despite the 
findings are mixed and might not be generalizable beyond the sample of just one 
sector of the economy. 
 
The present study intends to advance knowledge on the significance of corporate 
governance mechanism in improving the performance of firms listed on the ISX. 
This study encourages new practices for the implementation of sound corporate 
governance in Iraq. This study extends the findings of previous studies by including 
other important variables, like internal audit and external audit quality, to be 
considered to the best knowledge of the researchers in the Iraqi context. The 
organization management is saddled with the responsibility of instituting an effective 
internal control over financial reporting procedures and ensuring the efficient 
operation of such controls and procedure (Lin et al., 2011). Hence, the creation of an 
internal audit department provides an independent assessment of the internal control 
mechanisms in the organization (Lenz, 2013). According to the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (2008), an important attribute of the internal audit effectiveness includes 
the knowledge and skills of the internal auditors. These attributes are preserved and 
inculcated into internal audit personnel through constant training. 
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According to Fan and Wong (2005), the agency conflict is between the minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders. This makes the internal control system 
less effective while the mechanism of internal corporate governance can reduce the 
problem of agency theory to a manageable level in developing countries like Iraq. 
Aldogji (2009) stated that an external audit is an effective corporate governance 
mechanism that improves the authenticity of financial information. Thus, this study 
examines whether external auditing in Iraq can assist in mitigating agency problem 
to improve corporate governance. The organizational performance can be improved 
through the effectiveness of the decision-making process of the board members. This 
is due to the fact that the external auditor can provide recommendations to improve 
the internal control of an organization. Therefore, the inclusion of the variables, the 
quality of internal audit and external audit makes the study results more 
comprehensive and as guidance for forthcoming regulatory reforms on other 
governance variables within the context of ISX. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
This study intends to answer the specific research questions as set out below:  
1. Is there any relationship between the board of directors’ characteristics and firm 
performance among Iraqi listed companies? 
2. Is there any relationship between internal audit and firm performance among Iraqi 
listed companies? 
3. Is there any relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
among Iraqi listed companies? 
4. Is there any relationship between external audit and firm performance among Iraqi 
listed companies?  
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1.4 Research Objectives 
This study intends to achieve the following objectives: 
1. To examine the relationship between the board of directors’ characteristics and 
firm performance among Iraqi listed companies. 
2. To examine the relationship between internal audit and firm performance among 
Iraqi listed companies.  
3. To examine the relationship between of ownership structure and firm performance 
among Iraqi listed companies. 
4. To examine the relationship between external audit and firm performance among 
Iraqi listed companies. 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study can be discussed from the following perspectives: (1) 
theoretical contribution; (2) policymaker; and (3) business practices. 
 
1.5.1 Theoretical Significance 
Corporate governance and firm performance studies are limited to the Middle East 
region. This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance among Iraqi listed companies. Therefore, this 
study findings would provide interesting insights that Iraq is substantially blessed in 
terms of natural and human resources. Thus, this makes Iraq an investment 
destination in the Middle East region. In 2003, the Iraqi government shifted from a 
centrally planned economy to a free market. It became one of the most open 
economies in the region (Looney, 2004). This liberalization was carried out to 
improve the financial resources of the country in order to bounce back after the US 
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invasion and years of the slow economy (Jones, 2004). With these developments, 
Iraq has received the attention of government and businesses across the globe. Apart 
from that, Iraq is the second largest country in terms of oil reserves production 
(Shubber, 2009). This suggests that Iraq plays a crucial role in the global economy. 
Similarly, in 2004, the liberalization policy of the Iraqi government opened the 
ownership of natural resources to both local and foreign investors for the first time. 
As a result, Iraq becomes a destination of choice for investors.  
 
In addition, Iraq provides a unique context for this study as its legal and institutional 
environment is different from that of the larger markets, such as the USA, UK and 
Australia. Its smaller size and international economy reliance, isolation in 
geographical and less regulated nature, suggest that the larger markets findings 
cannot be generalized to Iraq. Furthermore, the Iraqi market is characterized by 
highly ownership concentrated, less presence of the big 4 auditing firms and 
directors serving on multiple boards.  
 
Regardless of this deserving and unique attributes possess by Iraq, there is a lack of 
evaluation done empirically to examine the effect the corporate governance 
mechanisms. Thus, this study offers contribution pertaining to theories on the effect 
of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. Firstly, the present study 
extends the literature on corporate governance by investigating both internal and 
external corporate governance characteristics in a single model by using data from 
one of the less studied countries with the trait of political instability. The current 
research contributes to the knowledge of body on accounting and encourages further 
research on the association of the governance mechanisms and performance of firms. 
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Secondly, the findings of the present study are beneficial to the corporate sector in 
Iraq. It also provides significant benefit to other countries within the region that are 
similar in terms of culture and political exposure. Therefore, a framework developed 
in this study could provide significant insight for researchers to investigate corporate 
governance and firm performance in the region.  
 
Thirdly, the present study extends the existing literature on corporate governance and 
performance by investigating the corporate governance structures of Iraqi listed 
companies. In addition, the study also examines the outcome of these structures with 
respect to board accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders through firm 
performance. In the current state of literature, several authors have assessed the 
effect of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance (Lenz, Sarens & D’Silva, 2014; Abdul Hakim & Dalloul 2009; Ani & 
Azzawi 2007; Khudair 2012). Nevertheless, the effect has not been evaluated in prior 
research. Similarly, those studies that specifically relates to Iraq have not been 
studied in the context of all sectors available in the ISX. Therefore, the findings of 
the study contribute to the present state of knowledge. 
 
1.5.2 Policy Makers 
In Iraqi corporate landscape of corporate governance practices, the draft code 
stipulates that it is mandatory to comply with the accepted code of practice. The 
current research provides an opportunity to assess how the various mechanisms 
address the corporate governance issues in Iraq by investigating the relationship 




The findings of this study are beneficial to policymakers on corporate governance 
matters. Thus, it is useful in setting the trend of governance policies for Iraqi 
companies in the future. The findings will be vital to the ISX and other regulators 
that are concerned about firm performance and investment climate in Iraq. This 
research is expected to contribute greatly to the professional environment as the 
materials could be used to formulate policies and assist in developing a corporate 
code of best practice for Iraqi companies. In addition, it also raises the awareness 
among the users of accounting information regarding numerous techniques used to 
improve firm financial reporting. 
 
In conclusion, the findings of this study offer valuable insight for standard setters, 
investors, analysts and researchers to understand the significance of corporate 
governance mechanisms in improving firm performance. 
 
1.5.3 Business Practices 
This research intends to reemphasize the prior research findings by investigating 
several sides of governance mechanisms and their link with firm performance 
despite several studies have debated the requirements of good governance (Barton, 
Coombes & Wong, 2004). The findings of this current study enable the investors to 
assess the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in reducing the 
conflicts between management and shareholders in Iraqi companies.  
 
In addition, it is very crucial to investigate the corporate governance in Iraq, a less 
researched country. Iraq remains a focal point of attraction if not for the political 
instability. The strong performance of the ISX could attract local and foreign 
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investors via improved corporate governance, better access to capital and economic 
development of the country despite in a volatile environment. The board structure 
can be improved through an effective reporting practice and hence enhance the value 
of the firm through the findings and recommendation of this study. 
 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
The focus of this study is to investigate the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance in Iraq. Therefore, this research is limited to some 
selected governance variables and firm performance measure variables as stated in 
the annual report of all listed companies on the record of the ISX between 2012 and 
2015.The ISX has seven sectors which are: Insurance, Investment, Services, 
Industry, Tourism & Hotels, Agriculture, and Telecom. 
 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is categorized into seven main chapters. These seven chapters include (i) 
background of the study; (ii) corporate governance practices in Iraq; (iii) literature 
review; (iv) research framework and hypothesis development; (v) methodology; (vi) 
results and discussion; and (x) discussion of results and conclusion. 
 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of corporate governance and firm performance. This 
is followed by an overview of the background of the study, evaluation studies, issues 
that provoked the essence of the study and the agency theory. Furthermore, this 
thesis reviews relevant literature related to the importance of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the financial crisis in the world. The corporate governance 
mechanisms include the board of directors’ characteristics, internal audit, ownership 
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structure and the external audit. This leads to the research questions and objectives, 
which are required to be achieved to form and develop a theoretical model. Further 
review reveals the contribution of the study to policy and decision makers, current 
literature and business practices. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the political and economic development in Iraq 
and historical background for ISX. The chapter also discusses the establishment of 
the legal dimension of ISX. The responsibilities control and objectives of ISX are 
enumerated. Moreover, this chapter also explains a historical overview of corporate 
governance. Nevertheless, the corporate governance mechanisms in Iraqi laws and 
legislation are justifiably reviewed. Last but not least, this chapter discusses firm 
performance and performance measures. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature and theories on corporate governance. This 
chapter discusses how to measure corporate governance. It subsequently explains the 
established relationship exists between performance and measurement of corporate 
governance. Furthermore, this chapter provides a theoretical foundation used in 
investigating the association between the variables of interest in the firm 
performance model. The review of the literature also discovers the potential to 
enhance evaluation study questions (why, what, who, when and how). Two 
performance measures are used, such as market-based measures and account based 
measures in order to evaluate the firm performance. The further review suggests this 
area of research has not been conducted extensively within the evaluation studies, 




On the other hand, Chapter 4 discusses the proposed theoretical framework and 
hypothesis development, which integrates two well-known theories: (i) agency 
theory and (ii) resource dependency theory. Several hypotheses are established for 
empirical testing and empirical validation. Hypotheses are developed from the 
variables of interest, which include (i) board of director’s characteristics, (ii) internal 
audit, (iii) ownership structure, and (iv) external audit quality. It discusses the 11 
hypotheses that require to be analyzed. H1a, H1b, H1c and H1d related to the board 
structure, which includes board size, CEO duality, the proportion of non-executive 
director and board meeting. Furthermore, H2a and H2b represent the internal audit 
existence and internal audit training on firm performance by using Tobin's Q and 
ROE measures. In addition, H3a, H3b, H3c and H3d are hypotheses, which represent 
managerial ownership, individual block shareholder, local institutional shareholders, 
and foreign institutional shareholders. Last but not least, the last hypothesis4 is 
developed from the relationship between external auditing and firm performance.  
 
In Chapter 5, the methodology used to examine the proposed hypotheses (as outlined 
in Chapter 4) is presented. The methodology includes the use of secondary and 
cross-sectional time series data. Furthermore, this chapter discusses secondary data 
used to measure the proposed constructs and the period of a year to collect the 
secondary data from ISX. This is followed by extending the research model and 
measurement, justifying the software employed to analyze the data and the method 
of the data analysis used. Last but not least, this chapter also outlines the empirical 





In chapter 6, the analysis of the results is presented by referring to the methods 
mentioned in chapter 5. The results include the descriptive analysis to explain the 
data characteristics, change significance through assessment of the relationship 
between the variables via Spearman correlation analysis. The results of the proposed 
hypotheses are obtained through the panel regression analysis and diagnostic test 
adopted in this chapter. This chapter highlights the interpretation of the findings 
discovered from the proposed hypotheses with the purpose of achieving the four 
objectives and answering the questions of the study as highlighted in chapter 1. The 
overall result of all the relationships between the variables involved is discussed in 
this chapter.  
 
In chapter 7, the report of results for each approach utilized in the study is explained. 
The conclusions for the final research questions of the study as identified in chapter 
1 and the resultsare discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, this chapter presents the 
contributions of the thesis, research limitations and recommendation for future 
researches.  
 
1.8 Summary of the Chapter 
The introduction of this research intends to cover the significant issues and an 
overview of this thesis is presented to the readers. This research also provides an 
explanation of the research problem statement towards the firm performance among 
Iraqi listed companies. Subsequently, the thesis presents the research questions and 
objectives. In this chapter, it also provides the readers with significant details and the 
scope of the research. This research is conducted with the intention to fill the 
research gap in the literature regarding performance issues and the focus is on the 
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Iraqi listed companies. In short, this chapter is meant to offer a brief description of 





CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN IRAQ 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of several sections. After the introductory section, the second 
section provides an overview of political and economic development in Iraq. The 
third section provides an overview on the state of ISX history of corporate 
governance practices in Iraq, focusing on the regulatory environment and the 
disclosure requirements by the laws guiding firm operation in Iraq. The next section 
discusses the legal dimension of ISX and enumerates the responsibilities control and 
objectives of ISX. This chapter also discusses the corporate governance principles in 
Iraqi laws and legislation to provide a gateway to the main discourse of the study. 
Finally, the chapter also discusses the corporate governance mechanisms in Iraqi 
laws and legislation. The chapter also presents the measurements of firm 
performance and the summary of the chapter to cover the whole chapter.  
 
2.2 Political and Economy Development in Iraq 
      2.2.1 Geographical Information 
 
Iraq is also known asthe Republic of Iraq, which is located in southwest Asia. In the 
ancient time, this country was referred to as “Mesopotamia”. It means “between two 
rivers” in the Greek. Saudi Arabian bound Iraq on the southwestern part and by 
Kuwait on the southern part. Jordan bound Iraq on the southwestern part and by 
Syria on the western part. On both the Eastern and the Northern part, Iran and 
Turkey bordered Iraq respectively. Baghdad is the capital city of Iraq and is the 
largest city in the country. Iraq has a land mass of 438417 square kilometreswith a 
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population of 37.2 million people (Ministry of Planning, 2017; Al-aqla, 2015). 
Among this population, 95% are Muslims of various sects (i.e. Suni Muslims and the 
Shi’a). The remaining population formed by the people from other religions, such as 
Christians, Yarsan, Yezidism and Mandeanism (Lipka, 2014). Iraq is an Arab ethnic 
dominated country with other ethnic groups including the Kurds, Assyrians, 
Turkmen, Shabakis, Yazidis, Armenians, Man deans, Circassians and Kwaliya. 
75.8% of Iraqis are ofArab descent, 15 to 20% are Iraqi Kurdish people and the 
remaining 5% comprise of other ethnic groups such as the Turkomans, Assyrians 
and others (Zoghbi, 2005). 
 
2.2.2 Political Background 
With the brief Iraq geographical information discussed in the above paragraph, the 
economic development in Iraq predates the discovery of oil. Iraq was a formal 
colony of British under the League of Nations from 1920 to 13 October 1932. 
Subsequently, the country got its independence and become a sovereign nation. Iraq 
was the first Arab country to gain independence. Before the British occupation of 
Iraq, the Ottoman Empire ruled the country from 1534 to 1920 AD (Mohammed, 
2004; Alsaba, 2017). The first Iraq rule known as the modernera started during the 
reign of King Faisal 1 as king in 1921. Subsequently, the country witnessed a 
military coup in July 1958, which displaced the monarchical system of government 
in Iraq. The coup led to the emergence of Brigadier General Abdul Karim Qasim as 
the Prime minister, Minister of defence and the commander in chief of the Armed 




Barely five years after the first coup, Ba’ath Party in conjunction staged another 
coup with Nationalist Army officers on February 1963 which overthrew the 
government of AbdulKarim Qasim and imposed Abdul Salem Arif as the Prime 
Minister. The success of the coup later saw the reentrance of Saddam Hussein 
whohas has been on exile in Egypt back to the country. After the return, Saddam 
Hussein became an active member of the Ba’ath party. The government of Abdul 
Salem Arif proscribed the Ba’ath party and subsequently the imprisonment of 
Saddam Hussein in 1964. Abdul Salem Arif later died in a helicopter crash in April 
1966 (Hamiri, 2018).  
 
The death of Abdulsalem Arif led to the emergence of his brother Rahman Arif as 
the president in 1966. Two years later, on 17 July 1968, a group of Ba’athist plotted 
another coup, which disrupted the government of Rahman Arif and led to the 
emergence of Al-Bakr as the president and the Chairman of the RCC. Following the 
deteriorating health of President Al-Bakar, Sadam Hussein emerged as the Chairman 
of RCC, Prime Minister and secretary of the Ba’ath party after the former 
resignation. Since independence, the first National Assembly was inaugurated in 
June 1980. Members of the National Assembly were close allies of Sadam Hussein 
and had no legislative power to check the activities of Saddam Hussein. A military 
tribunal persecuted the coup organizer and sentenced the organizer to death 
(Aldhuab & Ali, 2012). 
 
In September 1980, the government of Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in an attempt to 
enlarge its regional power and exhumed the fire of Islamic fundamentalist in the 
country. The Iraqi-Iran war generated both internal and external support for Saddam 
27 
 
Hussein government, weakening the voice of the opposition in Iraq. The major 
opposition to Saddam Hussein government came from the Kurdish, Communist and 
Shiite group in Iraq. These groups made several efforts made to unite to unseat 
Saddam Hussein. Their effort grew during the Iran and Iraq war. In November 1980, 
a common front named the Democratic Iraqi Front by the Iraqi Communist Party, the 
Unified Socialist Party of Kurdistan and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. The 
Shiite group formed the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution of Iraq with the aim 
of breaking down the government of Saddam Hussein (Falih, 2012; Ahmed, 2005).  
 
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait due to territory, debt repayment and petroleum 
production quotas despite pressure from international bodies. Consequently, Iraq was 
sanctioned with a deadline to withdraw his armed forces from Kuwait. His failure to 
withdraw led to the Persian Gulf War, involving a coalition of military forces from 
different countries led by the United States. Iraq was defeated in the war and forced 
to withdraw its forces and sign the UN Security Council Resolution 687 (Ahmed, 
2005). 
 
The Persian Gulf War had a devastating effect on the Iraqi economy condition. There 
was hyperinflation, the country currency depreciated, high unemployment rate and a 
decline in the agricultural output. Throughout the 1990s, the economy of Iraq 
seriously fell as the living conditions of all the citizen deteriorated due to UN 





Throughout the reign of Saddam Hussein as the president, all his perceived and real 
enemies were silent. The Ba’ath party, which was Saddam Hussein political party, 
dominated in the legislative election. In addition, the loyalty of top military officers 
has monitored closely and only the member of his tribe and closes allies were 
assigned into sensitive positions to avoid the overthrown of his government 
(Aljazeera, 2003).  
 
Saddam Hussein government ended in 2003 in the wake of the USA invasion of Iraq. 
During the USA occupation, the Iraqi economy further deteriorated. In 2003, trade 
on Baghdad Stock Exchange dropped drastically from a huge volume of 100 million 
Iraqi dinars daily to approximately 50 thousand dinars (Chaney, 2008). 
Subsequently, there was a closure of the market as the shareholders were prohibited 
to trade until the stock market rechristened the stock exchange of Iraq.  
 
An interim government was formed on 3 May 2005. The government of United State 
of America, the Arab league and some other countries recognized the interim 
government as the legitimate representative of Iraq. The main task of the Iraqi 
interim government was to organise the elections to choose a permanent parliament 
and government in Iraq for 4 years. In addition, the interim government was to ratify 
the draft constitution written by the Interim Iraqi Council of Representatives in the 
interim Iraqi government. The government was transformed from a Republican 
presidential system into a republican system of parliament. Today, the parliamentary 
elections are held every 4 years, i.e. 2010, 2014, and 2018. The Speaker, his 
deputies, the President of the Republic, his deputies, the Prime Minister and his 
deputies shall be appointed (Kubba, 2011). 
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2.2.3 Economic Background 
The Iraq economic development can be discussed in four phases. In the first phase of 
economic development, the country depended heavily on the agricultural sector. As 
such, the country economy did not record any remarkable development. Another 
sector of the economy remained underdeveloped. The country discovered oil in 
1927. Nevertheless, during the seventies of the last century, the country was able to 
achieve a high growth rate due to the discovery of oil. With crude oil, it made Iraq 
the second largest proven reserves in the Middle East. As a result, Iraq became the 
wealthiest nation in the region and the world. The oil contributed largely to the GDP 
and the foreign exchange of the country. Majority of the manufacturing activities in 
Iraq revolved around the oil industry. This involved petroleum refining and 
manufacturing of chemicals and fertilizers. Aside from the crude oil, the country had 
other untapped natural resources and minerals, such as coal, chromium, copper, iron 
ore, lead manganese, zinc, and sulphur. Similarly, Iraq had significant gas reserves 
that remained untapped (Abdel Azeez, 2017).  
 
After oil discovery, there was an abundant investment in infrastructure and the 
development of many industrial and agricultural production activities. Other sectors, 
such as the health, education and housing, received a boost due to the rapid growth 
in the oil export revenues. Between 1970 and 1980, the real GDP of the country 
increased by 12.1% from Iraqi Dinars (IQD) 6197.2 million in 1970 to IQD 19416.6 
million in 1980. The increase was associated with abundant oil revenues, as oil 
prices rose globally from USD 1.3 to USD 11.26 per barrel in 1974. The real GDP 
without the oil sector witnessed a boost of about 13.7% with an upward movement 
from IQD 4304.4 million in 1970 to IQD 15578.9 million in 1980 (Qasim, 2011). 
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In the second phase (between 1980 and 1990), the real GDP of the country reduced 
by 4.7 % due to the disruption in oil export arising from the Iraqi war with Iran. The 
country achieved negative growth in economic development due to over-
commitment of available resources to warfare. Excluding the oil sector, the real GDP 
reached IQD15578.9 million in 1980 and decreased to IQD14273.7 million in 1990, 
a decline of 0.9%. The population growth rate during this period was 3.1%, which is 
higher than the real GDP growth rate of 1.4%. This reflected that the state of 
economic declined in the country as the ratio of fixed capital formation at 1988 
prices to the gross domestic product (GDP) 35.9% in 1980 compared to 12.1% in 
1990 (Allawi, 2005). 
 
In the third economic phase (1990 to 2000), due to the invasion of Kuwait, the 
international community imposed the sanction that hit the country economy 
negatively. During this period, Iraq witnessed a low GDP growth rate, which fell 
below the level of annual population growth. The value of the country currency 
depreciated in an unprecedented manner. The economy approach adopted by the 
government was to release new legislation and law that would encourage investment 
and boost the activities in the private embarked upon to sustain the economy. As a 
result, the real GDP witnessed a growth rate of about 3.3% with GDP increment 
from IQD 30672.9 million to IQD 42506.4 million between 1990 and 2000. In 1996, 
the value of exported crude oil rose to USD 4609.3 million in 1997, the real gross 
domestic product, excluding the oil sector, reached IQD 14273.7 million in 1990 and 
IQD 16606.2 million in 2000, i.e. the rate of growth at 1.5 %. The rate of growth of 
the population during this period was 3% and the growth rate of per capital share of 
real GDP declined to 0.6 % (Qasim, 2011). 
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In the fourth developmental phase (2000 to 2010), the Iraqi economy remained 
relatively stable with an increase of 3.7 %. Nevertheless, the economic activities 
were restricted to distribution and consumption sectors without any manufacturing 
activities during this period. Thus, the economic indicator for unemployment 
decrease from 18 % in 2005 to 15.3 % in 2008. In 2006 and 2007, the security 
situation in the country deteriorated seriously, causing the inflation rate to rise 
astronomically. The real gross domestic product (excluding the oil sector) amounted 
to IQD 16606.2 million in 2000 against IQD 37019.3 million in 2010. The amount of 
crude oil exported was USD 52202 million in 2010 (Jubouri, 2013). 
 
2.3 Iraqi Stock Exchange (ISX) 
One of the important pillars in any economic building is the stock market as it 
promotes the national economy and contributes to the promotion of savings and the 
development. The development of the economic sector is achieved through the 
capabilities, means, and regulations of ISX. These regulations contribute to the 
organization and development of Iraqi companies and economic institutions through 
the adoption and activation of concepts, such as transparency, disclosure, governance 
and international standards for accounting and auditing. These concepts provide 
investment opportunities to domestic and foreign investors, by creating confidence in 
the national economy and ensuring the rights of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
The aim of ISX is to achieve the following objectives (Jubouri, 2013):  
1.To provide protection to shareholders. 
2.To achieve justice, efficiency and transparency of transactions. 




2.3.1 Establishment of the ISX 
In April 2004, the Interim Law No. 74 established the ISX, replacing the Baghdad 
Stock Exchange established by Law No. 24 of 1991. The first trading session of its 
activity started on 24 June 2004 with 15 companies while the board of governors 
managed the market. It is the main market located in Baghdad and has the right to 
open branches in other Iraqi cities (Alsmmarraie, 2018; Abdul Hakim & Hassan, 
2010). 
 
2.3.2 Legal Dimension of ISX 
The ISX Law focuses on several aspects. The most important aspects are listed 
below:  
 
2.3.2.1 ISX Responsibilities 
The responsibilities of the market are as follow (ISX Law, 2004): 
1.ISX under the law of the market will be financially and administratively 
independent of the Iraqi government. A registration under the Ministry of Commerce 
is not required as there is no supervisory authority for the registration of companies 
in the Ministry of Commerce. Nevertheless, this provision does not affect the 
market's obligations towards the Securities Authority in relation to the regulation of 
control, the instructions of the Commission and the Temporary Securities Law. The 
market has the right to own movable and immovable property and guaranteed by the 
real estate. 
2.The liability of the market does not include assets owned by the members and is 
limited to assets owned by it. 
33 
 
3.The market is not responsible for any obligations that may result from the Baghdad 
Stock Exchange. 
4.The market has the power to file a claim before an investigative body, or court or 
any other authority to be represented by the chairperson of the board of governors or 
by a person authorized by him.  
5.The market should be a self-regulated organization with no alliance with the 
ministry of finance and government, which is owned by the members, and non-profit 
oriented. There should be no contradiction between the temporary and permanent 
laws, internal regulations and other instructions of the market or entity with others 
regarding joint commercial tradition.  
 
2.3.2.2 ISX Objectives 
The purpose of ISX is to achieve the following (ISX Law, 2004, Al-taie, 2009):  
1. Organizing and training its members and companies listed in the market in 
accordance with the objective of protection and promotion of shareholders. 
2. Promoting the shareholder’s interests in a reliable, competitive, transparent and 
free market.  
3. Simplifying and regulating securities transactions in an orderly, efficient and fair 
manner to ensure clearance and settlement of such transactions.  
4. Organizing the transactions of its members in all matters as related to the purchase 
and sale of securities. Determining the obligations and right of the parties and ways 
of safeguarding legitimate interests.  
5. Developing the capital market in Iraq to serve the national economy and to help 
companies in building the capital necessary for investment. 
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6. Collecting, analyzing and disseminating information and statistics necessary to 
achieve the objectives.  
7. Communicating with the stock markets in the Arab world and the international 
markets to develop the market. 
8. Conducting necessary activities and service to support its objectives. 
 
2.3.2.3 ISX Control 
The provisional law No. 74 of 2004 established the Iraqi Securities Commission 
(ISC). In addition to ISC, the board of directors of the market controls the market 
through a set of disciplinary rules and procedures governing the operation of the 
market. Many legal and administrative procedures authorized the disciplinary rules. 
Such procedures are regarding the documentation of integrated information about the 
companies listed in ISX. The law is published to inform the investor and enable them 
to decide the value of the actual shares, profits. Apart from that, the law also 
provides disclosure and transparency for the market, companies, intermediaries, and 
investors. The disclosure of the protection of small shareholders and the influential 
shareholders is the most important objective of the authority. This is 10% of the 
company's capital within the law of ISX (ISX Law, 2004). 
 
The role of the authority is to increase gradually the degree of disclosure of 
accounting information or any information related to the changes in the company's 
activities to protect the investors. This action is implemented through the means and 
methods, which can develop the disclosure project for listed companies with 




The commission follows the companies operating in the ISX regularly to ensure that 
the disclosure and transparency rules are followed for information to be provided to 
investors in a timely manner. Nevertheless, the authority obliges the violating 
companies to pay a ransom of 5 million Iraqi dinars and the company ceases to be 
listed, traded and delisted if they fail to do so. To list the company again, it must pay 
all the fees involved. Therefore, the shareholders should pressure corporate boards to 
promote transparency and disclosure as they are critical for the performance 
assessment of companies and the revelation of the real price in relation to a stock 
(ISX Law, 2004).  
 
2.4 The Historical Overview of Corporate Governance 
The idea of corporate governance originated from the work of Berle and Means 
(1932) by independent researchers and academics. It revealed that after the 
acquisition, the corporations that grow into very large size create the possibility of 
separation of power from its direct ownership over a firm. The observation of Berle 
and Mean on “the separation of owners from the actual control of the corporation” 
leads to a renewal of confirmation on the behavioural ways of the firm’s theory.  
 
The word “governance” is dated back to the time of Chaucer. During that period, it 
carried the denotation “wise and responsible”, that is adequate. This could mean 
either the method of governing or the action. It is applicable to companies in the case 
of governing. Despite that corporate governance is considered to be recent research 
paradigm, there is nothing new about its mechanism as it is far dated back as the 




The systems in corporate governance have developed over the centuries in response 
to systemic crises and failure in corporations. The first properly documented 
governance failure, which revived the businesses practices, and the England law was 
the South Sea Bubble in the 1700s. Most of the security laws are set in the United 
States following the stock market crash of 1929. Flannery (1996) stated that there 
has been no shortage of other crises, such as the US loan and savings debacle of the 
1980s, financial crisis in the second half of 1990s, East-Asian economic, and the 
1970 crisis of secondary banking in the United Kingdom.  
 
In addition, a series of famous company failures have punctuated the history of 
corporate governance due to weak regulations, lack of business ethics and shady 
accountancy practices. Such company failures include the collapse of the 
Commercial International and Credit Bank, global corporation (i.e. global crossing, 
international accountancy) such as WorldCom, Enron and Parmalat, Baring Bank, 
and Maxwell Group raid on the pension fund of the Mirror Group of newspapers 
(Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes & Shleifer, 1999).Most of the crises and major corporate 
setbacks due to abuse, fraud and incompetence prompt the development of elements 
for an improved system of corporate governance (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). 
 
Corporate governance is a multi-faceted concept with unique complexity, which is 
free of systematic and unified theory. Its paradigm, diagnosis and solutions 
encapsulate multi-disciplinary fields, such as accountancy, economics and finance 
(Cadbury, 2002). Thus, it is paramount to codify a detailed model as an accounting 
framework for many organizations. The corporate governance is one of the key 
factors in any organization that determines the system’s efficiency and survival from 
37 
 
economic setbacks. An organizational growth is depended on the connection 
between the individual components and the underlying soundness.  
 
The following support the stability of the financial system of any country among 
many factors: 
(i) an effective marketing discipline, 
(ii) sound disclosure regimes, 
(iii) an appropriate saving system of deposit protection, 
(iv) accounting reliability and accuracy of financial reporting systems  
(v) good corporate governance, 
(vi) Strong prudential regulation and supervision (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 
1988).  
 
Different scholars and practitioners have defined corporate governance in different 
ways. Nevertheless, they are contributing towards a direction by providing a mutual 
agreement to the definition. Similarly, the corporate governance is the association 
between shareholders and enterprises (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006). In 
another word, it is the connection between the society and the enterprise as a whole. 
The corporate governance is defined as “a philosophy on the platform where 
companies are managed and directed by the organization for economic corporation 
and development” (1999). From a wider perspective, Mayer (1999) offered a 
definition as “the summation of the formation, structures and processes applied for 
directing and overseeing the management of the organization”. The requirements are 
tendered to the division of responsibilities and competencies among these parties 
(i.e. shareholders, management, supervisory board, and the board of directors) upon 
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this system, and the formulated procedures and rules of adopting a corporate 
decision on issues.  
 
In another word, Arun and Turner (2002) confirmed the existence of a weak 
approach to corporate governance by viewing the system where the shareholders and 
stakeholders are assured that the directing managers will act upon their interests. 
Nevertheless, a wider approach explains the subject of the matter as a way, which the 
suppliers of finance controls the managers to ensure that their capital is not 
expropriated and to earn a return on investment (Oman, 2001; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997; Vives, 2000). There is a consensus on the definition. Nevertheless, the wider 
opinion of corporate governance should be employed as a special contractual form of 
banking. The banking institutions require the banking mechanisms of corporate 
governance to capture shareholders and depositors Arun and Turner (2002).  
 
Macey and O’ Hara, (2003) supported the argument that the nature of any banking 
requires both the comprehensive view of corporate governance and the intervention 
of the government that restrains the actions of the bank management. Furthermore, 
the study stated that the nature of the firms in banking requires comprehensive 
narration of corporate governance in both developing and developed countries. Such 
corporate governance for banks comprises the depositors and shareholders. The 
study concluded that protecting the depositors and the overall financial system in 




2.4.1 Corporate Governance Practices and Regulatory Framework in Iraq 
Corporate governance is widely discussed around the world as it provides a proper 
guideline for firm operation. According to Rezaee (2009), corporate governance has 
a great impact on the economic growth of firms and the society. The role of the 
corporate governance is to enhance the performance of firms and protect the interest 
of the shareholders. The corporate collapse around the world has always provokeda 
regulatory response, such as the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Sarbanes Oxley Act 
was a response to the corporate malfeasance in the USA. The UK government also 
reviewed its corporate laws in accordance with the provision of Cadbury (1992) and 
the Greenbury (1995) reports. There were two reforms further strengthened 
corporate governance mechanisms in both countries.  
 
In Iraq, there is a gap with respect to corporate governance and regulatory 
framework development. The unstable political system caused serious disruption in 
the economic development of the country. As mentioned in section 2.2.2, the 
available money, which supposedly could contribute towards economic 
development, goes into defence expenditure (Azzawi, 2015). Iraq has no rules and 
mechanisms established in the form of a charter or a special code in corporate 
governance (Doski, 2015; Abdulhakim & Dalloul, 2009). Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that they are not practised. There are several laws and regulations set by the 
legal and regulatory framework, which include all the laws, regulations, instructions, 
standards and activities governing the operation of the ISX of the listed shareholding 
companies. The restructuring made ISX be independent and give more power to ISC. 
ISC is the custodian and regulators of laws governing Iraq companies (Khalaf & 
Fadel, 2016; Mohammed & Ahmed, 2014).  
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Other existing regulatory framework that guides the operation of listed firms in Iraq 
is the 1997 Companies Law and the accounting and auditing standards issued by the 
Accounting and Auditing Standard Board in Iraq. There are also instructions and 
procedures that guide the activities of practising auditors and accountant. The ethical 
code of conduct refers to these instructions and procedures issued by the Association 
of Accountants and Auditors.  
 
The subsections below discuss the level of contribution of both the legal and 
supervisory framework governing the ISX and the activities of the listed companies 
in the field of establishing the general principles of governance. To achieve a high 
quality of corporate governance, the mechanisms must be available to ensure proper 
management of the company and avoid the issues associated with mismanagement. 
Those mechanisms are:  
 
2.4.2 Board of Director Mechanism 
Paragraph (II) of the amended Article (102) of the Companies Law No. 21 of 1997 
(“Companies Law”) defines the board of directors as a group of members elected by 
the general assembly (the highest authority in the company) to represent the 
shareholders of the company. The Companies Law introduces many issues related to 
the board of directors, such as the composition and structure and functions of the 
board. Article 103 and 104 of the Companies Law further mentioned that the board 
of director of a private shareholding company shall consist of the five to nine 
directors. Nevertheless, seven original members should sit on the board of Joint 
Stock Company, representing two to three members of the state sector. According to 
Article 121 of the Companies Law, a Chairman leads the board of director and the 
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position of the chairman and executive director should be separated and not 
combined. Article 110 states that the chairman of the board of directors cannot seat 
above six board of different companies simultaneously. In addition, the chairman or 
member of the board is not permitted to be a member of another company that 
operates in the same activities, unless such member is authorized by the general 
assembly. The general assembly is to elect the remaining shareholder representative 
and seven other reserved members. The board of directors is the supreme body that 
controls the company. As stated in the Companies Law, one of the functions of the 
board is to ensure that the stewardship of account rendered by the management 
reliable. The board is responsible to monitor the implementation of its objectives and 
hold the management accountable. Article 112 of Companies Law also states that the 
board meets at least once every two months. 
 
Apart from that, the Companies Law (2004), Instruction No. 8, and Instruction No. 6 
state that the company must disclose the names, nationalities, occupations, addresses 
and number of shares held by the company members and the members of the board 
of directors, the chairman and the authorized director.  
 
Nevertheless, unlike other countries with dispersed ownership such UK or Australia, 
the directors in Iraq often represent the interests of controlling shareholders who are 
either state-owned or family members. In this case, the directors have a direct stake 
in monitoring the management. For the state-owned companies, the government-
appointed board members are not selected through a structure nomination process 




Figure 2.2 presents the timeline of all the laws and instructions detailing the board of 












Board Requirements Timeline. 
 
2.4.3 Internal Audit Mechanism 
Figure 2.2 presents the timeline regarding the issuance of the various laws, guiding 
internal audit requirement and the period. There are four laws issued between 2000 
and 2011. Each law was issued to cater for specific internal audit requirement as 
summarized in Table 2.1. The audit standard No. 4 issued in 2000 emphasises 
internal audit efficiency. On the other hand, the Guide for Internal Audit Units issued 
in 2007 provides the qualification requirements of the head of the internal audit 
department. Such a person has to be a member of a professional body with 
substantial years of conglomerate experience. Furthermore, Instructions No. 8 
focuses on the organizational structure, qualifications and training programs for the 
employees. Nevertheless, “Audit Approach on Risks Method” issued in 2011 states 
that the internal auditor is in charge of the senior management on the submission of 
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Timeline on Laws Guiding Internal Audit in Iraq  
 
Table 2.1 
Summary of Internal Audit Requirement  
Year Requirements 
 Accounting standards council in Iraq Audit 
Standard No.4 issued in 2000   
The law guides internal audit efficiency.  
Board of Supreme Audit in Iraqi reference 




The law states the skills and behaviors 
expected of internal auditors. The law lay 
emphasis on the knowledge, skills and their 
experience on the application of auditing 
standards and audit procedure. Including 
their knowledge on o laws, regulations and 
administrative instructions and decisions of 
the company's work. 
Instruction No. 8 (Disclosure of listed 
companies in the ISX) 2010 
The instructions states that the listed 
companies must make disclosure about the 
organizational structure, the number of its 
employees, qualifications, and training 
programs for the company's employees. 
Audit approach on risks method issued in 
2011 
 
The Internal auditor works together with the 
senior management in order to submit the 
audit results to the president or vice president 
of the governance officials; he stays away 
from political participation and conduction of 
auditing which he previously has an idea of 
before. 
 
2.4.4 Ownership Structure Mechanism 
The ownership structure consists of managerial ownership and concentration 
ownership. The managerial ownership refers to the sum of shares owned by directors 
of the board. Article 126 of the Companies Law No 21/1997 as amended in 2004 



























directors, the authorized director, the number of own shares, which are in possession. 
The instructions of the financial disclosure department 2008 state that the company 
must disclose the changes to the original board of director’s members and their 
possession in the company. Article 5 of Instructions No. 6 and Article 1 Instruction 
No. 8 in 2010 state that the report of board directors must include the names of the 
board of director and the names, positions of the high executive management 
persons, their own securities, relatives, membership in the board of other companies. 
Figure 2.3 presents the timeline of the laws between 2004 and 2010, detailing the 












Managerial Ownership Requirements Timeline. 
 
Two main elements determine the concentration of ownership in the involving 
companies are: (i) the number of the major shareholders; and (ii) the percentage 
owned by these shareholders of the total shares issued in the company. The Iraqi 
legislators also recognize these classifications. The Article 32 of the amended 
Companies Law states that the upper limits of the contribution to the capital of the 
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issued to the shareholder includes it. This implies that the ownership of shareholder 
in a private equity company is limited to 5% of its authorized capital. 
 
The rights of ownership as referred to in Paragraph (1) of Article (97) of the 
Companies Law indicate that each shareholder should have a number of votes 
equivalent to the number of shares he holds in the joint stock companies. Such rights 
of ownership are required to distribute the rights of control among the shareholders. 
In the event there is right for cash flow, such rights lead to a balanced treatment of 
the cash receipt rights and control rights in those companies.  
  
The Local Accounting Standard No. 6 of 1995, Instruction ISX No. 8 for 2010 
recommends the disclosure of the shareholders who own 5% or more of the 
company's capital and controls due diligence to customers for securities 2017.On the 
other hand, Article 5 of Instructions No. 6 states that the company must disclose 
about the names and nationalities of the participants whose contributions are more 
than 1% of the shares of the company and the number of their own shares. 
 
Furthermore, the Paragraph III, Section 10 of the ISX Law No. 74 of 2004 states 
that:“any person who is an ally shall be considered illegal if they obtain or attempt 
to obtain more than 30% of the shares of any joint-stock company, unless they 
identify themselves and disclose their holdings to the market and the Authority 
regarding the transactions”. Figure 2.4 present the timeline of all the laws and 
instructions between the periods 2004 to 2017 detailing the concentration ownership 
requirements to be complied with by all listed companies in Iraq. As it can be seen 
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Ownership Concentration Requirements Timeline. 
 
Despite the corporate governance models look similar, the models vary according to 
the corporate ownership and management control mechanism available in each 
country (Nilsson, 2007). In Iraq, families and state government plays a substantial 
role in firm ownership. A study on the ownership profile of listed companies in Iraq 
revealed that the families, close family relatives, or the government held most of the 
companies (OECD, 2009). As such, the corporate ownership and management 
control system can be referred to as an insider control system (Nilsson, 2007). The 
available statistics revealed that seven State-owned banks dominate the banking 
sector. The seven banks assets and credits account for the 86% and 69% of the total 
banking sector asset and credit respectively. Furthermore, three of the insurance 
companies are State-owned insurance companies in the insurance sector (ISX, 2016; 
Alsmmarraie, 2018). Table 2.2 shows that the private sector owns 86.4% of the 
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held firms, the individuals own 63%, family-owned companies own 11.1% and 
institutions own 12.3%. 
 
Table 2.2 
Statistic Showing Ownership Distribution of Firms Listed on ISX 
Industry  Percentage% 
Public 13.6 
Private firms Individual 63.0 
Family 11.1 
Institutions 12.3 
  100 
Source: Alsmmarraie, 2018 
 
2.4.5 External Audit Mechanism 
The Standardized Accounting System Regulation (1) issued in 1985 specifies the 
need for an external independent auditor to verify and report thereof on the true and 
fair state of its client financial statement. Subsequently, No 3 of the Practise of 
Monitoring and Auditing System issued in 1999 dwells on the professional 
competency of the external auditor, experience, qualification and the independence 
of the external auditors in effectively discharging their duties. Specifically, to 
preserve the independence of the external auditor, the law prohibits some services 
delivered by incumbent auditors and emphasises on the strict adherence to a code of 
professional conducted established by the council of professionals.  
 
Similarly, the audit No 3 of 1999 on the Basic Auditing Standards issued by 
Accounting and Auditing Standard Council of Iraq contains the description of the 
auditing standard that guides the conduct of auditors’ work to ensure the highest 




The articles of the “Practice of Monitoring and Auditing System No. 3 1999” as 
amended in 2011 comprise the auditing professionals. These auditing professionals 
are qualified to be members of the Board of the Audit and Auditing Profession. The 
level of the accepted qualifications, the years in the Office of Financial Supervision 
and the legal certificate are to be obtained for non-Iraqi auditing firms to practise the 
profession. The Practice of Monitoring and Auditing System No. 3 1999 amended in 
2013comprises the Articles 100, 101 and 102 which impose the penalty on the 
auditor in the event of a breach in the performance of his duties. The decisions of the 
Disciplinary Committee and their imposition for penalties on the violator are 
highlighted. 
 
 In addition to the provision of an external auditing requirement, Article 102 of the 
Iraqi Companies Law 2004 stipulates the right of shareholders to participate in the 
meetings of the general authority for the company. It discusses the financial reports 
and the auditor’s report. It also discusses all the other issues, such as the appointment 
of the auditor and determination of wage and approves the proportion of profits to be 
distributed to members on the meeting schedules.  
 
Instructions No. 8 issued in 2010 highlights the annual financial statements of the 
company for the current year as compared to the previous year and the auditor’s 
report in accordance with the audit evidence. Accounting Standard No. 6 issued in 
2012 guides the disclosure of information relating to the financial statement and the 
external auditors’ report.  On the other hand, the Audit Guide No. 7 issued in 
2016consists of two themes. The two themes are Quality control of Federal Board of 
Supreme Audit (FBSA) and Quality Control for Auditing Financial Statements. The 
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purpose of the FBSA is for individual audit office or audit firm to adopt a quality 
control system that provides reasonable assurance. In contrast, the purpose of the 
Quality Control for Auditing Financial Statements is to provide guidance on the 
quality control concerning the works of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs), auditing 
company and individual audit. Based on the above, Figure 2.5 describes the timeline 
of the various regulatory requirements issued by the Iraqi government from 1985 to 
2016. As summarized in Table 2.3, each law was issued to serve as a guideline for 
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External Audit Requirements 
Year Requirements 
Standardized Accounting System Regulation (1) 
for the year 1985 
The requirement stressed the importance of 
disclosure of information in the financial reports 
of companies.  
The Practice of Monitoring and Auditing System 
No. (3) issued in 1999 
This stressed the importance of the availability of 
scientific qualifications and professional 
experiences of auditors before they are allowed 
to exercise their duties in the subject companies 
to audit (as stated in Article 7 of this system 
text).  
 
Also the law dwells on the importance of the 
commitment of the auditors to the rules of 
professional conduct and standards regulators 
issued by accounting and auditing standards 
Council of Iraq. Likewise, the law discusses the 
prohibition of the provision of some services by 
auditor as stated in Article 12 of this system). 
 
It also emphasis adherence to controls established 
by the Council of the profession and the relevant 
type and size of business that they practice and 
the fees they receive to meet audit service. 
Audit No. 3 of 1999 Basic Auditing Standards This standard contains the description of the 
basic standards that the auditor must abide by to 
ensure the highest professional performance 
required and determine the professional 
responsibilities levels, and between the relevant 
associated general standards that emphasize that 
the observer qualify academically and 
professionally accounts to be able to perform 
professional duty in accordance with standards as 
it expected of him as well as should the 
independence of the auditor and avoid having 
benefit between him and the actors performed 
audited, and the audit procedures that should be. 
Iraqi Companies Law in 2004 
 
Article 102 of the law stipulates the right of 
shareholders to participate in the meetings of the 
general authority for the company and discuss the 
financial reports and the auditor's report and all 
the other issues on the meeting schedules, such as 
the appointment of the auditor and determine 
wages and approve the proportion of profits to be 
distributed to members. 
Instructions No. 8 (Disclosure of Listed 
Companies in the ISX) 2010 
 
The article contained in this instruction highlights 
the annual financial statements of the company 
for the current year as compared to the previous 
year and the report of the auditor in accordance 
with the audit evidence. However, the in case of 
violation, the data is rejected and the accounts are 






Table 2.3 (Continued) 
Year Requirements 
The Practice of Monitoring and Auditing System 
No. 3 Amended in 2011 
 
The Article 2, Article 8 and article 12 comprise 
the auditing profession, those who are qualified 
to be members of the Board of the Audit and 
Auditing Profession, the level of the accepted 
qualifications, the years in the Office of Financial 
Supervision, the legal certificate to be obtained 
for non-Iraqi auditing firms to practise the 
profession respectively. However, the auditor 
shall not combine the work of organizing the 
accounts and monitoring such accounts.  
Accounting Standard No. 6 issued in 2012 
 
Guides the disclosure of information relating to 
the financial statements and accounting policies) 
as well as disclosure of the external auditor's 
report. 
 
The Practice of Monitoring and Auditing System 
No. 3 Amended in 2013 
 
This comprises the Articles 100, 101 and 102 on 
the penalty imposed on the auditor in the event of 
a breach in the performance of his duties. The 
provisions of the system include: The offense in 
which information is provided; invitation of the 
Chairman by the Disciplinary Committee; 
disciplinary punishment in the case of its failure 
to attend without a legitimate excuse; the record 
of the Disciplinary Committee; and the State, 
Socialist, Mixed, Cooperative and Private sectors 
shall be a reference point of contact. The 
decisions of the Disciplinary Committee and their 
imposition for penalties on the violator are 
highlighted through a written letter.  
 
Audit Guide, No. 7 Quality Control issued in 
2016 
 
This consists of two themes: Quality control of 
Federal Board of Supreme Audit (FBSA) and 
Quality Control for Auditing Financial 
Statements. The aim of the first theme FBSA is 
for individual audit office or audit firm is to 
adopt a quality control system that provides 
reasonable assurance in terms of individual audit 
office, audit firm and their employees, as well as 
applicable legal and regulatory requirements. The 
scope surrounds FBSA's responsibilities, 
individual audit office and audit firms. The 
second theme which is the aim of the Quality 
Control for Auditing Financial Statements is to 
provide guidance on the quality control 
concerning the works of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (SAIs), auditing company and 
individual audit. This guide aims to apply the 
quality control procedures in the audit 
engagement that an auditor performs in order to 




2.5 Firm Performance and Performance Measures 
Literaturehas offered different definitions of firm performance (Barney, 2002). In the 
literature, firm performance refers to a firm value. Previous research (for example, 
Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006, Klapper & Love, 2004) indicated that the effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms influences the firm value. In this regard, corporate 
finance studies adopt four approaches of firm valuation (Qureshi, 2007). The first 
approach involves the use of investment level and cash flows, followed by analysis 
on the effect sources of finance on the value of firms. The second approach examines 
the change impact of capital structures on how debt, firm’s value and equity 
composition of firm capital structure responds to various factors. The third method 
adopts the resource approach to establish firm value. The last approach refers to the 
sustainable growth method that considers the firm performance to the operation, the 
requirement to finance, sources, investment and the policies of dividends, leading to 
sustainable development of the value maximization and resources of the firm. Apart 
from the above factors that enhance the value of the firm, the corporate takeovers 
and managers for the market reduce the information asymmetry which reduces the 
capital cost and hence improve firm value (Hamad, 2013; Jazrawi & Khidair, 2014).   
 
Firm value is the current value of the cash flow in relation to the expected future 
discount at a return risk of adjusted rate (Kothari, 2001). The value of shares changes 
in response to the accounting and capital information (Hamad, 2013). Capital market 
performance depends on the confidence of the investors in the market. Such 
confidence stimulates economic growth and leads to financial stability in an 
economy. When the investors have confidence in the firm, its share price increases 
(Rezaee, 2009). Share price is a measure of firm value that translates into firm 
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performance (Khudair, 2012). From the stakeholder perspective, Allen, Carletti, and 
Marquez (2007) regarded the values of the shareholders as the only firm concern. 
Therefore, there is a universal acceptability regarding the significance of more 
experienced stakeholder caucus. Proper measures of firm performance should be 
used to evaluate the firm performance. The appropriateness of performance measures 
can be assessed from its relevancy, measurability and importance to the organization 
performance. Nevertheless, the cost used in obtaining the information should not be 
more than the value of the information (Mashhadani & Fatlawi, 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, there are different arguments regarding the appropriateness of each 
measure. Nevertheless, no consensus on the superiority of one measure over other 
measures. In general, firm performance measures as seen in Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003) can be categorized into (1) Market-based; and (2) accounting-based. The 
prominent measures used under the accounting-based measures are Return on Equity 
(ROE), Return on Asset (ROA) and Earning per Shares (EPS) (Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003; Baysinger & Butler, 1985). The market-based measures comprise book value, 
market value and Tobin’s Q (Barnhart, Marr, & Rosenstein, 1994).  
 
The accounting-based measures are susceptible to management manipulation with 
respect to the choice of accounting methods and accrual the interpretation of these 
measures vary across industries. Accounting measures are backwards looking as 
such measures focuses on the past success of the company and the figures and thus 
the computation of the figures are historical. As a result, such measures leave behind 
the time value of money, investment requirement and risk (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). 
On the other hand, the market-based measures mainly focus on the value of the 
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company, which is affected by factors that are not within the control of the 
management of the firm. Market-based measures are forward-looking and not 
affected by risk adjustment performance. Furthermore, market-based measures do 
not react to variation in industry characteristics and country characteristic.  
 
The existing studies have used various measures of firm performance to examine 
how corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects firm performance (Orlitzky, 
Schmidt & Rynes, 2003).There is a significant association between CSR and firm 
performance based on the evidence of ninety-five studies conducted since 1972 
(Margolis & Walsh, 2001). CSR studies mostly use the market definition of firm 
performance instead of the accounting-based measure. This is due to the reason that 
the social responsibility studies can positively or negatively affect the firm value. In 
another study, there is a positive association between performances in accounting-
based measure and CEO duality (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Despite the type of 
performance measures, Daily and Dalton (1998) reported the non-existence of a 
systematic relationship between firm performance and board composition. The 
studies on performance measures and corporate governance are well established. 
Nevertheless, there are still conflicts with respect to the most appropriate measure 
and there is no agreement with respect to the reliability of one measure over another 
measure to assess firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998).   
 
Identifying and understanding the different approaches to measure performance and 
choosing the appropriate measure to answer the research question is important due to 
the existing conflict on what performance measure to use and employ (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). Some examples of the firm performance that are commonly used in 
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literature include value ratio, net present value, market to book value and earnings 
per share. The next section discusses these performance measures. Nevertheless, the 
discussion only focuses on the performance measures fit for the purpose of the 
present study i.e. accounting-based measure and market-based measure. 
 
2.5.1 Market-based Measures 
The market-based measures are considered to be the best indicators of organizational 
performance (Copeland, Koller, & Murrin, 2000; Robinson, 1995). Market-based 
measures reflect the action taken quickly by management and changes in the 
economic value. In contrary, the accounting based-measures encapsulate historical 
performance if the firm is in an efficient market. The market-based measures also 
consider all relevant information i.e. both financial and non-financial (Lubatkin & 
Shrieves, 1986). These measures include the value created by the execution on 
existing opportunities and the risk-adjusted expected value of future opportunities 
that have yet to be realized (Subrahmaniyam, 2009). 
 
Carton and Hofer, (2006) claimed that the issues connected with the use of 
accounting-based measures have no influence on market-based measures. Thus, 
market-based measures are not subject to management manipulation in a well-
regulated market like the accounting-based measures. The market-based measures, 
include market to book ratio (MTB), market value added (MVA) and Tobin’s Q, are 
commonly used in corporate governance studies (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Del 
Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Lassoued & Attia, 2013; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; 




The market-based measures have been criticized for different reasons. One of the 
main reasons is that the true value of the firm may not be reflected by the stock 
market prices accurately, especially in developing countries where the capital 
markets are inefficient and not well developed (Joh, 2003; Lindenberg & Ross, 
1981). Bacidore, Boquist, Milbourn and Thakor (1997) stated that market-based 
measures “may not be an efficient contracting parameter because it is driven by 
many factors beyond the control of the firm’s executives ”.Kapopoulos and 
Lazaretou (2007) also criticized market-based measures for being unreliable, 
especially in developing countries with weak legal protection for minority 
shareholders. Claessens and Djankov (1999) stated that these factors include the 
expectations of the investors about future events, signalling, noise trading, group 
mistakes and behaviour. Therefore, the use of stock market performance can lead to 
downward bias in the relationship between ownership and valuation of the firm in a 
country where the minority protection is weak.  
 
2.5.1.2 Tobin’s Q 
Jams Tobin introduced Tobin’s Q ratio to evaluate future investments of the firm 
(Ammann, Oesch & Schmid, 2013). Tobin, (1969) said it is the ratio of the market 
value of the firm to the replacement cost of its assets. Tobin’s Q is considered a good 
indicator of a firm performance and value and it is associated with the quality of 
investment opportunities. It is also an indicator for the ability of management to 
exploit growth opportunities. Thus, from the perspective of the investors, Tobin's Q 
is used as a measurement for firm value. It examines the extent that a manager is 
successfully utilizing the assets of the firms to maximize the wealth of the 
shareholders. Tobin’s Q is a better measure of a firm’s economic performance than 
57 
 
accounting measures as argued by Landsman and Shapiro (1995). Tobin’s Q is 
widely used in the corporate governance literature as a measure of firm value 
(Aluchna, & Kaminski, 2017; Amran, 2012; Coles et al., 2008; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Nguyen, Evans, & Lu, 2017; Omran et al., 2008; Upadhyay et al., 
2014).  
 
A variety of situations in the financial literature used Tobin’s Q ratio to investigate 
different financial decisions and phenomena. Many types of researchlike Jose, 
Nichols, and Stevens (1986) and Malkiel, von Furstenberg, and Watson (1979) are 
related to investment and diversifications which have used the ratio to explain the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm value (McConnell & Servaes, 
1990; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). Recently, Tobin’s Q is used to explain 
cross-sectional returns implying that it is also a proxy for risk. Berger and Ofek 
(1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994) applied the Tobin’s Q ratio to examine the 
relationship between diversification and firm performance. Furthermore, Cho (1998) 
examined the effect of ownership structure on firm value by controlling for the 
endogeneity of ownership structure and using the q ratio. The study discovered that 
firm value determines the ownership structure and not vice-versa as claimed by 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). In another vein, Servaes (1991) and Lang, Stulz 
and Walkling (1989) used the Q ratio to examine the relationship between returns 
relating to the stockholders of bidders and targets and the market valuation. 
Similarly, Tobin’s Q is used as a measure of firm performance to estimate the 
relative importance of industry, focus and share effects by Wernerfelt and 




Additionally, Salinger (1984) used the Tobin’s Q ratio to examine the relationship 
between market structure and profitability to measure monopoly power. Lustgarten 
and Thomadakis (1987) discovered that the structural features of a firm’s 
relationship depend on market conditions by relating Tobin’s Q to the structural 
features of the firms. A result showed that there is a significant positive relation 
between Tobin’s Q ratio and the magnitude of stock market reaction to capital 
investment announcements (Blose & Shieh, 1997). The Tobin’s Q ratio was also 
used to test for the cash flow signalling and free cash flow or overinvestment 
explanations of the impact of dividend announcements on stock prices (Lang & 
Litzenberger, 1989). As the use of Tobin’s Q is not limited to financial literature, a 
study published by Bhardwaj, Bhardwaj, and Konsynski (1999) in management 
science used Tobin’s Q to evaluate the association between IT investments and firm 
Tobin's Q values after controlling a variety of industry factors and firm-specific 
variables. Apart from that, there are other papers in the financial literature that used 
Q ratio as a control variable in empirical analyses. Kim and Lyn (1986) explained 
the positive relationship between the excess market value of multinational 
corporations and the degree of international involvement with the use of Tobin’s Q 
measured by foreign sales percentage.  
 
The Tobin's Q ratio may be considered an important variable due to its widespread in 
empirical finance. Many papers intended the Tobin’s Q ratio to be measured by 
using methodologies ranging from complex to relatively straightforward. Some 
complex methodologies require data from a variety of sources, some of which may 
be missing for many firms Chung and Pruitt (1994).Lewellen and Badrinath, (1997); 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) applied a less complex formula for calculating the 
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Tobin’s Q ratio. The study discovered that approximate q correlates well with the 
more theoretically Tobin’s Q ratio obtained by using the Landenberg and Ross 
method. Megna and Klock (1993) presented results for the semiconductor industry 
and a refinement of approaches to measurement of the Tobin’s Q ratio. 
 
Tobin’s Q reveals the financial power of a company (Bhagat & Jefferis, 2002). 
Accordingly, high Q value indicates the efficiency of governance mechanisms that 
will later enhance the firm value. Furthermore, Weir, Laing and McKnight (2002) 
noted that high Q value indicates an alignment in shareholders-managers interest 
while lower value shows high managerial discretion. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
documented that board with a high number of a non-executive director is connected 
to the performance of the firm negatively. Nevertheless, both Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and Weir et al. (2002) discovered the relationship between the ratio 
of non-executive director and firm performance to be insignificant.  
 
Tobin’s Q suffers from numerous limitations like other performance measures. As 
noted by Pham, Suchard and Zein (2007), the result of Tobin’s Q is conditioned on 
the accounting treatment of balance sheet items. The changes in firm valuation might 
not necessarily due to the managerial decision, it could be affected by exogenous 
factors, such as the prevailing economic and industry condition. Thus, judgment 
from Tobin’s Q estimation could be erroneous. In essence, Tobin’s Q is affected by 
investors’ confidence in the market (Khanna & Palepu, 1999). Overall, using market 
measures according to (Omran et al., 2008) on the stock price assumption, to 
examine firm performance based on the indication of the exact firm value is 
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misleading as the capital market might suffer from liquidity problem and inadequate 
disclosure.  
 
2.5.2 Accounting-based Measures 
Accounting-based measures are indicators that capture historical performances. 
These measures use the information presented in this financial statements, such as 
profit and loss account, the cash flow and balance sheet. The accounting-based 
measures comprise ROE, EPS, ROA and ROS or profit margin. Many studies that 
examined the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
applied these measures (Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad, 2012; Arosa et al., 2010; Yang & 
Zhao , 2013; Dharmadasa, Gamage & Herath, 2014; Rodriguez-Fernandez, 
Fernandez-Alonso & Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2014; Mugobo, Mutize, & Aspeling, 
2016 ; Zabri, Nawafly & Alarussi, 2016; Aluchna, & Kaminski, 2017; Nguyen, 
Evans, & Lu, 2017). According to Sloan (2001), financial accounting contributes to a 
positive role in minimizing agency problems as it gives the shareholders an 
independently verified source of information about the performance of the managers. 
Thus, corporate governance and financial accounting are highly connected.  
 
Kihn (2005) summarized the major strengths of employing accounting-based 
measures in assessing firm performance. These strengths include appropriateness at 
both the macro and micro levels of analysis, relatively high criterion stability, the 
possibility of using single or multiple criteria, precise measurement and high 
generalizability of criteria and results (Kihn, 2005). Nevertheless, there are some 
shortcomings of relying on accounting-based measures. According to Chakravarthy 
(1986), accounting-based measures are criticized as they are affected by unsound and 
61 
 
unfair practices, such as manipulation of accounting information and fraud. Schilit 
(2010) also identified a few methods which corporate management can manipulate 
the financial statements of a firm, such as inventory valuation, methods of 
consolidating accounts, depreciation policies, treatment of certain revenue and 
expenditure items. Theaccounting-based measures do not comprise intangible assets 
as these assets can make up an important part of the market value of a firm, 
especially in knowledge-intensive firms (Webb & Schelemmer, 2008).  
 
2.5.2.1 Return on Assets (ROA) 
ROA is used to measure the profitability of a firm in relative to its assets. According 
to Dehning and Stratopoulos (2003), ROA relates to a number of financial 
performance measures as it focuses on firm performance as a whole and thus it is 
considered as the best overall measure of firm financial performance. Additionally, 
Mangena et al. (2012) argue that ROA is the most powerful operating financial 
measure and dominates the accounting-based measures as it possesses distributional 
properties. The equity of a firm can be negative or zero while a total assets of a firm 
are strictly positive. Firm performance is assessed by this measure in many studies 
(Aluchna, & Kaminski, 2017; Bagherpour, Velashani, & Omidfar, 2017; Chemweno, 
2016; Mugobo, Mutize, & Aspeling, 2016; Nawafly & Alarussi, 2016). 
 
ROA is one of the account-based measures used in the literatures of corporate 
governance (Weir & Laing, 2001). ROA assess how efficient the assets were 
employed (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan, 2004). The measure informs the investors the 
profit made from capital assets employed during the financial year end (Epps & 
Cereola, 2008). The efficient use of firm asset is represented by the rate of ROA. 
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Therefore, it does indicate the short term performance firm efficiency which is 
arrived at by dividing total income by the assets in total (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 
1994). The good side of it is that, ROA permits accounting information users to 
make an informed judgment about the efficiency in the operation of the corporate 
governance system by manager. Because, the managers are in charge of the daily 
operation of the system and how firm assets are put to use for income generating 
purpose (Epps & Cereola, 2008). ROA is calculated as follows:  
 
ROAit = Net incomeit / TAit 
 
Where:  
ROAit is the return on assets of firm i in year t, 
Net incomeit is the net income of firm i in year t, and  
TAit is the total assets of firm i in year t 
 
2.5.2.2 Return on Equity (ROE) 
In many studies, ROE is used as a proxy for firm financial performance (Dickie, 
2006). ROE explained the level of management success in applying the firm’s equity 
to meet the goals of the firm and maximizing the wealth of shareholders Gadoiu 
(2014).Therefore, ROE is considered highly effective to measure the efficiency of a 
firm’s management in utilizing shareholders’ equity. (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; 
Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008; Wahla et al., 2012) stated that the efficiency of ROE 
refers to the ability of the management to remunerate shareholders by the payment of 




ROE provides information on profits that are generated by using the income received 
from shareholders. ROE can be calculated by dividing net income by total assets 
(Brealey, Myers, Allen, & Mohanty, 2012; Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, & Hanson, 
2002). ROE has received some criticisms like other measures. ROE is criticized as it 
ignores the impact of the debt amount and considers the shareholders’ equity (Poza 
& Daugherty, 2013). Therefore, according to the ROE ratio, a firm can have an 
excessive amount of debt and still appears to be in a good financial position. A firm 
very close to bankruptcy can still have high ROE due to a high level of debts. Thus, 
ROE is measured as follows: 
 
ROEit = Net incomeit / Total Equityit 
 
Where: ROE it is the return on equity of firm i in year t, 
Net incomeit is the net income of firm i in year t, and  
TEit is the total equity of firm i in year t 
 
2.6 Performance Measurement Used in this Study 
A number of factors are considered to select the appropriate measures of 
performance in order to examine relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. The past literature revealed inconsistencies on optimal 
measurement to assess firm performance. Different measures have been used to 
examine firm performance in form of market-based measures and accounting-based 
measures. Nevertheless, each measure has its own weakness and strength. Thus, 




2.7 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter discusses the political and economy development in Iraq and existing 
laws and regulations for the State of ISX and explains how the organization of the 
economic sector achieves through the capabilities, means and regulations of ISX. 
These regulations contribute to the organization and development of Iraqi 
companies, economic institutions and the establishment of the ISX. The chapter 
enumerates the legal dimension of ISX and ISX responsibilities. This chapter also 
discusses ISX objectives and ISX controlequally. Another section of this study 
discusses the practices of corporate governance in Iraq include the board of directors, 
internal audit, ownership structure, and external audit quality related to Iraqi 







This chapter reviews the underlying corporate governance policies and firm 
performance related to the research subject. This chapter discusses the association 
between performance and corporate governance mechanisms. Furthermore, this 
chapter also provides theoretical foundation used in investigating the association 
between the variables of interest in the firm performance model. Specifically, this 
chapter reviews the past studies on corporate governance. It also reviews the past 
studies regarding the extent by which association is established between firm 
performance and corporate governance with respect to the board of director 
characteristics, internal audit, ownership structure and external audit quality that 
affect the performance of firms in Iraq. 
 
The chapter also discusses firm performance and corporate governance mechanism 
used in this present study. Moreover, this study discusses all relevant theories that 
explain corporate governance and firm performance. The last section provides a 
summary of the whole study. 
 
3.2 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
Corporate governance refers to a system where organizations are coordinated and 
managed. It dictates the duties and responsibilities of the board with respect to 
monitoring and the board duties to shareholders and other stakeholders (Pass, 2004). 
Besides, it is also viewed as an orderly procedure, which the shareholders affect the 
management to act at their greatest advantage. This leads to a level of investor 
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certainty which is critical for the proficient performance of the capital market 
(Rezaee, 2009). There is the inclusion of procedures that connect the agent and 
structures in governance, including control of management system, responsibility 
and in additional guidelines, directions, and regulated laws, standards and systems 
(Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2004). Hence, firm governance goes beyond the 
protection of the shareholders (Shammari, 2012).  
 
Similarly, corporate governance can be seen as an array of procedures design to 
ensure that capital providers get a reasonable return on invested capital. The 
corporate governance brings development prospect to the economy apart from 
ensuring a reasonable return on investment. The sound governance practice enhances 
the investors’ confidence by reducing their financial risk, which entices foreign 
direct investment (Spanos, 2005). In Iraq, sound corporate governance makes an 
organization to be more responsible in delivering high-quality financial information 
that promotes transparency at the capital market (Taan & Salman, 2015).   
 
Nevertheless, there is a lack of a generally acceptable governance practice that is 
applicable throughout the world. The inherent business practices, law and the 
prevailing economic and political factors shape corporate governance practice. At 
any rate, the board structure is generally consented to be an important governance 
tool (Cadbury committee, 1992).    
 
Effective corporate governance is expected to yield effective corporate governance 
by ensuring better decision making and disallowing leading shareholder’s 
expropriation. The value of the firm must give an instantaneous response to news 
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showing better corporate governance to obtain such achievement. Nevertheless, there 
are few quantitative pieces of evidence in consonance with the existence of a 
relationship between firm performance and corporate governance quality (Imam, 
2006).  
 
The good governance can be achieved when the controlling shareholders and 
managers expropriate the corporate resources and contribute to better resources 
allocation and performance. Better firm performance is also attributed to the lenders 
and investors that are ready to invest in a firm with low cost of capitals and good 
governance. Stakeholders, such as suppliers or employees, want to be connected to 
those firms as the business intercourse in that regards are likely to last longer, fairer 
and more prosperous than those firms are with less effective governance.  
 
Previous studies have discovered that corporate governance mechanisms affect firm 
performance (for example, Bennedsen et al., 2007; Henderson et al., 2006; Hermalin 
& Wiesbach, 1991; Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad, 2012; Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008; 
Cheng, 2008; Coles et al., 2008; O’Connell & Cramer, 2009; Arosa et al., 2010; 
Kumar & Singh, 2013; Ballinger & Marcel, 2010; Yang & Zhao , 2013; 
Jayachandran et al., 2013; Ammari, Kadria & Ellouze, 2014; Garba & Abubakar, 
2014; Dharmadasa, Gamage & Herath, 2014; Rodriguez-Fernandez, Fernandez-
Alonso & Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2014; Azar, Rad & Botyar, 2014; Al-Sahafi, 
Rodrigs & Barnes, 2015; Chemweno, 2016; Mugobo, Mutize, & Aspeling, 2016 ; 
Zabri, Ahmad & Wah, 2016; Nawafly & Alarussi, 2016; Moradi, Bagherpour 
Velashani, & Omidfar, 2017; Aluchna, & Kaminski, 2017; Nguyen, Evans, & Lu, 
2017). Moreover, there are conflicting empirical findings regarding the relationship 
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between firm performance and corporate governance. While some researches 
produce positive findings, some presented a negative relationship and others reported 
an insignificant relationship. Nevertheless, the distinction may be inferable from the 
type of information, a nation’s institutional structure and diverse time lead to diverse 
performance measures (Campbell & Minguez, 2008). The next section examines the 
influence of the board structure and composition, audit committee structure and 
organization, internal audit, ownership structure and external audit on the firm 
performance. All these are joint into corporate governance issues in Iraq. This study 
should consider the significance in affecting the firm performance, ownership 
structure, characteristics of the board of director and audit committee, internal audit, 
and external audit.  
 
3.2.1 Board Structure 
One of the decisive parts of the corporate governance structure is the board of 
director with its efficiency to promote the operation and performance of the 
company. Globalization, market turbulence and internet technology provide 
challenges for the board and companies. The board addresses the needs and requests 
channelled to its members by offering solutions to the challenges. The challenges are 
often overcome by careful management of the infrastructure, resources and skilful 
members (Aluchna, 2010).  
 
The boards are bound to protect the stakeholder’s rights by monitoring the 
performance of the management, thereby reducing the agency cost. By virtue of their 
responsibility, the board of director can appoint, dismiss and reward management 
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(Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2008). Boards are organized in various examples to 
address the issues of the companies.  
 
The fundamental role of the boards of directors is to control the management of the 
firm and minimize the potential challenges in the principal-agent relationship. In this 
regards, the principals are the owners and the agents are the managers by which the 
boards of directors monitor the whole mechanism. When there is a misalignment in 
the interests of the principals and agents i.e. when the problem of agency comes in, 
the principal assigns agents and members of the board of directors to ensure that the 
firm is functioning in the owner’s interests. The need to oversee agency and the 
divergence of interests has caused the firm to incur agency costs with the inclusion 
of bonding costs and monitoring of the residual losses (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 
Apparently, the cost is incurred on the principal. Thus, the agency cost reduction is 
one of the duties that increase the shareholders’ value. Coordination of the 
managementof the agents on behalf of the shareholders who appointed the members 
is the primary objective of the board of directors. The greater the power and control 
the boards exercise over the managers, the lesser the opportunities the agents or 
managers have to conduct activities not favouring the optimization of the 
shareholder’s values (Liu & Fong, 2010).The principals’ interests are protected, 
essentially through monitoring mechanism by the board of directors (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Generally, a part of an effective governance mechanism is an 
independent board as an independence from the management could support the 
board’s capacity to exhibit its duties of monitoring the former on behalf of the 
principal (Liu & Fong, 2010).  
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Furthermore, the director’s board has the authority to compensate, dismiss or engage 
the high-ranked managers to monitor or approve important decisions and confirm the 
pursuit of executive director towards the principal’s interests (Baranchuk & Dybvig, 
2009; Booth et al., 2002; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Gillan, 2006; Yermack, 1996). 
Similarly, the board of director is a vital tool to evaluate the decision of the manager. 
The agency theory states that the most efficient device in attaining the corporate 
governance of people interest is the duty of the board of directors. In addition, it is an 
institution primarily created to reduce the problem of agency (Fama, 1980). The 
theory of resource dependency considers the board of directors as a co-optative 
practice with the role of developing the company with demands from the external 
environment (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). In contracting accords or 
agreements with the agent for a more important role in firm performance, the agency 
theory relies more on a basic understanding of the human nature.  
 
The responsibilities of the directors are categorized into (i) resource, (ii) services and 
(iii) control dependence. The controlling role of the directors is to sack and hire the 
CEO or manager. This is to ensure that the managers are discharging their duty in the 
best interests of the shareholders (Monks & Minow, 1995). Johnson, Daily, and 
Ellstrand (1996) stated that the directors’ service duty consists of advising and 
counselling the top managers and CEO in relation to any conceptualizing the 
strategies, administrative issues and managerial challenges of the company. The 
directors are expected to discharge their duties by counselling or representative from 
another institution in order to achieve better performance of the company (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). The theory of resource dependency states that the board is a 
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fundamental assistance to the company. The external linkages are sorted for more 
resources to optimize the growth of the company.  
 
The study stated that the main disagreements in the boardroom are between the 
CEOs and the directors as the directors have remuneration to coordinate the board 
for the purpose of increasing the interest and benefits and maintaining their 
positions. Most of the board members are supposed to act as mediators (and be 
NEDs) and independent during the disagreement among the executives. The board 
members should seek alternatives for the internal managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
 
Thus, this will serve as a panacea and end the disagreements between the CEO and 
the board. There is a motivation for the internal director to control the CEO’s 
behaviour when the boards of the directors are independent (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1988). Therefore, the preservation of the directors’ independence is important to 
sustain the role of control by replacing under-performing managers and CEOs.  
 
The concept above suggested that the ultimate boardroom consists of the NEDs to 
monitor the management of the executives in the daily activities of the company. 
Thus, making the board of director effective as an internal monitoring control 
mechanism becomes an important issue regarding the board.  
 
To affirm the importance of the issue, the Iraqi Companies Law No. 21/ 2004 
requires the size of the board to be between five and nine members with vast skills 
and experience. The CEO duality is not allowed and two to three members of the 
board should be NEDs. Apart from that, there should be at least a meeting between 
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the board of directors once every two months. Thus, the roles of the CEO and the 
chairperson must be distinctively separated from each other. The percentage of the 
NEDs, the CEO duality, the board meeting and the board size were selected as the 
dimensions of board structure for this study due to the specifications of Iraqi laws.   
 
An effective board can assist in facilitating the commitment of the board members. It 
also monitors the management successfully to reduce the managerial activities that 
are not in accordance with shareholder interests. As a result, the board decisions 
affect the firm performance and value ultimately. The managers act in the best 
interest of the stakeholders with better monitoring of management. This implies that 
the profits from the operations will increase with conflict reduction between 
shredders and managers and the value of shares. The following sections discuss 
different corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. board size, CEO duality, non-
executive directors and board meeting) and firm performance to maximise the return 
on their investment, which is the major concern of the shareholders.  
 
3.2.1.1 Board Size 
The board of directors is one of the primary internal corporate mechanisms 
(Brennan, 2006). A well-established board is groomed with a handy number of 
directors who can effectively drive the value enhancement for shareholders and 
monitor the management. Therefore, the board size is a key factor that affects the 
firm performance (Kumar & Singh, 2013). The board of directors is considered as a 
major decision-making body within the companies and plays a central role as an 
internal mechanism on behalf of shareholders. It is difficult to have unambiguous 
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answers related to the optimum number of directors on the board due to the 
complexity of role played by the board. 
 
Despite the codes of corporate governance do not specify the minimum or the 
maximum number of directors, the codes recommend that the size should 
commensurate with the nature of a company’s operation and should be manageable. 
Brown and Caylor (2004) stated that the ideal size of the board should be around six 
to fifteen subject to the size of the firm and extent of diversification. Some argued 
that the board of directors should have a maximum number of eight to nine directors 
(Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). The previous studies examined the issue of 
what should be the ideal board size as it has consequences on the monitoring and 
advisory role of the board. There are conflicting theoretical arguments, which may 
lead to differences in empirical findings (Adams & Mehran, 2005). 
 
From a theoretical perspective, particularly in the agency theory, it is a bad idea to 
have larger boards, whereas smaller boards are considered good and effective at 
improving financial performance (Lipton & Lorch, 1992). The board size has 
implications relating to financial costs on the organization, direction and control of 
the organization’s business. Thus, larger boards consume more pecuniary and non-
pecuniary company resources in the form of remuneration and perquisites than 
smaller boards.  When a board is bigger in size, it becomes difficult to coordinate 
and comparatively easier to control by a dominant CEO due to associated director 




In other words, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) stated that corporate board size must 
preferably fall between eight and nine directors. The study argued that there are 
additional costs of having larger boards. Such costs are typically associated with 
slow decision-making when the corporate board size goes beyond a maximum 
number of ten directors. These are higher than any marginal gains from intense 
monitoring of management’s activities. On the other hand, the small board allows all 
directors to candidly express and contribute to opinions and ideas within a limited 
time available (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Thus, there is more cohesion in smaller 
boards with more effective discussions. Furthermore, the smaller boards suffer from 
far fewer agency problems than the large board, which is higher than smaller boards. 
Thus, the limitation of corporate board size may improve its efficiency. 
 
From the contrary views of agency and resource dependence, the larger board may 
possibly be preferred for a better corporate financial performance (John & Senbet, 
1998; Yawson, 2006). There is a diversity of skills, business contacts, and 
experience in larger boards than the smaller boards, which provide greater 
opportunity to secure critical resources (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004; Booth & 
Deli, 1996; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Klein, 1998; Pfeffer, 1972; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004), Booth and Deli (1996) and Klein (1998) 
established the relationship between board size and association of debt ratio. The 
study discovered that a firm with large boards records low debt expenses. This 





In the same vein, uncertainties are reduced and securing critical resources, such as 
finance, raw materials, and contracts, are facilitated with larger boards that offer 
greater access to their firm’s external environment (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Goodstein 
et al., 1994). In addition, Yaw son (2006) stated that larger boards enhance 
knowledge to know which of the business advice can be sought, which increases 
managerial ability to make important and better business decisions. A larger number 
of people with varied expertise are more capable to make managerial decisions for 
greater scrutiny and monitoring (John & Senbet, 1998). As a result, the monitoring 
capacity of the corporate board is demonstrated to be positively connected to the 
board size (Klier & Nicholson, 2003). This also checks and balances the power of 
dominant CEO. 
 
Empirically, the evidence regarding the association between board size and firm 
financial performance is conflicting (Yermack, 1996; Adams & Mehran, 2005; 
Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009). Authors in support of small board 
opined that large boards negatively affect the firm value due to the increased agency 
cost. Yermack viewed that small boards (1996) perform better when they come to 
leadership task as the board members have little agency cost. Large board creates a 
free-rider problem as some directors add little to board supervisory activities 
(Ihemeje et al., 2015). From a list of 348 firms in Australia, Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003) discovered that board size significantly (positive) affects firm performance. 





Latif et al. (2013) examined the effect of board size as corporate governance 
mechanism on firm performance from 2005 to 2010 in Pakistan. The study 
discovered a positive significant relationship between board size and firm 
performance. Dwivedi and Jain (2005) also discovered a positive but weak 
significant relationship between board size and firm performance among the 340 
listed companies in India. 
 
Furthermore, Nawafly and Alarussi (2016), Nor, Shafee and Samsuddin (2014) and 
Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) discovered a positive relationship between board size 
and firm performance in non-financial listed companies of Malaysian and Ghanaian 
firms respectively. Gull, Saeed and Abid (2013) investigated the relationship 
between board size and firm performance measure in ROA and ROE by using 160 
Pakistani firms from 2007 to 2011. The study recorded a positive relationship 
between the two constructs. Many other studies also recorded a positive relationship 
between board size and firm performance (Alsayanai, 2017; Isa, 2017). In the case of 
Sharma and Sharma (2016), the relationship is positive with Tobin's Q, negative with 
ROA but not significant with ROE, net profit margin, and stock returns. On the other 
hand, Yermack, (1996) estimated the market value by using Tobin’s Q when he 
studied 452 sample of US firms. He reported that a negative relationship between the 
value of the firm and board size. Furthermore, Yermack (1996) discovered that lost 
in firm values is at a progressing rate when the board size increases from 6 to 12 
members. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) reported that board size and firm value is 
negatively related based on a comparative study of the Kuala Lumpur stock 
exchange (KLSE) and Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX). Their finding is consistent 
with that of Healey (2003) that argued that large board are not effective in decision-
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making. In Pakistan, Yasser, Entebang, and Mansor (2011) showed that board size 
improves performance based on the small sample of registered companies between 
the periods 2008 to 2009.  
 
In another comparative study between Singapore and Malaysia conducted by Mak 
and Yuanto (2003), a firm with five board members experience high firm value. On 
the other hand, by using Nigerian data, Uwuigbe and Fakile (2012) noted that small 
board improves firm performance by increasing the reported profit. The studies of 
Mak and Yuanto (2003), Makhlouf, Ali, and Ramli (2017), Uwuigbe and Olusanmi 
(2012), Upadhyay, Bhargava and Faircloth (2014) and Dharmadasa, Gamage and 
Herath (2014) discovered other studies with negative significances between board 
size and firm performance. The study conducted by Zabri, Ahmad and Wah (2016) 
discovered that the relationship isnegative with ROA and insignificant with ROEby 
using top 100 public listed companies in Bursa Malaysia from 2008 to 2012.  
 
In another vein, Beiner et al. (2004) conducted an investigation by using a sample of 
listed firms in the Swiss stock exchange and discovered an insignificant relation 
between the two variables. They attribute the findings to the fact that the size of the 
board is often guided in Swiss by what is considered ideal for each individual firm. 
The findings of Manas and Saeayanan (2006); Lopes, Ferraz, and Martins (2016); 
Chemweno (2016); Aljifri and Moustafa (2007); Kajola (2008) pointed to the fact 
that there is no significant effect between board size and firm performance.  
 
Therefore, board size is an important component of corporate governance, which 
needs to be re-examined to ensure its effect on firm performance in Iraq. Despite 
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there is no code for corporate governance in Iraq, a further study on the board size 
can resolve the problem of inconsistency in the effective number of the companies 
and banks. Table 3.1 summarizes the results of empirical studies concerning the 
relationship between board size and firm performance. 
 
Table 3.1 
Summary of Empirical Findings on the Relationship between Board Size and Firm 
Performance 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Sharma and Sharma 
(2016)  
20 firms of the Indian 
manufacturing sector for 
the period 2001-2010. 
ROA, ROE, 











Latif et al. 
(2013) 
12 listed firms from 2005 
to 2010 in Pakistan 
ROA Positive 
Nor, Shafee and 
Samsuddin  
(2014)  









19 Ghanaian firms, 2005-
2009  




150 best non-financial 
listed companies of 
Malaysia 
ROE Positive 
Gull, Saeed and 
Abid 
 (2013)  
160 listed companies in 




Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003) 
348 firms in Australia  
in 1996. 
 




and Mehran  
(2005) 
35 US listed Banking 







30 Pakistani listed firms 
between 2008 and 2009. 
ROE and profit 
margin 
Positive  
Dwivedi and Jain 
(2005) 
340 listed Indian firms 
between 1997 and 2001. 
 





Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Chalevas and Tzovas 
(2016)   
Listed companies in the 
Athens Stock Exchange 
for the period 2000-2003 
Stock return Positive  
Alsayanai 
(2017) 
Top 100 non-financial 
listed firms in Malaysia 
between 2014 and 2015. 
Tobin’s Q Positive 
Isa  
(2017) 
122 listed firms in Nigeria 
between 2014 and 2015. 
ROA and ROE  Positive  
Chemweno 
 (2016) 
42 firms listed in the 
Nairobi securities 








companies (37 companies 




sales) ROS  
Not 
significant  
Beiner et al.  
(2004) 
26 listed companies in 
Swiss for 2001 





37 listed banks in India 
between 2001 and 2005 
Market-to-




Aljifri and Moustafa 
(2007) 
 51 firms for 2004 in 
UAE 




20 Nigerian listed firms 





Zabri, Ahmad and 
Wah  
(2016) 
Top 100 public listed 
companies in Bursa 
Malaysia from 2008 to 
2012 







452 large US industrial 





Mak and Kusnadi  
(2005) 
Comparative study of 
Kuala Lumpur stock 
exchange (KLSE) and 





Mak and Yuanto 
(2003) 
Comparative study 
between 271 firms listed 
in Singapore and 279 
firms listed in Malaysia 











Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Upadhyay, Bhargava 
and Faircloth 
 (2014)  
1500 US firms, 2000-
2003. 





Gamage and Herath 
(2014)  







96 Saudi firms, 2006-2008  Stock return  Negative 
Makhlouf, Ali, and 
Ramli  
(2017) 
120 non-financial firms 
listed on Amman Stock 
Exchange from 2009 to 
2013 in Jordan. 




3.2.1.2 CEO Duality 
Another vital control component is the authority structure of the board, which 
halfway mirrors the freedom on board (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; Dedman & 
Lin, 2002). The issue of CEO duality has centred in governance studies with the 
argument from the board the change advocate that CEO should not serve as the 
chairman of the company (Cadbury, 1992). The best practice code gazetted by the 
Cadbury board of committee in 1991 recommended the separation of the two 
positions. The recommendation is based on the thought that the CEO is deeply 
involved in the daily activities of the organization (Laing & Weir, 1999). On the 
other hand, some groups provided support for the duality of the two roles. CEO 
duality is a condition whereby the chairman of the board is the CEO.  
 
The agency theory explained the separation of CEO and chairman position. 
According to the agency theorist, the board of director is in charge of organizing and 
coordinating the management. The board also ensures that the interest of 
shareholders is guided (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Hence, when the two positions are 
combined, it might compromise the duty impose on the board of directors (Lam & 
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Lee, 2008). In Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) submission, CEO duality leads to 
CEO entrenchment and thus reduces board monitoring efficiency. Thus, conferring 
an individual with the responsibility of both the management and CEO allows the 
management to be responsible as a body controlled by the board. Hence, making a 
distinction between these parts is considered to prompt more successful assessment 
of the CEO. As a result, a conducive vicinity of more prominent responsibility can 
be achieved (Heenetigala, 2011). In Abdullah (2004) view, the observing part can be 
fundamentally debilitated when both checking and the execution parts are provided 
in a single personality (joined leadership roles). Similarly, Laing and Weir (1999) 
proposed that organizations with joint leadership may have a person who has a 
supreme influence and can settle on definite choices that do not expand the wealth of 
shareholder.  
 
On the other hand, the empirical evidence showed the mixed association between 
firm performance and board leadership structure (Krause, Semandeni, & Cannella, 
2014). In support of the agency theory, the corporate firms in the USA with 
leadership structures in separation always perform better than the joint leadership 
structures when their performance is proxy by ROA, profit margins and return on 
investment (Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Banks (2004) suggested that an independent 
chairman can easily bring experience objectivity and dispassionate viewed required 
on crucial matters. Apart from that, some firms by the nature of their industry havea 
tedious schedule. Thus, an individual may not be able to handle both roles efficiently 
due to the time and commitment requirement (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997). 




Similarly, evidence from some emerging economies revealed that the findings are 
consistent with those of the developed countries. For instance, Jackling and Johl, 
(2009) studied the association between internal structures of governance and 
performance from the financial aspect of India. The study discovered that there is a 
negative effect between CEO duality and firm performance. According to Ujunwa 
(2012), in Nigeria, the financial performance of firms is affected by CEO duality, 
consistent with the view that non-independent leadership structure of the firm. There 
are other studies in the context of emerging countries that offer a similar view. See 
for example: Cosken and Syiliar (2012); Chaghadari (2011); Rashid et al. (2010); 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006).  
 
On the contrary, Sharma and Sharma (2016) conducted a research on 20 Indian firms 
of the manufacturing sector for the period 2001-2010 in India and the result showed 
that chairman role and separation of CEO do not have any effect on firm 
performance. Dey, Engel and Liu (2011), Latif et al. (2013) and Veprauskaitė and 
Adams (2013) also conducted a study on CEO duality and firm performance. It 
discovered that there is a negative association between the two variables. 
Nevertheless, Al-Farooque, Van Zijl, Dunstan and Karim (2007), Omran, Bolbol and 
Fatheldin (2008), Wellalage and Locke (2011), Faleye (2007) and Peni (2014) 
recorded a positive association between CEO duality and firm performance. 
According to Lam and Lee (2008), a study was conducted on 128 firms in Hong 
Kong in 2003. The result showed that there is a negative and positive relationship 




Dehaene, De Vuyst, and Ooghe (2001); Kiel and Nicholson (2003) provided 
empirical evidence in support of combined leadership structure as it affects firm 
performance. There is a significant effect of combined leadership structure on ROA 
(Dehaene, De Vuyst, & Ooghe, 2001). It was suggested if CEO act as chairman in 
the daily activities of an organization, this will ensure that the fund of the company is 
invested in the profit-maximizing project. The shareholders in the firms with joined 
structures achieved higher returns according to the stewardship theory measured by 
ROE (Donaldson & Davis 1991). Dey, Engel, and Liu, (2009) argued that CEO role 
duality strengthens board leadership structure. The results of Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003) discovered that between the performance of the firm and CEO duality, there 
is a positive relationship.  
 
Evidence showed that no significant relationship between financial performance and 
director characteristics (Dalton et al., 1998). The relationship of firm performance 
does not have any effect on joint leadership and board independence (Abdullah, 
2004). Similarly, there is no relationship between CEO duality and performance of 
firms (Chen, Lin, & Yi, 2008). In the same vein, there is no significant relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance (Al-Abbas, 2009; Al-Matari et al., 2012; 
Chalevas & Tzovas, 2016; Cheung, Rau & Stouraitis, 2006; Rodriguez-Fernandez, 
Fernandez-Alonso & Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2014).  
 
Conclusively, leadership is an issue of the way the board performs, whether one 
individual or more at the top (Taan & Salman, 2015). It is the proficiency of 
alternate individuals from the board advisory group that figures out whether these 
two critical parts ought to be joined or completely isolated. It is required that the 
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chairman possess strategy, capacity and foresight due to changes that might occur in 
the business environment in the future. Thus, it requires a leadership quality to make 
the right decision at the right time with the dynamic business environment must be 
possessed by the CEO. As a result, the position of chairman and CEO requires 
diverse abilities, strategies and procedures.  
 
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that studies still require confirmation of its effect on 
firm performance, with the inconsistencies in the separation of CEO and chairman 
from the board director. It is revealed from the reviewed studies that board 
independence was improved following the separation of CEO from the role of the 
chairman. Table 3.2 summarizes the results of empirical studies concerning the 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance as discussed above. 
 
Table 3.2 
Summary of Empirical Findings on the Relationship between CEO Duality and Firm 
Performance 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Lam and Lee  
(2008)  
 










family firms  
Kiel and Nicholson  
(2003) 
348 firms in Australia  
in 1996  





1883 US firms in 1995  
 
Tobin’s Q Positive 
Peni  
(2014)  
850 firms, from 2006 to 




Wellalage and Locke 
(2011)  





Omran, Bolbol and 
Fatheldin 
 (2008)  
304 firms in four Arabic 
countries, 2000-2002  
Tobin’s Q Positive  
Al Farooque, Van 
Zijl, Dunstan and 
Karim  
(2007) 








Table 3.2 (Continued) 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Sharma and Sharma 
(2016)  
20 firms of the Indian 
manufacturing sector for 
the period 2001-2010. 
ROA, ROE, 






Chalevas and Tzovas 
(2016)   
Listed companies in the 
Athens Stock Exchange 
for the period 2000-2003. 




Kuala Lumpur Listed 










Rodriguez (2014)  
121 Spanish firms in 2009  
 




Cheung, Rau and 
Stouraitis (2006)  






Al-Matari et al. 
(2012)  
135 Saudi firms in 2010. Tobin’s Q Not 
significant 
Al-Abbas 
 (2009)  
78 Saudi firms, 2005-2007  Tobin’s Q Not 
significant 
Latif et al. 
(2013) 
12 listed firms from 2005 
to 2010 in Pakistan 
ROA Negative 
Rechner and Dalton  
(1991) 
141 Fortune 500 firms 
during 1978 and 1983 in 
USA 





Jackling and Johl 
 (2009) 
180 Top Indian companies 
listed on Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) between 






122 Nigerian firms, 1991-
2008  
ROA Negative  
Cosken and Syiliar  
(2012) 
31 companies in Turkey ROA, ROE, 
and Tobin’s Q 
Negative 
Rashid et al. 
(2010) 
90 non-financial firms 
listed on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE) during 
the period 2005 to 2009 in 
Bangladesh. 
Tobin’s Q Negative 
Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) 
347 Malaysian firms, 
1996-2000  
ROA Negative 
Dey, Engel and Liu 
(2011)  





Adams (2013)  
468 UK firms, 2003-2008  ROA Negative 
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3.2.1.3 Board Non-executive Directors 
The board of directors is crucial in the governance of corporation as it has an 
oversight function to reduce agency cost (Balsmeier, Fleming, & Manso, 2015). 
Board independence is one of the major considerations in corporate governance code 
and corporate governance study. Agency theory and resource dependence theory are 
applicable to non-executive directorship. The agency theory and the resource 
dependence theory recommend the high presence of non-executive directors in the 
boardroom. Based on resource dependency theory, the non-executive directors offer 
to the firm in form of expertise, reputation, business contacts and experience 
(Baranchuk & Dybvig, 2009; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  
 
As suggested in agency theory, board effectiveness is enhanced when non-executive 
directors dominate the boardroom. This category of the director is efficient monitors 
since they are free from the influence of the management (Dalton et al., 1998). The 
outside director comprises of independent and non-independent non-executive 
directors (Joseph, Ocasio, & MCdonnell, 2014). The non-executive directors are not 
employed by the firm and do not have any social tie with the management. 
Therefore, they are independent of the management (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 
2010). According to Yermack (2004), independent directors cannot possess more 
than one percent of the outstanding shares in the corporation. In addition, the 
independent directors also cannot share a family nor ownership relationship with any 
other directors. Similarly, independent directors must be professionally independent. 
Therefore, they cannot stay on the different corporate board with another director 




The external directors and their presence in the boardroom offer many advantages. 
For instance, the non-executive directors tend to bring forth a broad breadth of 
knowledge, contacts and expertise that improve the chance of the firm to obtain 
external resources in scarcity (Kesner & Johnson, 1990). The firms are likely to 
recruit the non-executive directors after firm experience poor performance Weisbach 
(1988). Hermalin and Weibach, (1988) reported companies that are dominated by 
non-executive directors, who change the CEO associated with poor performance. 
 
From the perspective of the stakeholders, the non-executive directors are effective in 
the stewardship of the firm with the duties of performing theory to achieve returns of 
shareholders and higher profits (Donaldson & Davis, 1994). The board with high 
effectiveness must consist of a majority of non-executive directors (Dalton et al. 
1998). In contrast, the responsibilities of the executive directors are a daily activities 
marketing and finance business. Their work is to entice expertise with great 
knowledge into the firm (Weir & Laing, 2001). Being the CEO’s alternatives, the 
expertise is not deemed fit to control or coordinate the CEO (Daily & Dalton, 1993).  
 
Thus, it is paramount to have a blueprint to control the executive directors and the 
CEO (Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 2002). The non-executive directors receive a 
higher incentive to promote the shareholders’ interests due to the significance of 
reputation management in the business world for external directors (Fama, 1980; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983). Nevertheless, the regulators value independent directors due 
to the importance of better management. Beasley (1996) categorically reported most 




In general, the majority of the previous studies showed that boards are characterized 
bya high presence of independent directors in preserving financial reporting integrity 
and that the shareholders of such firms are assured with the sound firm performance 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Consistent with this view, several studies have observed the 
roles and influence of non-executive directors’ presence in the boardroom on various 
board outcomes. Masulis and Mobbs (2014); Brochet and Srinivasan (2014) 
investigated the role of independent director. On the other hand, Faleye, Hoitash, and 
Hoitash (2011); Cole, Daniel and Naveen (2008) provided evidence on how 
independent directors affect CEO compensation.  
 
In the USA, Duchin et al. (2010) investigated the effect of the new regulatory 
requirement regarding more representation of independent directors on firm 
performance. They reported that the impact of the independent director is positive in 
the presence of low and negative information asymmetry when the information 
asymmetry is high. Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) discovered a decrease in the stock 
price of firms following the death of an independent director. Valenti et al. (2011) 
reported that in the period when the financial performance of the firms declines, the 
number of outside directors is reduced, whereas the number of non-executive 
directors increases as firm performance improves. The returns on stock and ROA 
improve as the proportion of independent directors increases (Dahya & McConnell, 
2007). Firms with a high number of non-executive directors are associated with high 
abnormal returns (Lee et al., 1992). 
 
Furthermore, Pfeffer (1972) showed that firm failure is associated with the high 
percentage of executive directors in the boardroom. A study showed that external 
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director improves firm profitability positively (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). Baysinger 
and Butler, (1985) stated that a non-executive director enhances the financial state of 
the firm. According to them, boards with a larger portion of external directors 
perform above average compared to the smaller number of non-executive directors. 
Similarly, the firms with larger external director record high return on an asset than 
those with executive directors (Ezzamel & Watson, 1993).  
 
In another study, Alsayanai (2017) mentioned that there is a positive relationship 
between NED and financial performance by using Tobin’s Q. In addition, Ammari, 
Kadria and Ellouze (2014) conducted a study among French companies and 
discovered that the size of external directors has a positive and significant effect on 
ROE. This indicates that NED independence is beneficial to the firm management 
and their independence is also considered by the investors for decision-making in 
investment. Chemweno (2016) examined the relationship between board 
composition and firm performance by using a sample of 42 firms listed in the 
Nairobi securities exchange between 2010 and 2014. The result revealed a positive 
and significant relationship between board composition and ROA. In addition, a 
study of Nawafly and Alarussi (2016) was conducted by using a sample of 150 non-
financial listed companies of Malaysia. Such a study was to investigate the 
relationship between NED and firm performance as measured by ROE. The result 
showed that there is a positive relationship between NED and firm performance by 
using ROE. 
 
Furthermore, many previous studies revealed a positive relationship between non-
executive director and firm performance (El Mehdi, 2007; Ferreira & Kirchmaier, 
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2013; Isa, 2017; Latif et al. 2013; Makhlouf, Ali, & Ramli, 2017; Nguyen, Evans & 
Lu, 2017; Zheng, 2010). On the contrary, some studies documented a negative 
association between firm performance and external boardroom directors (Bhagat & 
Black, 1998). Mashhadani and Fatlawi (2012) revealed that non-executive director 
reduces financial reporting quality in Iraqi listed companies. According to O'Sullivan 
and Wong (1999), the monitoring effectiveness of non-executive directors might 
reduce with elongated tenure as they become close with the executive directors. In 
addition, Weir and Laing (2001) explained that since non –executive directors are 
not fully part of the daily operation of the firm and busy schedule, they might not 
have much effect on performance. Similarly, the ability of non-executive directors to 
make value-enhancing decisions might be constrained due to their level of expertise 
and insufficient information on vital information (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989; Lorsch & Maclver, 1989).  
 
Bozec (2005), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), Garba and Abubakar (2014), 
Ghabayen (2012) Mahadeo, Soobaroyen and Hanuman (2012) and Shukeri, Shin and 
Shaari (2012) recorded the negative relationship between non-executive director and 
firm performance. In addition, Sharma and Sharma (2016) revealed a negative 
relationship between the non-executive director and firm performance by using 
Tobin’s Q and non-significant relationship by using ROA, ROE, Net Profit Margin, 
and Stock Returns measures. 
 
Some other researchers (Abdullah, 2004; Daily & Dalton, 1992) provided evidence 
of no association between firm performance and non-executive director. For 
example, MacAvoy et al. (1983) findings revealed that firm performance is not 
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affected by non-executive directors. According to Fosberg (1989) and Molz (1988), 
there exists no relationship between firm performance and non-executive directors. 
Therefore, the non-executive directors’ characteristics and their composition are 
significant to the performances of the firm. Thus, the knowledge and skills of the 
directors of the board are very crucial to firm performance. This serves as the 
justification of non-executive directors (Bonn, Yoshikawa, & Phan, 2004). 
Moreover, a study of Lopes, Ferraz, and Martins (2016) examined the relationship 
between board composition and two firm performance measures (i.e. ROA and 
ROE). The results provided evidence of an insignificant relationship between board 
composition, ROA and ROE by using a sample of 124 non-financial companies (i.e. 
37 companies in Portugal and 87 companies in Spain). Furthermore, (Al-Matari et al. 
(2012), Chalevas and Tzovas (2016), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Wintoki, Linck 
and Netter (2012) and Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh and Rudkin (2010) revealed a non-
significant relationship between non-executive director and firm performance.  
 
In summary, there is mixed available empirical evidence despite the various 
arguments that outside directors perform better in the boardroom (Borokhovich et 
al., 2014). The evidence emerged from some developed countries suggested that 
independent director improves firm performance, whereas some especially from 
Asian countries documented otherwise findings. Arguably, the conflicting results 
might attribute to the variation in sample choice, control variables and environmental 
factors, such as ownership structure and corporate governance practice.   
 
Therefore, this study stated that the additional non-executive directors on the board 
can enhance the firm performance of Iraqi companies in the stock exchange. There is 
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a need to align the interest of the stakeholders and managers and reform the 
director’s accountability to strengthen internal control due to the inconsistency in the 
past studies. Table 3.3 summarizes the results of empirical studies concerning the 




Summary of Empirical Findings on the Relationship between Non-executive Director 
and Firm Performance 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Latif et al. 
 (2013) 
12 listed firms from 2005 
to 2010 in Pakistan 
ROA Positive 
Nawafly and Alarussi, 
(2016) 
 150 non-financial listed 




42 firms listed in the 
Nairobi securities 
exchange between 2010 
and 2014. 
ROA Positive 





during the period from 




Top 100 non-financial 
listed firms in Malaysia 
between 2014 and 2015. 
Tobin’s Q Positive 
Isa  
(2017) 
122 listed firms in Nigeria 
between 2014 and 2015. 
ROA and ROE  Positive  
Valenti et al. 
(2011) 
90 companies listed on 







1124 companies in UK 
through 1989 and 1996 
ROA and 
return on stock 
Positive 
Baysinger and Butler  
(1985) 
US 266 firms during 1970 
and 1980 
ROE  Positive 
Ezzamel and Watson  
(1993) 
113 UK companies during 





Pearce and Zahra 
 (1992) 
119 Fortune 500 industrial 










Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Makhlouf, Ali, and 
Ramli  
(2017) 
120 non-financial firms 
listed on Amman Stock 
Exchange from 2009 to 
2013 in Jordan. 




Kirchmaier (2013)  
2661 firms in 28 European 




Ammari, Kadria and 
Ellouze (2014)  
40 French firms, 2002-
2009  
ROE  Positive  
El Mehdi  
(2007)  
24 Tunisian firms, 2000-
2005  
Tobin’s Q Positive  
Zheng 
 (2010)  
142 Chinese firms, 2006 -
2007  
Tobin’s Q Positive 
Chalevas and Tzovas 
(2016)   
Listed companies in the 
Athens Stock Exchange 
for the period 2000-2003 
Stock return Not 
significant 




companies (37 companies 




sales) ROS  
Not 
significant  
Wintoki, Linck and 
Netter  
(2012)  






Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006)  
347 Malaysian firms, 
FROM 1996 to 2000. 




Rashid, De Zoysa, 
Lodh and Rudkin 
 (2010)  
90 Bangladeshi firms, 
2005-2009  




Al-Matari et al. 
(2012) 
135 Saudi firms in 2010  Tobin’s Q Not 
significant 
Sharma and Sharma 
(2016)  
20 firms of the Indian 
manufacturing sector for 
the period 2001-2010. 
ROA, ROE, 














Bhagat and Black  
(1998) 
934 large U.S. public 













Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2008)  
8165 US firms from 1992 
to 2001. 
Tobin’s Q Negative 
Bozec  
(2005)  
25 Canadian firms, from 
1976 to 2000  
ROA and ROS  Negative 
Shukeri, Shin and 
Shaari (2012)  
300 Malaysian firms in 
2011. 
ROE  Negative 
Garba and Abubakar 
(2014)  
12 Nigerian firms, from 
2004 to 2009. 
Tobin’s Q Negative 
Mahadeo, 
Soobaroyen and 
Hanuman (2012)  





102 Saudi firms in 2011. ROA  Negative 
 
3.2.1.4 Board Meeting 
Meeting frequency represents the number of time directors dedicated to performing 
their monitoring duties (Carcello et al., 2002; Laksmana, 2008; Liang, Xu, & 
Jiraporn, 2013; Sahu & Manna, 2013). No specific number of meetings is made 
compulsory in most corporate governance. Nevertheless, the board of directors is 
required to meet not less than four times a year (Habbash, 2010). There is a 
connection between an improved firm performance and a greater frequency of board 
meetings. In this regards, the frequency of board meetings is considered consistent 
with agency theory. The agency theory emphasizes that the board shows greater 
capabilities in terms of monitoring discipline and advising the management. 
Therefore, a greater frequency in board meetings improves the performance with 
those capabilities (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999).   
 
Previous studies have investigated how board effectiveness improves firm 
performance. The board responsibility, such as financial management and 
monitoring, require more time devotion (Habbash, 2010). Thus, the high meeting 
frequency indicates board reactiveness and enables the board to discharge their 
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monitoring function efficiently. Insufficient time could hinder board effectiveness in 
its monitoring function (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).  
 
Conger et al. (1998) noted that the board of director needs a sufficient amount of 
time to make effective decisions. Other authors such as Evans, Evans, and Loh 
(2002); Conger, Lawler, and Finegold (1998) mentioned that the board increases 
their meeting frequency to resolve those issues that negatively affect firm 
performance and to make the important contribution of firm performance. Consistent 
with this view, Jackling and Johl (2009) findings suggested that a firm with high 
meeting frequency is most likely perform better.  
 
Consistent with the above, the empirical literature studied the relationship between 
board outcome (e.g. benefit to shareholders, the board oversight function on financial 
reporting process, director compensation, and transparency and earnings forecasts) 
and the audit committee activity measured by meeting frequency (Carcello et al., 
2002; Laksmana, 2008). Greco (2011) reported that the board of newly listed 
companies are busier. This is attributable to their high-risk nature and the need for 
more monitoring. In addition, board meeting frequency is high for highly levered 
companies as highly levered firms have more agency cost. Besides, the findings of 
Vafeas (1999) revealed that board meetings positively affect firm performance.  
 
In the USA, Brown and Caylor (2006) noted that meeting frequency and 75% of 
attendance in board meetings improve board effectiveness and organisation 
performance. According to Hsu and Petchsakulwong (2010), constant meeting 
attendance enables the directors to monitor and review the management 
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performance. Similarly, Kula (2005) reported that board meeting effectiveness and 
meetings frequency positively improve firm performance by using a sample of 
Turkey non-listed stock ownership companies. Al-Daoud, Saidin, and Abidin, (2016) 
investigated the relationship between firm performance and board meeting by using 
125 Firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange from industry and service sectors 
from 2009 to 2013. They discovered a positive significant relationship between 
Tobin's Q, ROA and board meeting.  
 
Apart from that, the empirical findings in relation to a board meeting and firm 
performance are mixed. Empirical findings from developed countries revealed a 
positive relationship between the performance of the firm and board meeting 
frequency (Gavrea & Stegerean, 2012; Khanchel, 2007; Liang, Xu, & Jirapom, 
2013). Those from the developing nations revealed also a positive relationship Kang 
and Kim (2011), Khan and Javid (2011), Al-matari (2014), and Sahu and Manna 
(2013). In addition, Hu, Tam, and Tan (2010) investigated whether a board meeting 
was related to the improvement of the firm performance. They discovered a positive 
relationship between a board meeting and firm performance (Tobin’s Q) based on an 
analysis of 304 publicly listed companies in China from 2003 to 2005. 
 
In contrast, studies like García-Sánchez (2010); Kamardin (2009); Noor (2011) 
discovered the negative association between firm performance and board meeting 
frequency. Alzahrani (2014) examined the relationship between a board meeting and 
firm performance by using ROE. By using a sample of 573 observations in the Saudi 
Stock Exchange from 2007-2011, he discovered that board meeting is negatively 
associated with firm performance. In the same vein, Dad (2012) investigated the 
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association between board meetings on firm performance, which was measured by 
ROE. Based on 971 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2009, the results 
indicated that board meeting negatively associated with firm performance. 
 
Another study discovered a negative relation in both developed and developing 
countries García-Sánchez (2010); Kamardin (2009); Noor (2011). In addition, there 
are only a few empirical studies on firm performance and board meeting and thus the 
findings cannot be generalized. Thus, further investigation is required to test the 
influence of board meeting on firm performance.  
 
From another perspective, Sharma and Sharma (2016) investigated the board 
meeting and firm performance of Indian 20 firms in the manufacturing sector for 
2001-2010 by using ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q, net profit margin, and stock returns. The 
study discovered that there is a positive relationship between a board meeting and 
firm performance with Tobin's Q and insignificant with ROA, ROE, net profit 
margin, and Stock Returns as measures.  
 
A study of Aryani, Setiawan, and Rahmawati (2017) hypothesized that a board 
meeting related with firm performance. They studied 175 listed companies in the 
Jakarta Islamic Index from 2006 to 2016. They discovered that the relationship 
between a board meeting and firm performance insignificant. Another study 
conducted by Makhlouf, Ali, and Ramli (2017), it investigated the relationship 
between board meeting and performance. The study used 120 non-financial firms 
listed on the Amman Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2013 in Jordan. Makhlouf, Ali, 
and Ramli (2017) discovered that no significant relationship between a board 
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meeting and firm performance. According to El Mehdi (2007), Jackling and Johl 
(2009), Ntim (2009) and Ren (2014), there is an insignificant relationship between a 
board meeting and firm performance.  
 
As the board meeting improves shareholders value, the conflicting issues regarding 
the number of meetings to be held in a firm are still debatable. The participation of 
the directors in board activities through meeting attendance improves monitoring. On 
the other hand, the number of board directorship and restriction placed on multiple 
board directorships in some codes of corporate governance further reinforce this 
view. Table 3.4 summarizes the results of empirical studies concerning the 
relationship between a board meeting and firm performance as discussed above. 
 
Table 3.4 
 Summary of Empirical Findings on the Relationship between Board Meeting and 
Firm Performance 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Sharma and Sharma 
(2016)  
20 firms of the Indian 
manufacturing sector for 
the period 2001-2010. 
ROA, ROE, 













Jackling and Johl  
(2009) 
180 Top Indian companies 
listed on Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) between 






307 firms over the 1990 - 
1994 in Cyprus 
MTB Positive 
Brown and Caylor 
(2006)  








157 Zimbabwean listed 
firms from 2001 to 2003. 




Table 3.4 (Continued) 





observations  from 1999 to 
2005 in US 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Positive  
Hu, Tam, and Tan 
 (2010) 
304 publicly listed 
companies over 2003–
2005 in China. 




listed firms in Oman for 
2010 




125 Firms listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange 
from industry and service 
sectors for the 2009-2013 
period 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Positive 
El Mehdi  
(2007) 
24 Tunisian listed firms 





100 South African listed 
firms from 2002 to 2006  






969 firms period from 
2007 to 2010 in China. 
ROE Not 
significant 
Makhlouf, Ali, and 
Ramli  
(2017) 
120 non-financial firms 
listed on Amman Stock 
Exchange from 2009 to 
2013 in Jordan. 




Aryani, Setiawan, and 
Rahmawati 
(2017) 
175 firms listed in the 






162 companies listed at 





573 observations in the 
Saudi Stock Exchange for 
the periods 2007-2011. 
ROE Negative  
Daud  
(2012) 
971 companies listed on 
Bursa 




3.2.2 Internal Audit 
Internal audit market contributes largely to the achievement of company goals and 
implementation of strategies for the achievement (Ljubisavljević & Jovanovi, 2011). 
In addition, it is the responsibility of the internal audit to reinforce management and 
audit committee (Hutchinson & Zain, 2009). 
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For an audit task to be successfully implemented, it must be independent. This 
implies that the work, information, conclusions and evaluations do not affect the 
company management. In this manner, the report of an internal audit becomes a 
mean of communication between management and internal audit and important 
guidelines for a successful management of the company (Ljubisavljević & Jovanovi, 
2011). As a result, internal audit determines the integrity of financial and operational 
information, the reality, and the reliability that emanates from many organizational 
units from which an effective business decision at all management levels are 
accorded.  
 
Furthermore, the internal audit facilitates the operation and effective working of the 
audit committee, as the audit function goals are consistent with the financial 
reporting oversight of the former responsibilities (Goodwin, 2003; Goodwin & Yeo, 
2001; Scarbrough, Rama & Raghunandan, 1998). The previous studies and the 
governance reports (NYSE, 2002) supported the creation of an internal audit as a 
mechanism to enhance internal governance processes (Collier & Gregory 1996; 
Goodwin & Kent, 2004).  
 
Al-Shamar (2010) mentioned many factors of internal audit functions along this line 
of argument as follows:  
1. The arithmetic evaluations and the internal control system is an attempt to 
ensure that the systems are suitable for the facility and proposed system 
enhancements. It is also to ensure that the accounting system and internal 
controls systems are appropriate.  
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2. Assessing procedures and plan to examine the defects and weakness in the 
procedures and system used by the company to provide authority, an internal 
auditor for the examination of the aspects of establishment activity. Such an 
assessment also used to propose modifications and enhancements needed.  
3. The staff commitment to the company policies and procedure should be 
considered. Therefore, the internal auditor has to monitor the implementation 
of these policies and procedures and to provide clarifications to the 
employees. 
4. Protecting the acquired funds as the implementation and development of 
systems is a move to ensure that the facility safeguards funds and assets 
against fraud and manipulation in order to minimize losses and detect fraud 
due to neglect or abuse.  
 
The International Professional Practices Framework (IPPF) (2009), Internal Audit 
Function (IAF) provide guidelines on the efficient operation of the company. 
Primary, IAF is established to create value and improve firm performance. On the 
other hand, IAF is a consulting, independent and objective activity directly 
responsible for designs an appropriate internal control that will prevent fraud and 
errors. According to IPPF (2009), the organization is assisted to accomplish its goals 
by bringing forth a disciplined and systematic approach to improve and evaluate the 
efficiency of the governance process, control and risk management. According to 
Wong (2012), professional support is provided by internal auditors in an 
organization. Such internal auditors are to actualize its purpose by devising a 
disciplined and systematic approach to improve and evaluate the efficiency of risk 
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management, control, and governance process. The next sub-section reviews the 
relevant literature on internal audit existence and internal audit training. 
 
3.2.2.1 Internal Audit Existence 
The existence of an internal audit improves the confidence of the stakeholders as it 
supports the governance disclosure (Archambeault, DeZoort & Holt, 2008; Holt & 
Dezoort, 2009; Mercer, 2004). The internal audit existence is able to expose many 
fraudulent activities (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007). Coram et al. (2008) documented that 
firms with internal audit department have a hedge in detecting fraudulent report due 
to asset misappropriation. The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA, 2010) concerned 
itself with how the value of an audit committee can be enhanced. As a result, the IIA 
issued a statement of policy titled: “Internal Auditing and the Audit Committee: 
Working Together toward Common Goals” on the audit committee. AICPA 
conducted a study and reported the existence of an internal audit plays a significant 
role in fraud prevention and detection (IIA, 2010).  
 
Internal audit serves as a bonding cost incurred by managers as a signal of their 
commitment towards sound governance practice (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
According to Krishnan and Lee (2009), firms with sound corporate governance 
practice possibly appoint directors with financial knowledge to be a member of the 
audit committee. Thus, there is greater cooperation between the committee and a 
knowledgeable internal auditor (Cohen et al., 2004). The minimum required level of 
professional competency of an audit committee member is required as this 
competency enhances the review of the performance. Nevertheless, there is a 
preference for oversight expertise in areas, such as law and auditing, (DeZoort, 
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1997) where reviews can be conducted on the audit committee and subsequently lead 
to higher internal audit performance. The audit teams conduct the internal audit 
assignments. For the assignments, the leaders of the audit team are assigned based on 
competence and qualification (suitability). As such, the appointing and monitoring 
the competent internal auditors with the necessary skills would assist the internal 
auditors to identify the better process in management. Thus, this enables them to 
make the internal audit more effective to assess business processes for improvement 
through discerning judgments.  
 
In emerging economies, family members influence the appointment of internal 
auditors (La Porta et al., 1998). According to Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), an important function of the board of director as specified in 
the agency theory is to safeguard the internal control. The board ensures that the 
right individuals are appointed as the member of the internal audit and determines 
the remuneration of internal auditors (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009; Jiraporn et 
al., 2009). Modibbo (2015) recommended that there should be an establishment of 
internal audit as a separate department in the state local government. The 
recommendation would ensure an independent and fair report for the improvement 
of accountability and transparency in public listed companies. 
 
Furthermore, Chalevas and Tzovas (2016) conducted a study on listed companies on 
the Athens Stock Exchange from 2000 to 2003. The study discovered that there is no 
significant relationship between internal audit existence and firm performance. 
Nevertheless, Kiabel (2012) discovered a non-significant relationship between 
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internal audit existence and firm performance with level profit as the relationships 
reported positive and negative with ROI and ROE respectively.  
 
Thus, this study is considering internal audit existence, as the previous researches 
have not fully explored such existence. None of the firms made internal audit 
establishment mandatory. As a result, it is very hard to know the significance level of 
the variable despite a few companies create their own internal audit department to be 
responsible for establishing the internal control system of the company. Table 3.5 
summarizes the results of empirical studies concerning the relationship between 
internal audit existence and firm performance as discussed above. 
 
Table 3.5 
 Summary of Empirical Findings on the Relationship between Internal Audit 
Existence and Firm Performance 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Chalevas and Tzovas 
(2016)   
Listed companies in the 
Athens Stock Exchange for 
the period 2000-2003 




65 state-owned Companies 

















3.2.2.2 Internal Auditing Training 
The management of organisations is saddled with the responsibility of instituting an 
effective internal control over financial reporting procedures and ensuring the 
efficient operation of such controls and procedure (Lin, 2011).  Hence, the 
management creates an internal audit department. The internal audit department 
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provides an independent assessment of the internal control mechanisms in the 
organisation (Lenz, 2013). There is empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
internal audit over financial reporting. Prawitt et al. (2009) provided evidence that 
internal audit improves reporting quality by correcting identified weakness in the 
internal control system. The management needs to support the department 
adequately without weakening the department independence to achieve the effective 
functioning of the internal audit. Earlier empirical studies and Professional standards 
suggested that effective and efficient internal control department is affected by the 
competency of the internal audit department staff, the scope of its monitoring 
function and the extent of correction made to the issues raised by the internal audit 
department (Salehi, 2016). Therefore, it is important to provide the necessary 
resources, such as training to internal audit personnel and to enhance the competence 
of the internal audit department further.   
 
Internal auditors need to develop and acquire new skills regularly to support the 
management and encounter with challenges in terms of regular training updates to 
keep informed with the new development (Pickett, 2000). Successful organizations 
regularly invest in the training of employees, whereas some organizations see 
training as a costly effort with no value added (Ubeda-Garcia, Marco-Lajara, 
Sabater-Sempere, & Garcia-Lillo, 2013). Moreover, practitioners and researchers 
affect the importance of training employees. The assistance provided to the 
employees lead to better performance in the jobs (Smith, 2013). 
 
According to the IIA (2009), the number of hours expended in the training of 
internal audit staff measures the index of quality of the internal audit. The 
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emphasizes were given on experience, training and attaining continuing professional 
education in a survey of measures of performance of internal audit in terms of 
quality. By implication, the opportunities for training and retaining auditors can 
enhance their quality of work and improve their skills, which in turn contribute to the 
organizational performance.  
 
The training of internal audit staff is critical to the efficient performance of the firm 
and that of its internal audit department (Johnson, 1991). Training is “A process that 
provides confidence that planned objectives will be achieved within an acceptable 
degree of residual risk” (Standard Australia, 2006: 6). An organisation can use 
several approaches to train their internal audit function and the benefits vary 
according to the approach adopted by each organisation. These approaches can either 
be external training, on the site training or internal training programs (Johnson, 
1991). In the view of Johnson (1991), the external training approach to internal audit 
training is very effective but very expensive, whereas on the site training is less 
expensive but cause more distractions. On the other hand, the internal training 
programs can be cost-effective. Nevertheless, it restricts the sharing of ideas among 
the participants.  
 
The success of the internal audit depends on the training received by those working 
at the department of internal audit. The essence of internal audit staff training lies in 
the fact that the internal audit department is staffed with an individual with different 
backgrounds and experience. Thus, this makes training of internal audit staff to be 
paramount (Johnson, 1991). Besides, developing skills enable the internal audit 
function to become more critical. Apart from that, the staff are able to ask a right 
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question without fear of favour or intimidation and make an important 
recommendation for the effective discharge of internal audit duty (Albrecht et al., 
1988; Mihret et al., 2010).  
 
Therefore, to the best knowledge of the researcher, no study has been conducted to 
consider internal audit training and its influence on the firm performance, especially 
in ISX. Proper training among the internal auditor is suggested to gain practical 
experience and increase competency to improve this deficiency. This study assumed 
that if adequate trainingis provided to the auditors in question, such training will 
increase the quality of the auditing and enhance the significanceof internal auditing. 
 
3.2.3 Ownership Structure 
The separation of ownership from those who manage the business present the 
principal-agent relationship. The individuals (the shareholder) sign a contract to 
engage another individual (the manager) who carry out some assigned functions as 
stipulated (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As such, the incentive of the principal and the 
agent are not aligned since all the profit accruing from the agent effort goes to the 
principal. Furthermore, the difference in the interests of the shareholders and 
managers prompts the managers to take critical steps (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The 
severity of the agency problem depends on the dispersed or concentrated ownership 
structure. Dispersed ownership improves market liquidity and leads to risk 
diversification (Amati et al., 1994). This structure exacerbates agency problem as the 
principal lacks the ability to monitor the agent (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Thus, 
according to Bolton and Von Thadden (1996), dispersed ownership in countries with 
the active stock market and an efficient regulatory system with active market 
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mechanisms is more preferable. On the other hand, ownership concentration lowers 
the agency problem arising from dispersing ownership structure since shareholders 
can easily monitor and discipline managers that perform poorly (Admati et al., 
1994).  
 
Controlling shareholders and having large proportions of shares have strong 
incentives to real power, actively monitor, and influence the management (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1986). According to the theory of agency, as mentioned by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986), ownership concentration is a critical factor in corporate governance 
that mitigates the problems of the agency due to the separation of control and 
ownership. The main issue regarding the controversy of ownership concentration-
performance relationship is the possibility of a trade-off between the expropriation 
effect and monitoring effect of concentrated ownership (Filatotchev et al., 2013). 
The possibility of the positive outcome of ownership concentration effect is in 
accordance with its impact on effective monitoring.  
 
Therefore, the mitigation of the agency problem improves the performance (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). The monitoring impact of ownership concentration is paramount 
in a market, where underdevelopment of external corporate governance mechanisms 
exists (Filatotchev et al., 2013). Shareholders are compelled to actively involved in a 
monitoring management as a result of absence in an external managerial discipline, 





Furthermore, from the perspective of expropriation effect, the prediction of 
performance on ownership concentration is considered negative in effect. According 
to Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), the nature of agency problem differs 
significantly between firms with or without large shareholders. The problem of 
agency is likely to move from traditional principal-agent conflict (type 1) to 
principal-principal conflicts (type 2) with the presence of highly concentrated 
ownership (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Young et al., 2008). In addition, the interest 
conflicts increase through ownership concentration between minority and controlling 
shareholders (Filatotchev et al., 2013). 
 
In other words, the resource dependency theory stipulates a positive impact of 
ownership concentration on firm performance by securing different types of 
resources, such as financial and managerial resources. In addition to the 
characteristics of the ownership structure, there are some types of ownership 
structure include foreign, government, institutional, managerial, family and public 
ownership. In this research, the researcher used the managerial ownership, block 
ownership, local institutional ownership, and foreign institutional ownership. 
 
3.2.3.1 Managerial Ownership 
The role of managers in improving firm value is significant. Managers minimize the 
cost associated with agency conflict through quality disclosure, hence an 
improvement in firm value (Bushman & Smith, 2003). As noted by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), managerial ownership is another mechanism used in reducing 
agency problem. Managerial ownership makes managers think and work in 
accordance with the interest of the shareholders. This has the resultant effect of 
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improving firm value. Moreover, the managers develop agency cost by under-
investing or over the investment of available cash flow. Nevertheless, the 
shareholders are at a disadvantage as they pay more monitoring, bonding and 
residual costs for those corporate firms (Hillawi, 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, the managerial ownership allows the shareholders and managers to 
align as the higher the stake of the manager in the firm, the higher the profit the 
manager will share with other shareholders. Hence, the manager will align their 
interest with that of the shareholder and refrain from self-serving behaviour, which 
will improve firm performance.  
 
Share ownership by management in developing countries may adversely affect the 
value of companies as explained in management entrenchment theory. In addition, 
there is an absence of market mechanisms such as a hostile takeover in the event of 
poor management performance. Hostile takeover incentivizes managers to perform 
their duty to secure their jobs. The bonus incentives and appreciation can encourage 
managers to discharge their duty with value and quality for shareholders (Bhagat & 
Jefferis, 2002). There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance (Li & Sun, 2015).  
 
Bos, Pendleton, and Toms (2013) discovered that managerial equity ownership 
below 5% and market disciplinary action are enforced to maximize shareholder 
wealth under UK Companies Law. The performance and executive equity stake 
above 15% threshold enhance the shareholder value by leading disclosure 
requirement while shareholding between 5% and 15% reduced. Chen, Hou and Lee 
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(2012) studied the effect of equity ownership by managers on the performance of the 
publicly listed companies in Taiwan. Based on their findings, insider managerial 
ownership predicts ROA, return on equity and Tobin’s Q but not stock return. Their 
study discovered an inverted U-shape positive association between performance of 
hotel and ownership of the managerial share. This suggested that the positive 
relationship would reach an optimal point. Amran and Ahmad (2013) reported that 
managerial ownership and company performance positively affect firm performance 
as measured by ROA and ROE. This suggested that company performance improves 
with the proportion of insider ownership due to the alignment of managerial-
shareholder interest. Ahmed (2009) reported the positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. Sulong and Nor (2008) documented 
that when managerial ownership is insignificant, they have less incentive to 
maximize organization value. Therefore, the managerial share should be increased to 
reduce agency cost, as owners-managers are more efficient in controlling corporate 
assets.  
 
Nevertheless, other previous studies examined the relationship between the 
managerial ownership and firm performance. Bhagat and Bolton (2009), Fauzi and 
Locke (2012), Florackis (2005), Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007), Makhlouf, Ali 
and Ramli (2017), Sing and Sirmans (2008), Swamy (2011), Ullah, Ali, and 
Mehmood (2017) and Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) stated that there is a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
 
On the other hand, there has been evidence against agency theory. For example, 
Kamardin, Latifa and Mohdb, (2016) conducted a study based on 183 companies 
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listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2006 to 2010. They discovered a negative association 
between managerial ownership and firm performance as measured by the market to 
book value. Khan and Nouman, (2017) also discovered the negative result from the 
majority of firms that firms with the managerial ownership perform worse than the 
other firms. Moreover, a study of Mutize, Aspeling, & Mugobo, (2016) examined 
the relationship between the managerial ownership and firm performance as 
measured by ROA. Furthermore, they revealed that there is a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and the firm performance (ROA) by using a sample 
of 80 South African companies from 2001 to 2010. In another study, Saleh, Zahirdin 
and Octaviani, (2017) used 240 observations over the period of 2010 - 2015 in 
Indonesia to examine the impact of managerial ownership on company performance 
(economic value-add and Tobin's Q). The author’s finding revealed that managerial 
ownership bears a negative relationship with firm performance. Furthermore, 
previous studies recorded a negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance (Belkhir, 2009; Irina & Nadezhda, 2009; Juras & Hinson, 2008; 
Liang et al.,2011; Mandacı & Gumus, 2010; Muravyev et al.,2010; Din & Javid, 
2011; Wahla et al., 2012). Furthermore, Juras and Hinson (2008), Mohd (2011), 
Nuryanah and Islam (2011), Garcı´a-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2011) reported the 
non-significant relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.  
 
As managerial ownership reduces the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders, different results reveal the positive and negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. Thus, the researcher intends to shed 
more light on the inconclusiveness and the inconsistencies in the findings. Table 3.6 
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summarizes the results of empirical studies concerning the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance as discussed above. 
 
Table 3.6 
Summary of Empirical Findings on the Relationship between Managerial Ownership 
and Firm Performance 
Study Sample Measure Findings 




firms listed on 
Amman Stock 
Exchange from 2009 
to 2013 in Jordan. 




31 firms of all firms in 
financial sector during 




83 unlisted families 
over  
2008 until 2010 
ROA and ROE Positive 




sectors’ group firms 
listed on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange 
(KSE) covering a 
period from 2004 to 
2012. 
Tobin’s Q and ROA Positive 
Bhagat and Bolton 
(2009)  
1500 large firms 
during from 1999 to 
2007 in US. 




large firms that were 





Sing and Sirmans  
(2008)  
228 Real Estate firms 
that were listed on the 
Singapore Stock 
Exchange that the 





Fauzi and Locke 
 (2012) 
79 New Zealand listed 
firms from 2007 to 
2011 
Tobin’s Q and ROA Positive 
Chen, Hou and Lee 
(2012) 
364 observations for 7 
hotels in Taiwan.  
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
and ROE 
Positive  
Amran and Ahmad 
(2013) 
420 companies listed 
on Bursa Malaysia for 
the year from 2003 to 
2007 
ROA and ROE  Positive 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Kapopoulos and 
Lazaretou (2007)  
175 firms in Greek in 
2000  




firms through 2006 
and 2008 in Malaysia.  
ROA Not 
significant 
Juras and Hinson 
(2008)  
Public banks and 
commercial database 
FOR the period was 








46 companies from 












listed on the Madrid 
Stock Exchange that it 
was 254 firms -year 
observation for the 
period from 1999 to 








406 listed companies 
on KLSE 2002 in 
Malaysia. 
Tobin’s Q Not 
significant 
Kamardin, Latifa 
and Mohdb  
(2016) 
183 companies listed 
on Bursa Malaysia in 
the year 2006 to 2010. 




and Mugobo  
(2016) 








firms of Karachi stock 
exchange in Pakistan.  
Tobin’s Q Negative 
Liang et al. 
(2011)  
907 firms in Taiwan 
during 1999- 2008.  
ROA and Tobin’s Q Negative 
Din and Javid 
 (2011)  
 
60 firm non-financial 
firms in Pakistan 
during 2000-2007.  







companies on the 
Istanbul Stock 
Exchange during 2005 
in Turkey 
ROA and Tobin’s Q 
 
Negative 
Muravyev et al. 
 (2010)  
916 companies over a 
five-year period from 
2002 to 2006 in 
Ukraine.  
ROA, Return on 







Table 3.6 (Continued) 




240 observations over 
the period 2010–2015 
in Indonesia. 
Economic 
Value Added (EVA) 
and Tobin’s Q 
Negative 
Khan and Nouman  
(2017) 
177 non-financial 
listed firms during 
2004 to 2014 in 
Pakistan 
Tobin’s Q and ROA Negative 
Belkhir  
(2009) 
260 US firms in 2002  Tobin’s Q Negative   
Irina and 
Nadezhda 
 (2009)  
 
270 German firms, 
2000-2006 
ROA and Tobin’s Q 
 
Negative   
Juras and Hinson 
(2008) 
370 US firms, 1999-
2003 
ROA and Tobin’s Q 
 
Negative   
 
3.2.3.2 Ownership Concentration 
There are different perspectives that the ownership concentration can benefit firms. 
Better funding sources and superior sustainable performance, benefits of ownership 
concentration can be gained through decisions that are more effective (James, 2006). 
In addition, the board of directors in a firm with high ownership concentration, such 
as family or state ownership (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008; Miller 
& Le Breton-Miller, 2005) provide better support, valuable advice and more relevant 
knowledge to management that facilitate and improve firm performance. 
Furthermore, concentrated shareholders are more concerned with a long or short-
term success of a firm compared to other shareholders with a small stake in the firm.  
 
Therefore, prior studies presented two conflicting ideas. First, the ownership 
concentration could be a form of monitoring mechanisms preventing the 
opportunistic behaviour. For instance, through their trading activity to discipline 
management, this approach is considered an effective tool (Admati & Pfleiderer, 
2009; Edmans, 2009). The second view presents its submission on the possible 
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collusion between management and majority shareholders to expropriate 
shareholders in minority (Claessens et al., 2000; Shleifer & Vishy, 1997). The next 
sub-headings discuss the findings of previous studies in relation to individual block 
shareholder, local institutional shareholder, foreign institutional shareholder, and 
firm performance.   
 
3.2.3.2.1 Block Shareholder Ownership 
Block shareholding that owns of a large unit of shares by individuals is another type 
of ownership structure (Habbash, 2010). Previous studies provide evidence 
suggesting that individual block shareholders are as well as effective monitoring 
mechanisms. This type of shareholders has the ability to supervise and influence 
board structure through voting rights (Persons, 2006).Zhong et al. (2007) classified 
block shareholders to larger and small block shareholders with an explanation of the 
various influence wielded by each class. According to him, the small block 
shareholders might decide disposes of their shares when the company’s performance 
is no longer favourable to them. Nevertheless, they may face some difficulties at the 
point of selling their shares due to the poor performance of the company and 
therefore might rather decide to employ some monitoring strategy to improve 
managerial performance. By doing so, large block shareholders create pressure on 
the managers more in order to improve financial performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). In other words, theoretical postulation suggests that dispersed ownership can 





Many studies discovered a significant positive association between block 
shareholding and corporate market value. For example, Berkman et al. (2009) 
reported that non-controlling block shareholders ranging from two to ten have the 
strongest incentive to monitor and control expropriation. Qiu and Yao (2009) 
reported that corporate performance improves with a high proportion of block-
holding ranging from 2nd to 10th largest shareholders. Mashhadani and Fatlawi (2012) 
reported that the existence of the largest shareholders in Iraqi companies increases 
earning management. 
 
Nevertheless, Abbas, Naqvi and Mirza (2013) and Khan and Nouman (2017) 
examined the relationship between largest shareholder and firm performance for a 
sample of listed non-financial firms of Pakistan. They discovered that largest 
shareholder is positively related to firm performance. Moreover, Isik and Soykan 
(2013) considered that block shareholder to improve firm performance. They also 
discovered that block shareholder improves firm performance by examining a 
sample of 164 industrial firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2010. 
 
Other previous studies examined the relationship between block shareholder and 
firm performance. For example, Boone, Colombage and Gunasekarage (2011), Ke 
and Isaac (2007), and Mourier (2010). They revealed a positive relationship between 
block ownership and firm performance. In addition, Moscu et al. (2015) in their 
studies discovered that the relationship between block ownership and firm 




In contrary, Aluchna and Kaminski, (2017) provided evidence of a negative 
association between block shareholder and firm value by using a sample of 495 
Polish non-financial firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in years 2005-2014. 
In a study conducted by Konijn, Kräussl and Lucas (2011), it discovered that block 
shareholder negatively associated with firm performance by using a sample of 3654 
firm-year observations in the USA. Furthermore, Filatotchev, Kapelyushnikov, 
Dyomina and Aukutsionek (2001), Hamadi (2010) discovered that there is a negative 
relationship between block ownership and firm performance in Russian and Belgium 
respectively. 
 
As revealed in the above-reviewed literature, the findings from previous studies are 
mixed. Both monitoring hypotheses could explain the mixed results. The monitoring 
hypothesis recognized the monitoring prowess of institutional investors and their 
ability to persuade managers to improve firm performance. Nevertheless, a family or 
controlling companies held substantial shares in the Middle East countries like Iraq. 
Thus, the interest of top shareholders is likely to be diverse and the monitoring 
hypothesis might not be applicable. In this context, this study examines the firm 
performance and impact of the top share ownership. 
 
The block shareholding owns a large number of shares and is well effective in 
monitoring mechanisms. Thus, the shareholding system has the potential to influence 
the firm performance of any developing country. With the various views on this 
variable, this type of shareholders should be tested to understand whether it has the 
ability to supervise and influence board structure over firm performance. Table 3.7 
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summarizes the results of empirical studies concerning the relationship between 
block ownership and firm performance as discussed above. 
 
Table 3.7 
Summary of Empirical Findings on the Relationship between Block Shareholder 
Ownership and Firm Performance 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Moscu et al. 
 (2015) 
55 companies listed on the 
Bucharest Stock Exchange in 
2010-2013. 




Khan and Nouman  
(2017) 
177 non-financial firms from 
2004 to 2014 in Pakistan 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Positive  
Boone, Colombage, and 
Gunasekarage 
 (2011) 
612 observations during 
2002 to 2007 in New 
Zealand 
Tobin’s Q and 
MTB 
Positive  
Abbas, Naqvi, and 
Mirza(2013) 
100 listed non financial firms 
of Pakistan. 
ROA and ROE Positive 
Isik and Soykan 
(2013) 
164 industrial firms listed on 
Istanbul Stock Exchange 
from 2003 to 2010 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Positive 
Ke and Isaac 
 (2007) 
All the listed property 
companies on China’s stock 
market from 2000 to 2002 
EPS and ROA  Positive  
Mourier 
(2010) 
5829 companies used in the 
analysis covers the initial 15 
member states of the 
European Union plus 
Norway and USA 
Tobin’s Q Positive 
Buallay, Hamdan, and 
Zureigat 
 (2017) 
171 listed companies for the 
period from 2012 to 2014 in 
Saudi Arabia.  
Tobin’s Q, 
ROA, and ROE 
Not 
significant 
Leković, and Marić 
(2016) 







76 manufacturing companies 
listed on the Ho Chi Minh 
Stock Exchange during 
2007-2015 
Tobin’s Q Not 
significant 
Aluchna and Kaminski 
 (2017) 
495 Polish non-financial 
firms listed on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange in years 
2005-2014. 
ROA Negative 
Konijn, Kräussl, and 
Lucas (2011) 
3654 firm-year observations 
in US. 





150 privatized manufacturing 
enterprises surveyed in late 
1999 by the Russian 
Economic Barometer (REB) 
ROA and ROS Negative  
Hamadi 
(2010) 
712 observations during 
1991 to 1996 in Belgium 
Tobin’s Q Negative 
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3.2.3.2.2 Local Institutional Shareholders 
Institutional ownership refers to the ownership stake in a firm that is held by large 
institutions, such as mutual funds, banks, insurance companies and pension funds 
(Davis & Steil, 2004). Local institutional shareholders refer to a major governance 
mechanism that has a direct influence on firm performance due to the growing 
volume of corporate equity that institutional investors control and own. In addition, 
only large shareholders such as institutional investors can effectively monitor 
managers and reduce agency problems given the high-costmonitoring (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). Based on different theoretical perspectives, the impact of institutional 
ownership on firm performance is discussed. 
 
The assumption of the agency theory is that monitoring is helpful in mitigating 
agency conflicts between managers and investors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Solomon, 2013). The incentive and ability to discipline and control managers are 
possessed by the institutional investors (Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; Ping & Wing, 
2011). The institutional investors can provide which significantly enhance firm 
performance (Alves, 2012; Arouri, Hossain & Muttakin, 2014). The positive impacts 
of institutional investors on firm performance are attributed to the substantial 
managerial and financial resources on the resource dependency theory. Local 
institutional investors possess stronger incentives to protect their investments and 
obtain benefit due to their large stock holdings (Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). Besides, the local institutional investors also can effectively use their power 
to control the activities of the manager, direct board decisions and absorb the cost of 
effective monitoring better than small shareholders as they are more professional 
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regarding businesses, industries and capital markets (Rose, 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). 
 
According to Claessens and Fan (2002) and Porter (1992), institutional investors are 
not active in controlling management activities. On the other hand, institutional 
investors are passive investors who are more likely to sell their holdings in poorly 
performing firms than to expend their resources in monitoring and improving their 
performance (Duggal & Millar, 1999). Furthermore, the institutional owners are 
unwilling to exercise their right to monitor managers or improve firm performance, 
especially in long-term as they are more likely to target liquidity and short-term 
investments instead of long-term investments (Coffee, 1991; Ozkan, 2007). From 
another perspective, the institutional investors of all stripes are more likely to take 
flight than fight when trouble appears (Martin & Bogle, 2011). Thus, institutional 
investors have no incentive to assist the firm when a firm starts to perform poorly. 
Hence, they tend to sell shares.  
 
According to Staubo, (2010), the institutional shareholders appoint an independent 
director in boardroom thereby preserving board independence. The managers make 
an adequate disclosure due to board independence (Laidroo, 2009). Gaspar and 
Massa (2007); Hansena, Miletkovb, and Wintokic (2015) noted the reporting 
transparency will reduce information asymmetry and protect investors right.  
 
Past studies examined the effects of institutional investors on firm performance. This 
class of investors could be either institutional investors in short terms or institutional 
investors in long-term (i.e. those who invest with the intention to hold the shares for 
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a long-term). Past studies revealed that there is the difference in the influence of both 
long-term and short-term institutional holdings. For instance, Abash (2010) argued 
that long-term institutional investors are active corporate governance mechanisms 
compared to the short-term investors. This is due to the reason that the short-term 
investors are only interested in current earning (Bushed, 2001).  
 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) investigated the monitoring role of institutional investors 
by using a global data set obtained from 27 regions. The findings revealed that firms 
having a larger percentage of international institutional shareholding discharge their 
duty better with respect to value and lower capital expenditure. The study also 
investigated the impact of concentrated ownership on the value of the firm (Yeh, 
2005). The result revealed that an increase in large shareholder ownership improves 
the market values of the companies. In support of earlier findings, Kapopoulos, and 
Lazaretou (2007) concluded that companies with concentrated ownership improve 
profitability. Mashhadani and Fatlawi (2012) reported that ownership concentration 
reduces earning management in Iraqi companies. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) 
reported that institutional investors positively affect firm performance.  
 
Moreover, Leng (2004) evaluated the relationship between the local institutional 
ownership and the firm performance among the Malaysian companies. The study 
involved a sample of 77 firms listed on the KL Stock Exchange during the years 
1996 to 1999. Based on which, the positive impact of the local institutional 




Similarly, Nuryanah and Islam (2011) investigated the impact of local institutional 
ownership on the firm performance using a sample of 46 companies from the 
financial sectors from the years 2002 to 2004 in Indonesia. The result of the study 
suggested that an increase in the local institutional ownership could improve the 
companies’ market values. This evidence was substantiated by Uwuigbe and 
Olusanmi (2012) which demonstrated similar findings based on a sample of 31 firms 
in the financial sector during 2006-2010 in Nigeria. Likewise, Ullah, Ali and 
Mehmood (2017) noted a positive relationship between the local institutional 
ownership and Tobin's Q in a sample of 184 non-financial sectors’ group firms listed 
on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) from 2004 to 2012. Also, Balagobei and 
Velnampy (2017) documented a positive impact of local institutional investors on 
the firm performance in Sri Lanka. 
 
Furthermore, Harjoto and Jo (2008), Imam and Malik (2007), Irina and Nadezhda 
(2009), Kyereboah-Coleman (2007), Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), and Tornyeva 
and Wereko (2012) reported that the local institutional ownership positively affects 
the firm performance in their studies. Additionally, Sharma and Sharma (2016) 
conducted a panel data analysis of 20 firms in the Indian manufacturing sector from 
the years 2001 to 2010. The study again revealed a positive relationship between the 
local institutional ownership and the firm performance in terms of Tobin's. The 
relationship of the local institutional ownership with ROA, ROE, Net Profit Margin 
and Stock Returns was however insignificant. 
 
On the contrary, some previous studies documented a negative relationship between 
the local institutional ownership and the firm performance. Al Farooque et al. (2007) 
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investigated the association between the local institutional ownership and the firm 
performance (MTB) in Bangladesh using a sample of 723 companies from the years 
1995 to 2002. Based on a sample of 240 observations over the period of 2010–2015 
in Indonesia, the study suggested that the local institution has a negative impact on 
the firm performance (Saleh, Zahirdin, and Octaviani, 2017). Similarly, (Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2007; Mura, 2007; Khan & Nouman, 2017; Khanna & Palepu, 1999) 
provided evidence indicating a negative association between the local institutional 
ownership and the firm value.  
 
However, there are accounts of insignificant relationship between local institutional 
ownership and firm performance by Aljifri and Moustafa (2007); Joher and Ali 
(2005); and Abdulsamad and Yusoff (2016) in companies Malaysia. Similarity, 
Chung et al. (2008), and Ongore (2011) found that the relation between local 
institutional ownership and firm performance were insignificant in Korea and Kenya 
respectively. 
 
Therefore, the inconsistencies in the above results provoked the essence of 
introducing institutional ownership into the board structure. There is a need to make 
a further investigation of the relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance in listed firms of ISX. This will clarify the statement that managerial 
ownership in Iraq would provide the managers with the incentive to act in the 
interest of shareholders. Table 3.8 summarizes the results of empirical studies 






Summary of Empirical Findings on the Relationship between Local Institutional 
Ownership and Firm Performance 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Sharma and Sharma 
(2016)  
20 firms of the Indian 
manufacturing sector for 
the period 2001-2010. 
ROA, ROE, 













Irina and Nadezhda  
(2009)  
270 companies for the 
period of 2000-2006 in 
German. 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA  
Positive  
Harjoto and Jo 
 (2008)  
14757 firm-years during 









31 firms of all firms in 
financial sector during 
2006-2010 in Nigeria.  
ROA  Positive  
Nuryanah and Islam 
(2011)  
46 companies from 
financial sectors over 
2002-2004 in Indonesia.   
Tobin’s Q Positive  
Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007)  
103 listed firms drawn 
from Ghana, South Africa, 
Nigeria and Kenya 
covering the five year 
period 1997-2001.  
Tobin’s Q Positive  
Imam and Malik 
 (2007)  
All non-financial over 
2000-2003 in Bangladesh.  
Tobin’s Q Positive  
Leng 
(2004)  
77 firms that were listed 
on the KL Stock Exchange 
that the period of study 







Tornyeva and Wereko 
(2012) 
19 Ghanaian firms, 2005-
2009. 
ROA and ROE Positive  
Balagobei and 
Velnampy(2017) 
295 companies for 2015in  
 Sri Lanka. 
ROE Positive  
Ullah, Ali, and 
Mehmood 
(2017) 
184 non-financial sectors’ 
group firms listed on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange 
(KSE) covering a period 
from 2004 to 2012. 




435 of the largest 
European companies in 
1990  
MTB Positive  
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Table 3.8 (Continued) 




369 listed Malaysia 
companies over the period 






Chung et al. 
(2008)  
377 firms that the period 
was during 1999 to 2005 





Aljifri and Moustafa 
(2007)  
51 firms through 2004 in 
UAE. 
Tobin’s Q Not 
significant 
Joher and Ali 
(2005)  
100 firms over 5 years 
from 1997 to 2001 in 
Malaysia. 




42 listed companies in 
Kenya 




1100 listed non-financial 
firms in UK. 
Tobin’s Q Negative  
Al Farooque et al. 
(2007)  
All listed financial and 
non-financial that was 
listed on Dhaka Stock 
Exchange. The sample 
was based on 723 
companies covering 8 
years from 1995 to 2002 in 
Bangladesh.  
Market-to-




103 listed firms drawn 
from Ghana, South Africa, 
Nigeria and Kenya 
covering the five year 




Saleh, Zahirdin, and 
Octaviani 
(2017) 
240 observations over the 







Khan and Nouman  
(2017) 
177 non-financial listed 
firms during 2004 to 2014 
in Pakistan 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Negative 
Khanna and Palepu  
(1999) 
Indian firms from 1990, 
1993, and 1994 
Tobin’s Q Negative   
 
3.2.3.2.3 Foreign Ownership 
Previous studies showed that foreign ownership affects firm performance from two 
perspectives. According to agency theory, foreign ownership refers to a source of 
effective monitoring and managerial skills in corporate governance (Choi et al., 
2012; Khanna & Palepu, 1999). From this perspective, the foreign investors act as 
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monitoring forces to reduce the decision of the managers or internal owners that may 
be expensive to the shareholders. The corporate governance can be improved by 
becoming external large shareholders and board members (Choi et al., 2012). High 
level of accounting practices and information disclosure are required by the foreign 
investors improve the firm performance. The investors can also transfer useful and 
new technology and knowledge (Ghahroudi, 2011; Kimura & Kiyota, 2007). The 
domestic investors in the emerging markets have less highly developed skills 
compared to the foreign investors. Thus, there are only a few agency problems 
among firms with high foreign ownership (Koo & Maeng, 2006). Meanwhile, the 
setback is it can harm the firm if the foreign ownership becomes saturated. Besides, 
when the stock holding increases to a certain level by the foreign investors and 
subsequently turn to large shareowners, the investors have the potential to affect the 
decisions of the management in a way that favour them by exploiting wealth from 
the minority shareholders. The firm performance can be improved by monitoring 
when the foreign ownership level is moderate or minor. Hence, the large foreign 
ownership can hinder the performance (Choi et al., 2012).  
 
According to the resource dependency theory, the substantial financial and 
managerial resources are achieved due to a positive relationship between foreign 
investors and firm performance. The institutional investors can provide a significant 
effect, which enhances the firm performance (Alves, 2012; Arouri, Hossain & 
Muttakin, 2014).  
 
There are studies that reveal a positive association between foreign ownership and 
firm performance. According to Ongore (2011), there is a significant and positive 
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relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance by investigating the 
impacts of different types of ownership on firm performance in Kenya. The study 
stated that management systems are improved by investors and accessible resources 
provided by foreign investors. Pervan, Pervan and todoric (2012) evaluated the 
relationship between corporate ownership and firm performance and discovered that 
the listed firms in Croatia controlled by foreign investors achieve more compared to 
the local firms. Similarly, Wellalage and Locke (2012) employed panel data from the 
listed firm in Sri Lanka to examine the effect of ownership structure on the financial 
performance of the firm. The study also discovered that foreign ownership has a 
positive effect on firm performance.  
 
Khanna and Palepu (1999) examined the impact of foreign institutional and domestic 
institutional ownership on firm performance. The study used data from Indian firms 
in 1990, 1993 and 1994 and discovered that domestic institutional ownership has a 
negative impact on firm performance. On the other hand, the foreign institutional 
ownership has a positive effect on firm performance. The study revealed that while 
domestic institutional ownership is not good for monitoring, the foreign institutional 
ownership acted as a good monitor. In Norway and Sweden, Oxelheim and Randoy 
(2003) examined the impact of foreign board membership on firm performance to 
show a positive relationship. The study discovered that firms achieved better 
corporate governance with foreign board membership (Anglo-American). Therefore, 
this increases the firm value. Subsequently, it enhances the performance of the firm. 
The developed markets and the emerging markets should observe this achievement 




Moreover, the Russian firms with foreign direct investment have higher productivity 
compared to the domestic firms (Yudaeva et al., 2003). Nevertheless, this result is 
not general for all locations in Russia. In some regions where reform is slow, the 
negative results were recorded. Filatotchev et al. (2008) analysed data of 434 firms 
in Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and stated the foreign ownership has a 
positive relationship with export intensity of firm.  
 
Douma et al. (2006) studied data from 1005 firms in India from 1999 to 2000 and 
discovered that foreign ownership has a positive effect on corporate performance in 
India as it is separated into corporate and institutional ownership. This study was 
based on multi-theoretical perspectives, such as resource-based and agency theories 
as foreign shareholders can be a role of the monitor in internal governance. The 
study is conformed to the result of Khanna and Palepu (1999). Similarly, Huang and 
Shiu (2009) discovered that foreign ownership in Taiwanese firms as the foreign 
investors act as the monitors and thus has a positive effect on firm performance.  
 
Furthermore, Koo and Maeng (2006) conducted a study on Korean manufacturing 
companies from 1992 to 2002 and discovered the negative relationship between 
foreign ownership and cash flow sensitivity. The outcome showed that foreign 
ownership assists the firms to overcome financial challenges, enhance easy access to 
external finance thereby leading to higher performance, and increase the 
investments. In Japan, the foreign-owned firms perform better than the domestically 
owned firms (Kimura & Kiyota, 2007). The finding showed that improved firm 




In addition, Ghahroudi (2011) examined 3500 foreign subsidiaries and discovered 
that foreign ownership has a positive relationship with knowledge transfer in the 
subsidiaries with a high number of foreign employees and managers. Furthermore, 
Nakano and Nguyen (2012) examined the impact of foreign ownership on firm 
performance in the Japanese electronics industry from 1998 to 2011. The foreign 
ownership has a significant relationship with the value of firms. The foreign 
ownership reduces the sub-optimal decisions by managers due to its monitoring role.  
 
Moreover, Kolasa et al. (2010) examined the impact of the global financial recession 
on firms in Poland and discovered that foreign-owned firms effectively deal with the 
challenges as they can proffer solution in demand and credit constraints. 
Nevertheless, Mihai (2012) stated that the positive effect of foreign ownership on 
firm performance reduced in the crisis period on listed firms of the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange.  
 
Some past studies stated that there is a non-linear relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance. Gurbuz and Aybas (2010) stated that the 
relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance resulted in an inverted 
U-shape by using data from the Turkish firm from 2005 to 2007. This implies that in 
the initial stage, firm performance is increased through an increase in foreign 
ownership. Nevertheless, the relationship becomes negative after the inflexion point. 
In addition, Azzam et al. (2013) discovered that foreign ownership improves firm 
performance to some extent and later decreases by using panel data analysis for 8185 
firms in Egypt during 2006-2010. Greenaway et al. (2014) stated that there is a non-
linear association between foreign ownership and firm performance of non-listed 
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21582 firms in China from 2000-2005. The study discovered if there is an increase in 
foreign ownership by 47 percent to 61 per cent, the firm performance also increases. 
Nonetheless, if the increases continue, the performance of the firms may collapse. 
The study added that foreign owners from Taiwan, Macao and Hong Kong to make 
more impacts on Chinese firm performance.   
 
Choi et al. (2012) showed an empirical result of inverted U-shape in a relationship 
between foreign ownership and firm performance in Korean listed firms from the 
period 2004 to 2005. The study claimed that by activation of independent monitoring 
foreign ownership increases the firm performance, whereas the performance drops 
when the foreign contingent becomes well concentrated to control the board.  
 
Several studies, such as Al Manaseer et al. (2012), Balagobei and Velnamp (2017); 
Chari et al. (2012), Choi et al. (2007), Dwivedi and Jain (2005), Filatotchev et al. 
(2007), Ghahroudi (2011), Isa (2017), Anum Mohd Ghazali (2010), Tornyeva and 
Wereko (2012) and Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) discovered the positive 
relationship between firm performance and foreign ownership. For instance, 
Kamardin, Latifa and Mohdb (2016) recorded the negative relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm performance in Malaysia by using a sample of 183 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2006 to 2010. Nevertheless, Abdulsamad 
and Yusoff (2016) and Sulong and Nor (2008) discovered the significant relationship 
between foreign ownership and firm performance in Malaysia. Furthermore, Khan 
and Nouman (2017) examined the relationship between foreign ownership and firm 
performance by using a sample of 177 non-financial listed firms from 2004 to 2014 
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in Pakistan. The results revealed an insignificant association between foreign 
ownership and firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA). 
 
Furthermore, another previous study conducted by Millet-Reyes and Zhao (2010), 
Shanand McIver (2011), and Tsegba and Ezi-Herbert (2011) stated that there is an 
insignificant relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance. In 
contrary, Sharma and Sharma (2016) investigated 20 firms of the Indian 
manufacturing sector from 2001 to 2010 and discovered that there is a positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance with Tobin's Q but 
insignificant with ROA, ROE, Net Profit Margin and Stock Returns.  
 
In relation to the diverse results on the relationship between foreign ownership and 
firm performance, the statement that an increase in foreign ownership from the initial 
stage will increase firm performance. Nevertheless, the relationship becomes 
negative prompted the necessity of investigating the variable more in the long run 
after the inflectional point. Table 3.9 summarizes the results of empirical studies 












Summary of Empirical Findings on the Relationship between Foreign Ownership 
and Firm Performance 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Sharma and Sharma 
(2016)  
20 firms of the Indian 
manufacturing sector for the 
period 2001-2010. 
ROA, ROE, 













Chari et al. 
(2012)  
The data was selected during 
1980-2006 in US. 
ROA Positive 
Ghahroudi 
 (2011)  
3500 foreign firms in Japan 
during 2006.  
Net profit, ROA 
& ROS  
Positive 
Filatotchev et al. 
(2007)  
 
40246 industry firms that 
were the period 1997 and 




Uwuigbe and Olusanmi 
 (2012)  
31 Nigerian firms, 2006-
2010  
ROA Positive 
Al Manaseer et al. 
(2012)  
15 banks in Jordan over 
2007- 2009 in Jordan.  
ROE, ROA, PM 
& EPR  
Positive 
Anum Mohd Ghazali 
(2010)  
87 non-companies during 
2001 in Malaysia.  
Tobin’s Q Positive 
Choi et al. 
(2007)  
457companies during 1999 
to 2002 in Korea. 
Tobin’s Q Positive 
Dwivedi and Jain 
(2005) 
340 listed Indian firms 
between 1997 and 2001. 
Tobin’s Q Positive 
Isa  
(2017) 
122 listed firms in Nigeria 
between 2014 and 2015. 
ROA and ROE  Positive  
Tornyeva and Wereko 
(2012) 
19 Ghanaian firms, 2005-
2009 




295 companies for 2015in  
 Sri Lanka. 
ROE Positive  
Ongore  
(2011) 
42 listed companies in Kenya ROA  Positive 
Wellalage and Locke 
 (2012) 
152 listed on the Colombo 
Stock Exchange (CSE) over 
the period 2004 to 2009 in 
Sri Lanka. 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Positive  
Khanna and Palepu  
(1999) 
Indian firms from 1990, 
1993, and 1994 
Tobin’s Q Positive  
Oxelheim and Randøy 
(2003) 
253 traded companies in 
Norway and Sweden for 
period 1996, 1997, and 1998. 
Tobin’s Q Positive  
Douma et al. 
(2006) 
1005 Indian firms from 1999 
to 2000 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Positive  
Huang and Shiu 
 (2009) 
Sample consists of annual 
data from 1995 to 2001 for 





Table 3.9 (Continued) 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Ghahroudi  
(2011) 
3500 foreign subsidiaries in 
Japan 
ROA Positive  
Nakano and Nguyen 
(2012) 
Electronics firms listed on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
over the period 1998–2011 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Positive 
Azzam et al. 
(2013) 
Panel data from 8185 
Egyptian firms from 2006 to 
2010 
Return on assets 
(ROA), return 
on equity (ROE) 
and debt ratio 
(DR) 
Positive  
Abdulsamad and Yusoff 
 (2016) 
369 listed Malaysia 
companies over the period of 






Shan and McIver 
(2011)  
540 firm from non-financial 
sectors which listed in Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange over 
2001-2005.  
Tobin’s Q Not 
significant 
Millet-Reyes and Zhao 
(2010)  
174 French companies from 







Tsegba and Ezi-Herbert  
(2011)  
73 firms listed on the Nigeria 
Stock Exchange during the 
period 2001-2007. 
Market price per 




Khan and Nouman  
(2017) 
177 non-financial listed firms 
during 2004 to 2014 in 
Pakistan 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Not 
significant   
Sulong and Nor 
(2008) 
406 listed companies on 
KLSE 2002 in Malaysia. 
Tobin’s Q Not 
significant 
Kamardin, Latifa and 
Mohdb  
(2016) 
Companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia in the year 2006 to 
2010 
 Market to book 
value 
Negative 
Gurbuz and Aybars 
 (2010) 
205 non-financial listed 
companies covering the 3 




















with ROA.  
Pervan, Pervan and 
Todoric 
 (2012) 
1430 observations from 
listed Croatian firms from 








3.2.4 External Audit Quality 
Today, there is no consensus on the exact definition of audit quality and how best to 
measure audit quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). The definition of audit quality 
varies based on the perceptions of the users of the financial statement. For instance, 
to an investor, an audited financial statement should be free from any material 
misstatement and fraud, whereas the auditors perceive an audit quality to mean an 
audit engagement that complies with all regulatory requirements (Wooten, 2003). 
The different perceptions between the auditor and users of the financial statement, of 
what an audit quality refers to, create an expectation gap. The investors see the work 
of an auditor as the detection and prevention of fraud (Zhao, 2010). Nevertheless, 
according to the auditors, an audit is expected to provide an assurance on the 
credibility of the financial statement based on evidence that is available at the 
disposal of the auditor (Wooten, 2003). According to DeAngelo (1981), audit quality 
refers to the likelihood of auditor detecting a material misstatement in the financial 
statement and his ability to report such misstatement. Based on DeAngelo’s (1981) 
definition, the auditor skills and independence determine the extent of audit quality. 
In Chia-Ah and Karlsson (2010) view, any threat to auditor’s independence 
undermines the auditor’s ability to conduct an audit effectively. 
 
Objectivity is the watchword of an auditor. An auditor is expected to be independent 
in mind and in appearance (Chia-Ah & Karlsson, 2010). When the external auditor is 
independent objectivity in financial reporting is guaranteed, the users of the financial 
statement are confident with the information contained in the financial statement. 
The auditor provides an opinion without compromising his professional judgment by 
being independent-minded. Meanwhile, independence in appearance suggests that 
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the auditor to avoid the situation that will warrant a third party to believe that he or 
she is not objective. Long auditor tenure could threaten the independence of auditors 
(Jackson et al., 2008).  
 
The proxy used to characteristic audit quality is the number of fees received by the 
auditor. Asthana and Boone (2012) conducted a study on the association between 
audit quality and audit fees measures. They discovered that fees of abnormal audit 
lead to lower quality of the audit. In the case of Choi et al. (2010), a non-linear and 
unsymmetrical relationship was established between audit quality and audit fees, 
depending on the signs given by the abnormal audit fees. Zureigat (2010) studied the 
association between financial structure and audit quality of a listed firm in Jordan.  
 
Coulton et al. (2014) investigated the relationship between the measures of audit 
quality and audit fees. The study demonstrated that the higher abnormal audit fees 
and annual excess fees are generally associated with a lower audit quality; while a 
multi-period measure, which implies consistently high audit fees, is related with a 
long-term positive relationship between audit fees and audit quality. In the same 
vein, Nam (2011) evaluated the link between audit quality of firms and audit fees as 
a proxy for auditor’s independence in New Zealand. This study found that the 
provided non-audit services by the auditors of a firm contain the abnormal audit fee 
change rate. The independence of the author is negatively related to the auditor’s 
independence from the previous year effect on the audit fee and the audit quality that 




The audit found a significant relationship between the two variables, indicating that 
provision of non-service by the auditors impair the auditor’s independence. Woodl 
and Reynolds (2003) examined the relationship between a financial statement and an 
audit fee. It was demonstrated that the financial statements are affected by the audit 
fees. Nevertheless, auditor size, tenure and industry specialization does not affect the 
audio quality. 
 
Towards this end, some previous researchers believed that Big 4 auditors received 
high audit fees due to a greater monitoring effort (Sayyar et al. 2015). Accordingly, 
the studies established a link between the amount of money paid as audit fees and 
audit quality (Hoitash, Markelevich & Barragato, 2007; Hamid & Abdullah 2012). 
The studies claimed that the higher the audit fees, the higher the audit quality. Thus, 
audit fees paid to the auditor could indicate a higher audit quality because high audit 
fees are assumed to reflect the auditors’ effort and the specialized audit staff 
involved in the audit engagement (O’Sullivan & Diacon, 2002). Sayyar et al. (2015) 
investigated the impact of audit quality (proxied by audit fees) on the firm 
performance among the Malaysian listed companies during the period of 2003 to 
2012. The study revealed a significant negative relationship between the audit fees 
and ROA. Meanwhile, there was a significant positive relationship between the audit 
fees and Tobin’s Q. Likewise, the relationship between audit fees, non-audit fees and 
Tobin’s Q among Brazilian audit firm was studied by Martinez and Moraes, (2014) 





In Moutinho et al. (2012) finding, operating performance increases as the audit fees 
increase and the performance decrease with the audit fees since the audit quality (as 
a proxy for by audit fees) improves performance. Moutinho et al.(2012); Martinez 
and Moraes, (2014) this study argues that the firms with poor corporate governance 
could hire good auditors that could enhance the value of the firm at the market 
because the auditor with a reputation that charges high audit fees is likely to provide 
advice to the board on how to enhance their governance mechanisms. Moreover, 
auditors with a good reputation are less likely to get engaged with the companies 
with a poor governance mechanism.  
 
Furthermore, Aledwan, Aledwan, and Alkubisi (2015) examined the relationship 
between audit quality and firm performance by using a sample of listed Cement 
firms in Jordan from 2009 to 2013. The result suggested a positive relationship 
between the audit quality and the firm performance (net profit margin). 
 
Similarly, the investigations of the Nigerian firms from the years 2007 to 2011 by 
Hassan and Farouk (2014) revealed a positive relationship between the external audit 
and the firm performance. On the contrary, Aryan (2015) discovered that the 
relationship was insignificant based on a sample of 69 companies during the study 
period (2009-2014) in Jordan.  
 
Essentially, a high-quality auditing improves the firm values whereby the auditors 
that have a good reputation reduce the rate of uncertainty in the firm financial 
statements. It is highly important for the newly introduced code or the potential 
auditing laws and regulations to set standards to be followed by the Iraqi companies 
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listed in the stock exchange for external auditing. In addition, the study shall fill the 
gap of a few studies that explored the idea of external auditing. As external auditing 
is essential to curb any trace of financial manipulation in a company or firm, so as 
the quality of the auditing. Table 3.10 summarizes the results of the empirical studies 




 Summary of Empirical Findings on the Relationship between External Audit and 
Firm Performance 
Study Sample Measure Findings 
Sayyar et al.  
(2015) 
Malaysian listed companies 
between the periods of 2003 
to 2012 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA  
Positive with 
Tobin’s Q and 
negative with 
ROA  
Hassan and Farouk  
(2014) 
Firms in Nigeria over a 





Martinez and Moraes 
(2014) 
Brazilian public companies 
in the period from 2009 to 
2011 
Tobin’s Q Positive  
Aledwan, Aledwan, and 
Alkubisi 
(2015) 
Listed Cement Firms in 






69 companies during the 






Moutinho et al. 
(2012) 
Sample of U.S. publicly 
traded, non-financial firms 
covering the period from 
2000 to 2008. 
Earning power, 




3.3 Underpinning Theories 
Corporate governance has received prominence in the recent time due to the 
monitoring responsibility imposed on the board of directors. Thus, the underpinning 
theories that explain the corporate governance structure and practice in relation to the 
firm value are outlined. Specifically, the agency theory and the resource dependency 
are discussed in this study. 
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3.3.1 Agency Theory 
Corporate governance is a set of monitoring mechanisms designed to overcome any 
agency issues. Majority of the studies on the corporate governance are built on the 
agency theory based on the ownership separation from the control which creates an 
agency cost Berle and Means (1932). There are two factors which are attributable to 
the agency theory. Firstly, the theory hinges on the argument whereby the 
corporations are owned by the shareholders and controlled by the managers whose 
interest may be in conflict with those of the shareholders. Secondly, the theory 
argues that a human being is often egocentric and not keen to forgo his or her 
personal interest (Berle & Means, 1932).  
 
A firm is a nexus of the contract between several individuals (Daily, Dalton, & 
Cannella, 2003). It is a legal entity, where different views of personalities are 
considered in a model of a relationship contract. According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), such relationship extends beyond the employees to include the creditors, 
suppliers and customers. Each of these individuals has their own interest, which 
varies from the others’ interest. Nonetheless, they share common objectives, such as 
maximizing the firm value, reducing the agency cost and adopting accounting 
procedures reflective of the firm performance (Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012).  
 
The agency theory emphasizes the responsibility of the board of directors, which 
involves ratifying and monitoring of the decisions made by the management. Several 
literature works have examined the role of agency theory in the corporate 
governance (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Daily & Dalton, 1994) and analyzed the 
board composition in the corporate governance (Bhagat & Black, 1998; Kiel & 
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Nicholson 2003). The value of the shareholders could be maximized as a result of 
the imposition of the agency on the board of directors. 
 
Information asymmetry in the agency theory arises from the relationship between the 
shareholders and the corporate managers (Hill & Jones, 1992). The ownership and 
control separation often leads to the behaviours of managers which are inconsistent 
with the shareholders’ interests i.e. reducing the shareholders’ wealth. Hence, a 
mechanism to monitor is established to protect the interest of the shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Consequently, accountability plays an important role in 
reducing the cost of the agency of an organization.    
 
With the contracts documented to the numbers of accounting, the corporate 
governance structure becomes crucial. When the manager performance is tied to the 
performance such as the accounting profits, the firm profit tends to improve, 
contributing to a bonus or remuneration increment through the accounting choice 
that will enhance the profit. As stated above, the agency theory laid emphasis on how 
the agent functions in the interest of the principal by disciplining the agent and 
incurring the monitoring cost on them (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Agency cost is 
defined as the total cost of monitoring incurred to ensure that the agent performs in 
the best interest of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A bonding cost could 
also be incurred by the agency to convince and reassure the principals that their 
interest is protected.  
 
Other methods of resolving an agency conflict noted in the agency theory is the exit 
option which could be made by the shareholders when they are not satisfied with the 
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managers’ performance. For example, when the performance of the managers is 
unacceptable, the shareholders could choose to sell off their shares, which will 
negatively impact the share value of a firm. Despite the robust explanation of 
corporate governance provided by the agency theory, its applicability in the 
developing countries, such as Iraq is limited due to the nature of ownership structure. 
Agency theorist has identified several mechanisms that can protect the shareholders’ 
interest and thus reduce the agency cost. Among which, the corporate governance 
mechanisms are prominent, which is the focus of the present study.  
 
The main purposes of these mechanisms are to reduce the agency costs and to 
control and direct the actions of agents in accordance with the principal’s interests 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; McKnight & Weir, 2009). Corporate governance 
mechanisms comprise the internal mechanisms and the external mechanisms. The 
internal mechanisms include the board structure, compensation contracts and 
bonding costs. Meanwhile, the external mechanisms encompass the large block 
holders, debt holders and monitoring activities by the external auditors, the capital 
market authorities or the other regulators (Shapiro, 2005; Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 
2002). 
 
One of the most important mechanisms of corporate governance is the significant 
role assigned by the agency theory to the board of directors. The theory claims that 
the majority of the board should be independent directors to control and monitor the 
management (Al-Janadi, Rahman, & Omar, 2013; Berle & Means, 1932). 
Additionally, the positions of CEO and chairman should be separated to reduce the 
power of the CEO effectively (Sharma, 2004). Moreover, the managerial behaviour 
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is controlled by the board committees, including the audit committee and nomination 
and remuneration committee (Allegrini & Greco, 2013). Establishment of a system 
of compensation based on the financial performance is also vital to motivate the 
managers to improve their performance (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Chalevas, 2011). 
Such a board structure can prevent the managers from exploiting the firm’s resources 
for their own interests. 
 
In relation to the ownership structure, Gogineni, Linn, and Yadav (2010) argue that 
the more distributed the ownership structure, the greater the tendency for the agency 
problems to arise, and thus a higher agency cost. On the other hand, the ownership 
concentration could reduce the agency problems by providing more effective 
monitoring (Earle et al., 2005; Laiho, 2011). Therefore, the conflict of interest 
between the principals and agents are expected to be lower and less significant in 
countries where the ownership is concentrated, especially in the developing 
countries, (Alghamdi, 2012). Clark (2004) highlighted the fact that the collectivist 
nature of the relationship between managers and owners in Asian, South American 
and Southern European countries, can also be regarded as another factor that leads to 
a low level of agency problems in these countries. Nonetheless, a conflict between 
the majority and the minority shareholders may occur if the majority of shareholders 
have different interests and objectives from those of the minority shareholders (Fan 
& Wong, 2002). This situation allows the majority shareholders to use their power to 
achieve their own goals at the expense of the minority shareholders’ interests 





Debt is another type of corporate governance mechanism that can potentially 
attenuate the agency problems. Based on the agency theory, debt is an external 
governance mechanism which influences the managers to act in the best interests of 
the stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Williamson, 
1988). In a case where there is a high debt level in a firm’s capital structure, the debt 
holders are expected to have a monitoring role over the management (Berger & di 
Patti, 2006). Furthermore, the use of debt can reduce the agency costs by shifting the 
control from the shareholders to the debt holders. Hence, debt can be used to 
effectively govern the managers’ actions without increasing the agency costs 
(Pinegar & Wilbricht, 1989). 
 
3.3.2 Resource Dependency Theory 
Corporate governance is linked to the theory of resource independence (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967). Based on the argument of Pfeffer (1972), the internal structures 
which are in line with the environmental needs are characterized by a successful 
organization. Pfeffer posits that the composition or the size of a board to the external 
environmental conditions is a response of a rational organization. In addition, the 
board of directors may decide to serve to link the firm with the external resources to 
prevail over the unknown and maintain the firm survival (Hillman, Cannella & 
Paetzols, 2000). Information, legitimacy, and skills that can minimize the 
constituents (such as public policy decision-makers, social groups, buyers and 
suppliers) are resources that brought forth the role of resource dependency (Gales & 
Kesner, 1994). Accordingly, it is established that the potential results of a firm 
connection with the minimization of uncertainty and external environmental factors 
will reduce the cost of the transaction in relation to the external linkage. Inevitably, 
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multiple boards with many appointments of directors favoured this theory due to 
their opportunities to build a meaningful network and gain information from the 
various methods.  
 
Resource dependency theory emphasizes the organizational structures that assist the 
firms in accessing the necessary resources for their success and survival. This theory 
indicates that the board of directors is a vital link between a firm and the necessary 
critical resources for a firm’s growth (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The 
board of directors has several important roles in providing the firms with different 
types of resources including finance, capital and information. Another significant 
role of the board is to link the firms to key customers, suppliers, major shareholders 
and government policy-makers (Bouwman, 2011; Freeman & Evan, 1990; Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; 
Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Further, the resource dependency theory argues that the 
issue of the dichotomy between dependent and independent directors is irrelevant, 
claiming that the ability of the directors to establish a strong relationship with the 
environment is more pertinent (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Psaros, 2009).  
 
According to Kalyebara and Islam (2013, p. 31), “the more control an organisation 
has on external resources, the lower the costs of resources and the higher the chances 
that the firm will minimise agency costs”. If the firm’s achievement depends on the 
accessibility to the external resources, then the presence of its members on the board 
of directors that govern the external resources is essential to reduce the uncertainty 
and the external dependencies. Psaros (2009) asserted that the skills and resource 
base are the main factors that dictate the extent to which the directors add value to 
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their firms. Moreover, the relationship of the directors with the government or 
policy-making authority may reduce the transaction costs of the firms. As an 
intangible asset, the personal reputation of its directors could also enhance a firm’s 
reputation (Psaros, 2009).  
 
From another perspective, resource dependency theory assumes that the ownership 
concentration can positively impact the performance of a firm. Concentrated owners, 
such as the state and family, can benefit their firms greatly in terms of managerial 
and financial resources (Boubaker & Nguyen, 2014). In terms of the improvement of 
a firm performance, the theory considers the government ownership as one of the 
most important outsourcing mechanisms (Al-Matari et al., 2013). According to the 
theory, outsourcing helps provide a variety of resources including monetary and 
material resources, information and social legitimacy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013). Therefore, the firms with a higher level of 
government ownership could enjoy major advantages, including an easier access to 
financial resources, direct political connections, a better commercial treatment and a 
higher degree of legitimacy (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Buckley et al., 2007; Cuervo-
Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). Furthermore, the family ownership 
can contribute to a unique combination of financial, human and social capital in a 
firm (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; Dyer, 2006; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter identified the literature gap by reviewing the literature from both the 
developed and the developing countries in relevance to the corporate governance, 
external audit and firm performance. Based on which, it was discovered that the 
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firm’s primary objective is to increase its short-term and long-term value. It was 
established that the corporate governance structure is not a one-size-fits-all approach 
as what is considered good for organization A might not be the same for organization 
B. As such, there are mixed findings demonstrated by the corporate governance 
literature findings. Apart from that, it was also reported by the previous studies that a 
sound corporate governance could boost the investors’ confidence in the firm which 
will equally improve a firm’s performance. Finally, it was also observed from the 
literature that the corporate governance studies are limited in a volatile environment, 
such as Iraq. The conceptual framework for the present study would be designed and 





RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discusses the literature review on the subject matter. This 
chapter has four sub-headings. The chapter starts with the introduction section. 
Section 4.2 presents the research framework whereas section 4.3 presents the 
hypotheses development. Section 4.4 summarizes the whole chapter. In this chapter, 
several hypotheses are established for empirical testing and empirical validation. The 
variables of interest are a board of director characteristics, internal audit, ownership 
structure and external audit quality.  
 
4.2 Research Framework 
This study is an extension of the framework developed by Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) on corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. This study 
provides understanding and comprehension of the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the firm performance. Thus, Figure 4.1 presents the proposed 
conceptual model of this study. The two theories, namely agency theory and resource 
dependency are used as a guide for testing the study hypothesis. 
 
The agency theory emphasizes the responsibility of the board of directors, which 
involves ratifying and monitoring of the decisions made by the management. Several 
literature works have examined the role of agency theory in the corporate 
governance (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Daily & Dalton, 1994) and analyzed the 
board composition in the corporate governance (Bhagat & Black, 1998; Kiel & 
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Nicholson 2003). The value of the shareholders could be maximized as a result of 
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Resource dependency theory emphasizes the organizational structures that assist the 
firms in accessing the necessary resources for their success and survival. This theory 
indicates that the board of directors is a vital link between a firm and the necessary 
critical resources for a firm’s growth (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The 
board of directors has several important roles in providing the firms with different 
types of resources including finance, capital and information. Another significant 
role of the board is to link the firms to key customers, suppliers, major shareholders 
and government policy-makers (Bouwman, 2011; Freeman & Evan, 1990; Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; 
Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Further, the resource dependency theory argues that the 
issue of the dichotomy between dependent and independent directors is irrelevant, 
claiming that the ability of the directors to establish a strong relationship with the 
environment is more pertinent (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Psaros, 2009). 
 
Hair, Money, Samouel and Page (2007) highlighted that the conceptual model 
connects study variables, which are based on the study’s underpinning theories 
through graphical illustrations. In the previous chapter, the conceptual model for this 
study developed all its constructs and variables from the two theories and previous 
empirical studies as discussed in details. In summary, the framework depicts the 
corporate governance variables (i.e. board of directors’ characteristics, internal audit, 
and ownership structure) which represent the internal monitoring device. It also 
depicts the external monitoring mechanisms (external auditing) through which the 
shareholders receive more assurance. Variable selection is guided by past studies and 
those governance practices that affect firm performance is considered relevant in the 
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Iraqi environment. The firm performance is measured in terms of marketing-based 
measures. In this study, the financial performance measured is Tobin’s Q.  
 
4.3 Hypotheses Development 
     4.3.1 Relationship between Board Structure and Firm Performance 
 
Prior studies investigated board structure in relation to CEO duality and board 
composition (Dahya, Lonie & Power, 1996; Daily & Dalton, 1995). The studies 
argued that board structure affects organization outcome as the legal, political, and 
economic institutions mostly determine corporate governance practice and this varies 
with country. Nevertheless, the international code of best practice considers the 
board structure as an important mechanism that guarantees sound corporate 
governance, which improves firm performance. There are conflicting empirical 
findings on the effect of CEO duality, non-executive directors and on performance as 
the result varies according to the study of context (Dalton et al., 1998). This study is 
a concern with investigating the various aspects of board structure, specifically board 
size, non-executive directors, CEO duality and board meeting and their influence on 
firm performance in Iraq.  
 
4.3.1.1 Relationship between Board Size and Firm Performance 
Board size is an important component of corporate governance mechanism that 
monitors the management and ensures that agent act accordingly and reduces agency 
cost (Carausu, 2015). Nevertheless, the appropriate size of the board and the way it 
affects the firm performance has generated controversy over the years. According to 
some authors, small board size is more effective than a large size board as it 
enhances communication and coordination. According to this school of thought, a 
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small board size improves board outcome (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Kumar & 
Singh, 2013). On the contrary, the other school of thought stated that large board size 
more effective as it provides room for diversity in knowledge, expertise and 
capabilities and consequently improves performance (Adams & Mehran, 2012; 
Jaafar & El shawa, 2009; Kim et al., 2012).  
 
The extant empirical findings have produced conflicting results which are consistent 
with the conflicting theoretical arguments. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) 
submitted that firms with complex operation have a larger board than those firms 
with less complex structure. Adams and Mehran (2005); Latif et al. (2013); Dwivedi 
and Jain (2005) documented that firms with larger board size perform better. In 
addition, Nawafly and Alarussi (2016), Nor, Shafee and Samsuddin (2014) and 
Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) reported a positive and significant relationship 
between board size and firm performance. All findings with the positive relationship 
are consistent with the theoretical argument that a larger board size is better to secure 
available resources within the firm operating environment (Alsayanai, 2017; Gull, 
Saeed & Abid, 2013; Isa, 2017; Sharma 2016). On the contrary, some other studies 
(Makhlouf, Ali, & Ramli 2017, Upadhyay, Bhargava & Faircloth 2014; Dharmadasa, 
Gamage & Herath 2014) discovered a negative significant relationship between 
board size and firm performance. Similarly, Mak and Kusnadi (2005), Yasser, 
Entebang and Mansor (2011) findings support the theoretical postulation that large 
board are not effective in decision-making due to board cumbersome and free rider 
problems. Therefore, small board improves firm performance better through an 




Despite there is no code of corporate governance in Iraq, Iraqi Companies Law 
requires that the board be made up of at least seven members besides the banking 
sector. The banks are required five to nine directors. The concept is similar to 
empirical studies from emerging countries like India (Sarkar, Sarkar & Sen, 2008); 
Malaysia (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006) and Tunisia (Elmehdi, 2007). Thus, the present 
study postulated that large board size would bring their wealth of knowledge and 
expertise to improve firm performance. Accordingly, this study hypothesized that: 
 
H1a: There is a positive significant relationship between board size and firm 
performance.  
 
4.3.1.2 Relationship between CEO Duality and Firm Performance 
The findings from the empirical literature on CEO duality and firm performance are 
inconsistent. The separation of CEO and chairman responsibility is widely 
considered to improve board effectiveness (Cadbury, 1992, Fama & Jensen 1983; 
Higgs Report, 2003). The concentration of CEO duality is likely to dampen the 
board monitoring effectiveness, consistent with the agency theory postulation 
(Abdullah, 2004). Based on the view of Laing and Weir (1999), enthroning the 
responsibilities of CEO and a Chairman in a single individual provides the individual 
too much power to make decisions that do not maximize the wealth of the 
shareholders. Some evidence also indicates that firms that separate the two roles are 
highly valued at the market as the market assumes that CEO duality enhances 




Several empirical findings (Faleye, 2007; Al-Farooque, Van Zijl, Dunstan and 
Karim, 2007) reported that CEO duality increase firm performance. another related 
studyOmran, Bolbol and Fatheldin (2008), Wellalage and Locke (2011), and Peni 
(2014) discovered that CEO duality increases firm performance. On the other hand, 
Dey, Engel and Liu (2011), Latif et al. (2013) and Veprauskaitė and Adams (2013) 
conducted a study on CEO duality and firm performance and they discovered that 
there is a negative association between the two variables. 
 
 In Iraq, the Companies Law demands that the role of the chairman and that of the 
CEO should be separated to enhance board independence. Therefore, consistent with 
the theoretical view that separation of the two roles improves firm performance, this 
study hypothesized that: 
 
H1b: There is a negative significant relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance 
 
4.3.1.3 Relationship between Non-Executive Directors and Firm Performance 
The non-executive directors is an important component of corporate governance 
code around in the world. The appointment of a non-executive director in the 
boardroom is widely accepted as a factor that strengthened corporate governance 
practice. Non-executive directors are objective in their monitoring in the absence of 
social connection with the executive directors (Dalton et al., 1998). This view is 
inconsonant with the agency theory. Most corporate governance codes and Iraq 
Companies Law support the agency view. The non-executive directors bring their 
expertise, knowledge and reputation to bear in the boardroom. Therefore, this 
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enables them to provide advice and necessary resources that assist the firm to 
perform (Yoshikawa & McGuire, 2008).  
 
Recently, there are inconsistent findings in the literature that examined firm 
performance and non-executive directors. In the study conducted by Alsayanai, 
(2017), it stated that the non-executive directors passively and significantly affect 
firm performance. The positive relationship is underscored by the fact that outside 
directors act in the interest of the shareholders due to their independence from 
management, which enhances performance through better monitoring (El Mehdi, 
2007). Furthermore, the positive relationship signals the ability of outside directors 
to improve firm performance through resource contribution and networking (Peng, 
2004). 
 
Many previous studies revealed a positive relationship between non-executive 
director and firm performance (Ammari, Kadria & Ellouze, 2014; Chemweno, 2016; 
Ferreira & Kirchmaier, 2013; Isa, 2017; Latif et al. 2013; Makhlouf, Ali, & Ramli, 
2017; Nguyen, Evans & Lu, 2017; Nawafly & Alarussi, 2016; Zheng, 2010).  Daily 
et al. (2003) reported that a financially distressed company with an independent 
board is less likely to go bankrupt. On the other hand, Elloumi and Gueyie (2001) 
revealed that firms with a higher proportion of outside directors are not likely to 
experience financial distress. Perry and Shivdasani (2005) noted that non-executive 
directors could restructure non-performing companies.  
 
On the contrary, some literatureprovided countervailing evidence against the 
effectiveness of non-executive directors. The argument boils down to their busy 
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schedule and the expertise of non-executive directors that does not enhance board 
performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The executive directors behave ethically risk 
and embark on long-term strategic investment that has a long benefit for the 
company due to the intense scrutiny of non-executive director (Gunasekarage & 
Reed, 2008). Abdullah (2004) claimed that the presence of non-executive directors 
in the boardroom could negatively affect board performance due to limited 
knowledge about the firm. Similarly, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) discovered that 
Tobin’s Q and ROA as proxies for firm performance do not significantly affect 
performance. Moreover, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) utilized Tobin's Q as a 
measure of performance documented that the presence of outside director on board 
negatively affects firm performance. Bozec (2005), Garba and Abubakar (2014), 
Ghabayen (2012) Mahadeo, Soobaroyen and Hanuman (2012) and Shukeri, Shin and 
Shaari (2012) also recorded the negative relationship between non-executive director 
and firm performance. In addition, Sharma and Sharma (2016) revealed a negative 
relationship between with-executive director and firm performance by using Tobin's 
Q as measure and non-significant relationship by using ROA, ROE, and Net Profit 
Margin. 
 
Despite those inconsistent findings in past studies, the reforms embarked on by the 
Iraqi government intend to enhance directors’ accountability, strengthen internal 
control and align the interest of managers and shareholders. This study stated that the 
inclusion of more non-executive directors on board improve the performance of 




H1c: There is a positive significant relationship between the proportion of non-
executive directors on board and firm performance. 
 
4.3.1.4 Relationship between Board Meeting and Firm Performance 
Another issue that has generated concern is the board meeting. The intensity of the 
board meeting, which measures the effectiveness of board activity, has produced 
conflicting views. The first view stated that the board meeting could improve 
shareholders value. The board of director's commitment to board activity through 
attendance of meeting is attributable to some problems encountered by the board 
(Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Board meeting according to Conger et al. (1998) is a 
valuable resource that leads to board effectiveness. The recent disclosure 
requirement regarding the number of board directorship and restriction on multiple 
board directorship in some codes of corporate governance further reinforce the view 
that directors’ participation in board activities through meeting attendance improves 
monitoring (Amer, Ragab & Ragheb, 2014). This suggests that frequent board 
meeting could enhance the performance of the board of director’s duty.  
 
According to Ntim (2009), higher frequency of board meeting can improve 
managerial monitoring, which positively improves corporate firm performance. 
From the perspective of Mangena and Tauringana (2006), regular board meeting 
keeps the director abreast of important development within the firm and take 
immediate action on emerging critical issues. According to Vafeas (1999), 
abnormally high meeting frequency improves operating performance, especially the 
firms which experience poor firm performance. This is due to the reason that the 
frequent meeting permit directors to formulate strategies and appraise managerial 
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performance. Furthermore, Al-Daoud, Saidin, and Abidin (2016), Al-matari (2014) 
andNtim and Osei (2013) revealed a positive relationship between a board meeting 
and firm performance. The positive relationship suggests that constant board meeting 
improves the firm performance since the board can take proactive actions easily and 
promptly (Mohammed 2009; Sharma & Sharma 2016). 
 
On the contrary, some studies (Garcia-Sanchez 2010; Kamardin 2009 & Noor 2011) 
discovered a negative relationship between board meeting frequency and firm 
performance. The negative relationship suggests that high meeting frequency could 
impede firm performance if the meeting fails to address critical issues affecting the 
firm (Alzahrani 2014; Daud 2012). 
 
In Iraq, Companies Law requires the six meetings every accounting year. The 
expectation is that increasing meeting frequency provides the directors more time to 
attend a board meeting, formulating strategy and monitoring management 
effectively. Therefore, this study hypothesized that: 
 
H1d: There is a positive significant relationship between a board meeting and firm 
performance.  
 
4.3.2 Relationship between Internal Audit and Firm Performance 
     4.3.2.1 Relationship between Internal Audit Existenceand Firm Performance 
 
Internal audit is touted as another internal corporate governance control mechanism 
that ensures effective corporate governance (Christopher, Sarens & Leung, 2009). 
The rationale behind establishing an internal audit department is to preserve the 
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firm’s assets and to ensure that financial information produce reflects the exact state 
(Ebaid, 2011). With the view of Ebaid (2011), the Institute of Internal Auditor 
extend the role of internal audit to include value-added assurance and consulting 
service with some theoretical arguments supporting this view. 
 
According to Ruud (2003), internal audit complements the function of the 
management, audit committee, and the board of director. The significance of internal 
audit in enhancing corporate governance is further stressed in the code of 
international best practice. Based on the practice’s guideline for internal audit issued 
in Iraq, the independence of the internal audit must be preserved. Therefore, it is a 
requirement that the head of the internal audit should report directly to the board 
through the audit committee. Christopher et al. (2009) stated that the objective of an 
internal auditor is objectivity; this involves an independent state of mind and fair 
attitude. The audit department should be free to design the scope of their work and 
perform their duty without external influences. In this way, internal audit will 
strengthen governance disclosure as well as enhance shareholders and other 
stakeholders’ confidence in the firm (Archambeault et al., 2008). Another study 
indicates that internal audit existence reduces earnings management practice as a 
proxy by abnormal accruals and the propensity to meet or beat earnings forecast 
(Prawitt et al., 2009).  
 
In Iraq, internal audit department existence is not mandatory in the Companies Law. 
Nevertheless, few companies create their own internal audit department to be 
responsible for establishing the internal control system of the company. This study 
expects those companies that established internal audit department to have sound 
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corporate governance, which will improve firm performance. Therefore, this study 
hypothesized that: 
 
H2a: There is a positive significant relationship between internal audit existence and 
firm performance.  
 
4.3.2.2 Relationship between Internal Audit Training and Firm Performance 
Some listed companies in Iraq introduced various training programs to improve 
internal audit department efficiency. The provision of this training program is based 
on the premise that training can be a platform through which the internal audit can be 
made more effective and efficient, facilitating and enabling a company to improve 
performance through accountability. Tamimi (2012) identified some factors that 
affect the performance of the internal auditor, include practical experience and level 
of education of internal audit staff. According to Tamimi (2012), the internal audit 
team, audit teams should be competent, have experience, and participate in different 
training courses that will make them more efficient. Thunaibat (2009) documented 
that continuous education and training of audit staff can improve the technology and 
professional performance of an internal audit staff. Likewise, Said (2010) 
recommended the establishment of specialized training courses as a method of 
rehabilitating the internal audit department. Furthermore, Salum, Jawher, and Abdul 
(2012) suggested that necessary training should be organized for an internal auditor, 
especially the new entrant to enhance their knowledge about the significance of 




In Iraq, No. 3 of the Audit Guide issued by the Accounting and Auditing Standard 
Board of the Republic of Iraq in 1999 demands that auditors should undergo 
sufficient training that enables them to perform efficiently and update their 
professional expertise. Hashim and Abdulzahra (2015) reported a positive 
relationship between internal audit training and the performance of the internal 
auditor and accounting. This is supported by Barghouti, Akkad and Jawher (2013) 
study which stated that ongoing training programs can assist the internal audit staff 
to develop and acquire more skills. Thus, this study hypothesized that:  
 
H2b: There is a positive significant relationship between internal audit training and 
firm performance.  
 
4.3.3 Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
       4.3.3.1 Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance 
 
Managerial shareholding is an important mechanism that aligns the interest of 
shareholders with management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the 
convergence of interest hypothesis, the managerial ownership makes director to 
avoid sharp practices as the managers bear the same loss with shareholders if their 
wealth suffers. As a result, managerial shareholding has the incentive to reduce 
agency cost and improve firm performance. In contrast, the management 
entrenchment hypothesis states that when managerial ownership is substantial to 
make managers possess voting power. As such, the managers are immune against the 
action of market forces to remove them in case of poor performance (Denis & Denis, 
1994). Therefore, the managers act opportunistically by increasing personal gains at 
the expense of maximising the overall welfare of the shareholders.  
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Due to the conflicting theoretical postulations, empirical studies showed inconsistent 
results. Fauzi and Locke (2012); Sing and Sirmans (2008); Swamy, (2011); Uwuigbe 
and Olusanmi (2012); Ramli (2016); Ullah, Ali, and Mehmood (2017) discovered a 
positive relationship between the proportion of shares held by managers and firm 
performance consistent with the interest convergence hypothesis. Similarly, Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008) opined that the present value of shares owned by the manager’s 
increase the performance of the companies. On the other hand, other previous studies 
(Mandaci & Gumus 2010; Wahla et al, 2012; Kamardin et al, 2016; Mutize et al, 
2016; Saleh et al, 2017; Khan & Nouman, 2017) reported a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance. The negative relationship 
documented in these studies confirms the entrenchment theory. 
 
The research on managerial ownership is very scarce. As a result, it is not easy to 
predict an exact relationship. Nevertheless, owing to the ineffectiveness of another 
corporate governance mechanism in Iraq, it could be argued that managerial 
ownership would provide the managers with the incentive to act in the interest of 
shareholders. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H3a: There is a positive significant relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance. 
 
4.3.3.2 Relationship between Block Shareholder Ownership and Firm 
Performance 
 
Theoretical postulation suggests that dispersed ownership can reduce agency cost 
between shareholders with substantial equity and those with little equity. Zhong et 
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al. (2007) noted that the individual shareholder can be fall under two categories, 
which are the short horizon individual large shareholder and long time horizon 
individual long-term horizon. Short time horizon shareholders might decide to 
dispose of their shares when the company’s performance is no longer favourable to 
them. Nevertheless, the long-term horizon individual shareholders create pressure on 
the managers more to improve financial performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
 
Extant studies such as Moscu et al, (2015); Khan and Nouman, (2017); Isik and 
Isaac, (2013) revealed that individual shareholder ownership improves firm 
performance. The positive relationship is due to the individual large shareholder who 
has a strong incentive to monitor the activities of the management. In some 
instances, the individual largest shareholder has a representative on board and in the 
management to assist in monitoring and protecting their investment interest. Several 
other studies, Boone, Colombage and Gunasekarage (2011), Ke and Isaac (2007) and 
Mourier (2010) also discovered results that are consistent with the theoretical 
postulation that individual shareholders can be monitored better and hence improve 
firm performance.  
 
Nevertheless, Aluchna and Kaminski (2017); Konijn, Krraussl, and Lucas (2011); 
Filatotchev, Kapelyushnikov, Dyomina and Aukutsionek (2001) and Hamadi (2010) 
documented a negative relationship between block shareholder and firm value. The 
negative relationship shows the effect of the entrenchment effect hypothesis, where 
individual controlling shareholders can hijack board processes by appointing 




Despite a lack of study on the ownership structure and firm performance in Iraq, the 
prevailing ownership structure leans towards those of controlling shareholders. 
Families or government controls the majority of the listed companies in Iraq. In this 
vein, the study proposes a positive relationship between individual block holder and 
firm performance as the majority of these companies have transcended many 
generations, which suggest good performance on their part.  
 
H3b: There is a positive significant relationship between block shareholder’s 
ownership and firm performance. 
 
4.3.3.3 Relationship between Local Institution Ownership and Firm 
Performance 
 
The institutional ownership refers to large institutions, such as banks, pension funds, 
insurance companies and mutual funds that are holding ownership stake (Davis & 
Steil 2004). They are considered as major governance mechanisms that have a direct 
influence on firm performance due to a large investment portfolio. Institutional 
shareholders can effectively monitor managers and thus reduce agency problems 
given the high cost of monitoring. Furthermore, the local institutional investors have 
both ability and incentive to control and discipline managers (Aljifri & Moustafa, 
2007; Ping & Wing, 2011). Thus, local institutional investors possess stronger 
incentives to protect their investments and obtain benefit due to their large stock 
holdings (Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
 
In addition, regarding capital markets, industries and businesses, the institutional 
investors are more professional as they can use their power effectively to control the 
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activities of the managers, absorb the cost of effective monitoring better than small 
shareholders and direct the board decisions (Rose, 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Consistent with these postulations, studies like Balagobei and Velnampy (2017); 
Ullah, Ali, and Mehmood (2017); Nuryanah and Islam (2011) investigated and 
discovered that local institutional ownership improves firm performance. 
Specifically, Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) reported that local institutional 
ownership improves the firm profitability. Similarly, Sharma and Sharma (2016); 
Harjoto and Jo (2008), Imam and Malik (2007), Irina and Nadezhda (2009) 
discovered that there is a positive relationship between local institutional ownership 
and firm performance. 
 
In other words, some previous studies recorded the negative significant relationship 
between local institutional ownership and firm performance like (Al Farooque et al., 
2007; Saleh, Zahirdin & Octaviani, 2017; Khan & Nouman, 2017; Khanna & 
Palepu, 1999; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Mura, 2007). Therefore, the hypothesis 
stated that:  
 
H3c: There is a positive significant relationship between local institutional 
ownership and firm performance. 
 
4.3.3.4 Relationship between Foreign Institutional Ownership and Firm 
Performance 
 
Investors from foreign countries have a high level of accounting practices and 
information disclosure to positively affect firm performance. From the perspective of 
agency theory, foreign ownership can be seen as a source of good monitoring and 
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managerial skills in corporate governance (Choi et al., 2012; Khanna & Palepu, 
1999). Foreign ownership investors may pose as a monitoring force to reduce the 
managers’ decision or internal owners that may be expensive to another shareholder. 
According to Ghahroudi (2011) and Kimura and Kiyota (2007), the foreign 
ownership may also transfer useful and new technology and knowledge, which will 
subsequently improve firm performance.  
 
Several studies have indicated that foreign ownership has a great effect on the 
performance of the firm. Al Manaseer et al. (2012), Balagobei and Velnamp (2017) 
reported that foreign ownership can improve the corporate governance, becoming 
external large shareholders or board members. The findings are consistent with the 
argument that management systems are improved with the assistance of foreign 
investors and provide the company with useful scarce resources at their disposal. 
Several other studies like Chari et al. (2012), Choi et al. (2007), Dwivedi and Jain 
(2005), Filatotchev et al. (2007), Ghahroudi (2011) , Isa (2017), Anum Mohd 
Ghazali (2010), Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) and Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) for 
the relationship to be positive. 
 
In Iraq, the presence of intuitional foreign investor improves firm performance as the 
foreign investors are more conscious of the type of company and the environment 
they want to invest in. Stringent and more conditions are provided before they 
committee fund in any endeavour.  
 
H3d: There is a positive significant relationship between foreign institutional 
ownership and firm performance 
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4.3.4 Relationship between External Auditing and Firm Performance 
The external auditing is an important external corporate governance mechanism. 
Theoretically, an independent examination on the books of account for a company 
by an auditor reduces agency problem by preventing the insider (controlling 
shareholders or managers) from engaging in discretionary accounting practises and 
estimates (Jensen & Meckling 1976). A few studies like Chari et al. (2012), Choi et 
al. (2007), Dwivedi and Jain (2005), Filatotchev et al. (2007), Ghahroudi (2011) , Isa 
(2017), Anum Mohd Ghazali (2010), Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) and Uwuigbe 
and Olusanmi (2012) examined the role of a quality external monitoring mechanism 
to assist in reducing the agency problems that emerge from the separation of 
ownership from control. These studies argued that external monitoring by high-
quality auditor improves the credibility of financial reporting. In the model of 
DeAngelo (1981), high-quality auditors are conscious of their reputation capital and 
this motivates them to supply high-quality audit compared to other auditors. 
Furthermore, Aledwan, Aledwan and Alkubisi (2015). The study discovered a 
positive relationship between audit quality and firm performance (net profit margin).  
 
Sayyar et al. (2015) investigated the effect of audit quality (measured according to 
the audit fees) on firm performance among listed companies between 2003 to 2012 
in Malaysia. The study discovered that there is a negatively significant relationship 
between ROA and audit fees. Nevertheless, the relationship is positively significant 
between Tobin’s Q and audit fees. Similarly, Martinez and Moraes (2014) studied 
the relationship between audit fees, non-audit fees and Tobin’s Q among the 
Brazilian audit firms. The result showed a significant relationship between audit fees 
and Tobin’s Q.  
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In another study, Moutinho et al. (2012) discovered that performance decreases with 
audit fees while the increase in operating performance increases the audit fees. 
Moutinho et al. (2012) argued that firms with poor corporate governance can hire 
good auditors to improve the firm’s value in the market. The auditors with a good 
reputation are not likely to work with companies with poor government mechanisms. 
Thus, auditors who charge high audit fees with high reputation are likely to provide 
advice on the best way the board can enhance the government mechanisms. 
Therefore, this study hypothesis that: 
 
H4: There is a positive significant relationship between audit quality and firm 
performance 
 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter starts with a discussion on the development of the theoretical 
framework in accordance with the theory and empirical evidence, followed by the 
hypotheses development. The dependent variables is Tobin’s Q, whereas the 
corporate governance variablesinclude a board of directors’ characteristics, internal 






5.1     Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology employed in this study. There are 
nine main parts in this chapter. The first and second parts present the introduction of 
the chapter and elucidate the research design of the study, including data collection 
and sample of the study. The third and fourth parts comprise the industrial 
classification of the sectors involved and data management respectively. Part five of 
the chapter explains the panel data explored. Part six of the chapter exclusively 
describes research data analysis and interpretation where the research model and 
measurements are explained. Part seven of the chapter presents the model that guides 
the research in general. Apart from that, part eighth of the chapter discusses the 
variable measurement of the study. The final part summarizes the whole sections of 
the chapter.  
 
5.2 Research Design 
     5.2.1 Data Collection 
 
According to Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005), secondary data are useful for improving 
understanding and explaining the research problem in addition to providing more 
information to solve the problem. There are several sources of secondary data such 
as online data sources like Web pages of firms, government organizations and 
catalogues, census data, statistical abstracts and databases, including books, journal 
articles, media, annual reports of companies (Sekaran, 2003; Veal, 2005). The 
advantages of using secondary data sources are: (i) fewer resource requirements, (ii) 
relative ease of access, (iii) the provision of comparative and contextual data, (iv) 
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savings in the time and cost of acquiring information, and (v) unforeseen discoveries 
resulting from using suitable methods (Sekaran & Bougi, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, secondary data is an essential method as there is no need to collect 
primary data if secondary data are available to answer the research questions. Thus, 
in this study uses the secondary data to measure corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance. Four corporate governance mechanisms and Tobin’s Q are 
measured by using secondary data. Information on Corporate governance mechanism 
variables and firm performance were collected from annual reports and ISX 
websites. Data were collected for the years 2012 to 2015 for the purpose of this 
study. The years 2012 to 2015 were chosen to test the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance as these periods reflected the corporate 
governance practices of firms after listed companies in Iraq were obliged to follow 
the rules of corporate governance. In other words, the listed companies in Iraq were 
required to prepare corporate governance information.  
 
In summary, this section highlights the type of data and method of data collection 
used to conduct the study. The study determines the relationship between corporate 
governance and the firm performance of listed companies in ISX. The secondary 
data include the following independent variables: (i) board of director’s 
characteristics, (ii) internal audit, (iii) ownership structure, (iv) external auditing, and 
(v) control variables (i.e. company age, company size, company leverage, and 
company growth). The dependent variables in terms of firm performance is Tobin’s 
Q. The data on control variables were also collected from the annual reports of listed 
companies in ISX. Data were obtained as related to the independent and dependent 
172 
 
variables through secondary means, which imply the annual report of the companies 
listed in ISX. The annual reports were scrutinised and all the necessary data were 
filled-up using the checklist. Subsequently, all data collected were keyed-in into 
STATA software version 13 for statistical analysis.  
 
Therefore, the data for the study was solely from a secondary source. In this 
research, both the quantitative and qualitative data were extracted from the annual 
report. This study utilized the annual reports of the sampled companies for all 
necessaries data gathering. The annual report presented financial statements of the 
sample companies in form of quantitative and qualitative information. The 
quantitative financial information covered the balance sheet, the income statement 
and some parts of the notes to the accounts. The qualitative aspect outlined the 
chairman’s report, directors’ report and the significant companies’ policies.  
 
5.2.2   Sample of the Study 
All firms are to submit their audited annual report at the end of each fiscal year under 
the ISX Law. Therefore, the annual reports were retrieved from the stock exchange, 
both non-financial and financial information, were collected manually from the 
annual reports.  
 
The samples for this study are the listed companies in ISX from 2012 to 2015. The 
years 2012-2015 were chosen as the observation years as there were new disclosure 
requirements in 2012. In addition, two new sectors were added to the existing ones 
on the ISX in 2012. Therefore, this study chose three subsequent years after the new 
disclosure date as it is difficult to measure compliance using one year to test the 
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extent of compliance with the new disclosure.  In Iraq, there were 85, 83, 83, and 98 
listed companies for 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively (ISX reports, 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2015). The listingwas obtained from the ISX facts book and this figure 
was for the total population of the listed companies. 
 
The final sample consisted of 192 firm-year observations over the sample period of 4 
years after excluding the banks and the companies with incomplete information for 
the analysis as related to the 48 different companies across 7 different sectors. Due to 
new sectors and new companies in the sectors that were added in 2015, with no 
additional companies during the period of 2012 to 2014, this accounted for the 
occurrence of incomplete data. Similarly, the missing annual report occurred in some 
companies from 2012 to 2015 was due to the omission of some companies by the 
ISX. Table 5.1 below presents information on sample characteristics and sector 
composition.  
 
Table 5.1  
Sample Selection 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total listed companies  85 83 83 98 
Excluding the banks 21 21 21 21 
Incomplete data  0 0 0 17 
Missing annual report 16 16 14 12 
Total companies selected  48 48 48 48 
 
5.3 Industry Classification 
The data were obtained from the financial statements, in addition to the information 
needed to calculate Tobin’s Q. For example, the market prices of the shares were 
collected from the ISX and ISC website. The final sample comprised 48 firms having 
the necessary data for analysis over the sample period of 4 years (2012-2015) 
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resulting into 192 observations (balanced panel). Table 5.2 below shows the majority 
of the sample companies come from the Industry (31.25%); followed by Tourism 
and Hotel (16.67%); Services (14.58%); Agricultural (12.5%); Investment (12.5%); 





5.4 Data Management 
The data were managed through statistical software, called STATA version 13 after 
the collection of the data. The thesis relies on panel data to estimate the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. board size, non-executive directors, 
CEO duality, board meeting, internal audit existence, internal audit training, 
managerial ownership, individual block shareholder ownership, local institutional 
ownership, foreign institutional ownership, and external audit) and firm 
performance. This is an incorporation of cross-section and time series data. The data 
set used in the present research is more orientated toward cross-section analyses than 
time series analyses like most panel data sets. Nevertheless, in the case of the so-
called short panel, there are a large number of cross-sectional units and only a few 
periods. In this study, the data set follows a population of Iraqi companies listed in a 
Sector Freq. Percent 
Industry 60 31.25 
Tourism & Hotels 32 16.67 
Services 28 14.58 
Agricultural 24 12.5 
Investment 24 12.5 
Insurance 20 10.42 
Communication 4 2.08 





stock exchange over a four-year period (2012-2015). Thus, such data provide 
multiple observations on variables for each firm.  
 
5.5 Panel Data 
There are two main reasons for using panel data. First, panel data allow change over 
the time. Nevertheless, in this study, some variables are largely time-invariant. 
Second, it is possible to control for unobserved independent variables with repeated 
observations on each firm. In addition, panel data also are used to limit the impacts 
of any short-period inconsistencies inherent in the annual data and obtain more 
information on the issues raised in the study (Merendino, 2014).  
 
It is necessary to understand the reason that care must be taken to control variables 
that are omitted. Thus, there is a need to discuss the assumption of homoscedasticity 
with respect to the classical regression model, i.e. the ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression. Given any value of the independent variable, the error term should have 
the same variance with this assumption. This implies that there is no change across 
different cross-sectional firms and through time in the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variable. Across different cross-sectional units and 
through time, the intercept is constant. If the individuality of each firm is considered 
i.e. units, this assumption may be violated. In addition, there are two kinds of 
variation: (i) one within cross-sectional units (firm-specific effects); and (ii) the other 
one between cross-sectional unit. Due to this fact, firm-specific effects are probably 
observed in relation to the operations of the excluded variables. Therefore, one main 
advantage of panel data is the ability to control such unobserved firm-specific effects 
(Merendino, 2014).  
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5.5.1 Panel Data Models 
Three models are used to analyze panel data: (i) the random effect; (ii) the fixed 
effects; and (iii) the pooled OLS. The model of pooling OLS is estimated and 
specified with cross-sectional data and more observations. Without considering an 
observation from the same firm, each firm or observation is treated as a discrete 
observation is known as pooling data. Moreover, there is an assumption from pooled 
OLS that the error terms are not in correlation across time i.e. no serial correlation 
assumption. Despite it is four-year periods in the case of this study, the structure of 
the panel data shows that every firm is repeatedly surveyed over the years. 
Therefore, from one year to the other, the error term can be carried over. This 
correlation is ignored by the pooled OLS standard errors as tested by the statistics. 
There is the possibility of bias in t-values with pooled OLS, which leads to 
inconsistent results from marginal effects. There is a likely occurrence when the 
dependent variable remains fairly stable over time and when there is little within 
variation in one or more of the independent variables. Thus, it means the same 
observations are counted many times with the use of pooled data.  
 
In contrast, the models of random and fixed effects determine the availability of 
firm-specific effects. As such, the two effects divide the error term into the firm-
specific component i.e. (i) one idiosyncratic component and (ii) one time-invariant, 
which changes between, and within the firms. Specifically, the fixed effect model 
enables unobserved variables to be in correlation with the error term thereby solving 
the problem of endogeneity which is in relation to the omitted variables. On the other 
hand, the purpose of the fixed effect model is to study the causes of changes within 
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an entity. Since the change is constant for each person, such change cannot be caused 
by a time-invariant characteristic (Kohler & Kreuter, 2009).  
 
The model of random-effects (unlike that of fixed effect) states that the independent 
variables are not in any way correlated to the error term. The model makes an 
assumption of taking advantage of both within-unit and cross-sectional variations 
while assuming that there is a similarity in those effects. In addition, the model of 
random effect accounts for some observations that belong to the same company. The 
random effect (the within estimator) applied the intra-firm variation by removing 
from each variable over the time its mean value for the firm. Nevertheless, the 
between-estimator i.e. the fixed effect makes comparisons between companies in 
their average result by taking the mean value of each variable for each firm across 
the time. The mean value of all firm-specific intercepts and time-invariant is the 
intercept, whereas the firm-specific and time-invariant components are the random 
deviations of the individual intercepts from the mean value. The intercepts are 
considered randomly drawn from a larger population by the random-effects models 
to be treated as if they were part of the error term or interpreted as random.  
 
The model of random effects can be estimated consistently by both fixed effect and 
random effect estimator to make a decision between the fixed-effect models, 
random-effect model and OLS pooled. Thus, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is used to 
test the estimators, especially when it is used to discriminate between RE and FE. 
The differences between the tested RE and FE estimates are statistically and 
significantly different from zero. Specifically, this is meant to make a decision 
between random and fixed effects by running Hausman test where the null 
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hypothesis is the preference of model is a random effect over the fixed effects as the 
alternative (Green, 2003). This does not imply that the random effect estimator is 
“safely” free from bias if there is no indication of p > 0.05 significant difference 
from the Hausman test. Therefore, this makes the fixed effect estimator less 
preferred (Clark & Linzer, 2012).  
 
This study used the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) to decide between a 
simple OLS regression and a random effect regression. The LM test of null 
hypothesis shows that the value of zero is derived from variances across entities. 
There is no panel effect i.e. there are no significant differences across the units. From 
the analysis, there is an unbalanced and short panel data which imply that the 
number of periods is different for all individuals (each firm). Besides, a Hausman 
test was adopted for all models and the fixed effects coefficient was suggested to be 
used. The models were tested, considering the dummies of the sector. The Hausman 
test confirmed that the fixed effects are not biased.  
 
Furthermore, the robust standard error is generally relied on to ensure reliable 
statistical inference when some underlying assumptions of the regression models are 
not followed (Hoechle, 2007). Therefore, the outcomes of the robust test are all fixed 
effects coefficient that is analyzed and described. According to Dielman and Rose 
(1997), the unbiased variables with minimum variance and estimates are yielded 
during the estimation of a regression model by using OLS, when the disturbances are 
identically distributed and independent. Nevertheless, the performance of OLS can 
be impaired in the presence of non-normal errors, especially if the errors follow a 
distribution pattern that leads to outliers. Rousseeuw and Leroy (2005) stated that 
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using a robust model is one of the possible methods to adjust heteroscedasticity. 
Therefore, robust coefficient and robust standard error are performed by using 
STATA13. Wooldridge (2006) mentioned that the use of robust standard errors in 
STATA 13 does not change the coefficient estimates as provided by models of fixed 
effects. Nevertheless, they modify the significance tests and standard errors. The 
following section enumerates the advantages of using panel data analysis. 
 
5.5.2 The Advantages of Panel Data Analysis 
By blending the inter-individual differences and intra-individual dynamics, panel 
data have several advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data: 
i.Panel data is more accurate in interference of model parameters. 
ii. The analysis has a greater capacity for capturing the complexity of firm behaviour 
than a single cross-section or time series data. 
iii.Simplicity in statistical inference and computation.  
 
Several significant differences were revealed by Henderson and Kaplan (2000), 
between using the panel data analysis and cross-sectional analysis, such as panel data 
analysis, accounts for omitted variables bias. It captures the dynamic in firm 
performance relationship over several time periods. Apart from that, it has a higher 
firm performance model explanatory power. Besides, the pooling time series and 
cross-section allows changes in time-dependent explanatory variables to affect the 
dependent variable (Chou & Lee, 2003). Thus, it provides a more dynamic analysis. 




5.6 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
The panel data for four (4) years were used to achieve the objective of this research. 
The data were pooled to allow for changes arising from time-dependent variables 
(Chou & Lee, 2003). This approach is considered appropriate to explain the 
relationship between independent variables and dependent variables (Oviatt, 1988). 
Similarly, the multiple regression analysis explains the variance and marginal 
contribution of individual independent variables. Variables measurement used in this 
study are consistent with past studies and as a hypothesis.   
 
5.7 Research Model and Measurement 
This study employed a linear multiple regression testing to know the relationship 
between the dependent variable firm performance (Tobin's Q) and the independent 
variables (i.e. board size, CEO duality, board non-executive directors, board 
meeting, internal audit existence, internal audit training, managerial ownership, 
individual block ownership, local institutional ownership, foreign ownership, and 
external audit quality). This section presents the model that guides the research in 
general. This model is precise as it includes both the dependent and independent 
variables to be in line with the main objective of the research. Below is the main 
model for the study.  
 
Model of the study:  
TOBINQ   = α   + β  BSIZE   + β CEO_DUAL   + β NON_NED   + β BMEET  
+ β IAEXIST + β IATRAIN   + β MGROWN   + β BLOCKOWN   
+ β LOCAL_INSTIT    +  β  FOREIGN    + β  AF   + β  COYSIZE  




 α = Intercept term 
β = Regression slope coefficient 
TOBINQ = Tobin's Q 
BSIZE = Board size 
CEO_DUAL = CEO duality 
NON_NED = Non-executive directors 
BMEET = Board meeting 
IAEXIST = Internal audit existence 
IATRAIN = Internal audit training  
MGROWN = Managerial ownership 
BLOCKOWN= Block shareholder ownership 
LOCAL_INSTIT = Local institutional ownership  
FOREIGN = Foreign ownership  
AF = External audit fees 
COYSIZE = Company size 
COYGROW = Company growth 
COYLEV = Company Leverage  
COYAGE = Company Age 
ε - Error term 
 
5.8 Variables Measurements 
The following section highlights the variables of the study. Table 5.3 below 




5.8.1 The Dependent Variable (Firm Performance) 
This study used the Tobin’s Q measure as in Haniffa and Hudaib, (2006); Aluchna, 
and Kaminski, (2017); Amran, (2012); Nguyen, Evans, and Lu, (2017); Upadhyay et 
al., (2014) as it was used as the measures for firm profitability. Some previous 
studies discovered that Tobin’s Q and market‐to‐book value are highly correlated. 
Thus, the latter is generally used as the surrogate for Tobin’s Q in empirical tests 
(Bai et al., 2004). Tobin’s Q, or the q ratio, is the ratio of the market value of a 
company's assets (as measured by the market value of its outstanding stock and debt) 
divided by the replacement cost of the company's assets (book value).  
 
5.8.2 The Independent Variables 
         5.8.2.1 Board Size: 
 
As amended in 2004, No. 21 of 1997 of Article 104 of the Iraqi Companies Law 
states there shall be only five to nine members of the board of directors. This study 
adopted the average number of seven to classify the boards of directors of the sample 
companies. The sample companies are classified into large councils if the numbers 
of members are beyond seven. On the other hand, they are classified into small 
councils if the members are between five and seven. For large board size, the dummy 
1 is used to measure the board size, whereas zero is used for others (Abdul-Zahra, 
2011; Corbetta, Huse & Ravasi, 2004). 
 
5.8.2.2 CEO Duality 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero if 
otherwise (Latif et al., 2013; Sharma & Sharma, 2016; Chalevas & Tzovas, 2016; 
Ujunwa, 2012; Cosken & Syiliar, 2012; Peni, 2014; Veprauskaitė & Adams, 2013; 
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Rodriguez-Fernandez, Fernandez-Alonso & Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2014; Al-Matari 
et al., 2012). CEO duality (DUAL) is a dichotomous variable.  
 
5.8.2.3 Non-executive Directors 
This is the number of non-executive directors (non-independent director and 
independent director) divided by the total number of board members (Latif et al., 
2013; Sharma & Sharma, 2016; Chalevas & Tzovas, 2016; Nawafly & Alarussi, 
2016; Lopes, Ferraz, & Martins 2016; Nguyen, Evans, & Lu, 2017; Alsayanai, 2017; 
Isa, 2017; Makhlouf, Ali, & Ramli, 2017; Ferreira & Kirchmaier, 2013; Ammari, 
Kadria & Ellouze, 2014; Wintoki, Linck & Netter, 2012; Garba & Abubakar, 2014; 
Mahadeo, Soobaroyen & Hanuman, 2012; Al-Matari et al., 2012).  
 
5.8.2.4 Board Meeting 
The board meeting is measured by the numbers of a board meeting during the year 
(Sharma & Sharma, 2016; Noor, 2011; Brick & Chidambaran, 2010; Hu, Tam, & 
Tan, 2010; Ren, 2014; Alzahrani, 2014; Al-matari, 2014; Al-Daoud, Saidin, & 
Abidin, 2016; Makhlouf, Ali, & Ramli, 2017; Aryani, Setiawan, & Rahmawati, 
2017). 
 
5.8.2.5 Internal Audit Existence 
Internal audit existence is measured as a dummy variable one for companies that has 
an internal audit department and 0 if otherwise (Chalevas & Tzovas, 2016; Ayoub, 




5.8.2.6 Internal Audit Training 
Internal auditing training is measured as a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that 
have audit training and zero otherwise (Ayoub, 2014; Abdelsayed, 2010). 
 
5.8.2.7 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership refers to the percentage of direct shareholdings of executive 
directors and indirect shareholdings by the family executives (Kamardin, Latifa & 
Mohdb, 2016; Mutize, Aspeling, & Mugobo, 2016; Makhlouf, Ali, & Ramli, 2017; 
Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012; Wahla et al., 2012; Ullah, Ali, & Mehmood, 2017; 
Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Saleh, Zahirdin, & Octaviani, 2017; Khan  & Nouman, 2017; 
Chen, Hou & Lee, 2012; Amran & Ahmad, 2013).  
 
5.8.2.8 Block Shareholder Ownership 
Block shareholder ownership is measured by the percentage of the largest individual 
shareholder in the company (Aluchna & Kaminski, 2017; Moscu et al., 2015; 
Buallay, Hamdan, & Zureigat, 2017; Khan  & Nouman, 2017; Leković, & Marić, 
2016; Boone, Colombage, & Gunasekarage, 2011; Abbas, Naqvi, & Mirza, 2013; 
Isik & Soykan, 2013; Lai, 2017). 
 
5.8.2.9 Local Institutional Ownership 
Local institutional ownership refers to the percentage of company shares held by 
local institutional divided by total number of shares issued (Abdulsamad & Yusoff, 
2016; Sharma & Sharma, 2016; Irina & Nadezhda, 2009; Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 
2012; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011; Tornyeva & Wereko, 2012; Balagobei & Velnampy, 
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2017; Ullah, Ali, & Mehmood, 2017; Saleh, Zahirdin, & Octaviani, 2017; Khan & 
Nouman, 2017). 
 
5.8.2.10 Foreign Institutional Ownership: 
This is the sum of ordinary shares owned by foreign institutional, divided by a total 
number of shares issued (Kamardin, Latifa & Mohdb, 2016; Sharma & Sharma, 
2016; Abdulsamad & Yusoff, 2016; Chari et al., 2012; Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012; 
Al Manaseer et al., 2012; Isa, 2017; Tornyeva & Wereko, 2012; Balagobei & 
Velnampy, 2017; Khan & Nouman, 2017; Pervan, Pervan & Todoric, 2012; Azzam 
et al., 2013; Nakano & Nguyen, 2012). 
 
5.8.2.11 Audit Quality 
The audit quality is measured by the log of the amount paid as audit fees (Aryan, 
2015; Hassan & Farouk, 2014; Sayyar et al., 2015; Martinez & Moraes, 2014; 
Moutinho et al., 2012). 
 
5.8.3 Control Variables 
         5.8.3.1 Company Age 
 
Company age is a measure of the difference between the year of company 
incorporation and the year of observation (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  
 
5.8.3.2 Company Size 
The company size is measured by the total asset logarithm (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
Hussein, 2018; Mandacı & Gumus, 2010).  
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5.8.3.3 Company Leverage 
Company leverage is measured by total debt divided by equity (Isik & Soykan, 
2013; Boone, Colombage & Gunasekarage, 2011; Hussein, 2018). 
 
5.8.3.4 Company Growth 
Company growth is measured by change in year-to-year sales (Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006; Hussein, 2018):  
Company Growth = Sales t - sales t-1 / sales t-1. 
 
Table 5.3 
Variables Description and Measurement  
Variable  Description Measurement   Sourced from 
Firm 
performance  
   
TOBINQ Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q is a market 
base measure of firm 
performance 
calculated as total 
market value divided 
by total assets value.  
Aluchna and Kaminski, (2017); Amran, 
(2012); Coles et al., (2008); McConnell 
and Servaes, (1990); Nguyen, Evans, and 
Lu, (2017); Omran et al., (2008); 
Upadhyay et al., (2014) 
Board 
structure  
   
BSIZE Board size A dummy variable 
equal to 1 for 
companies that have 
large board size, and 
zero if otherwise. 
Abdul-Zahra, (2011), Corbetta, Huse and 
Ravasi, (2004) 
CEO_DUAL CEO duality A dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the CEO 
is also the chairman 
and 0 if otherwise. 
Latif et al., (2013); Sharma and Sharma, 
(2016); Chalevas and Tzovas, (2016) ; 
Ujunwa, (2012); Cosken and Syiliar, 
(2012); Peni, (2014); Veprauskaitė and 
Adams, (2013); Rodriguez-Fernandez, 
Fernandez-Alonso and Rodriguez-






divided by board size. 
Fauzi and Locker, (2012); Haniffa and 
Hudaib, (2006); Latif et al.,(2013); Sharma 
and Sharma, (2016); Chalevas and Tzovas, 
(2016); Nawafly and Alarussi, (2016); 
Lopes, Ferraz, and Martins (2016); 
Nguyen, Evans, and Lu, (2017); Alsayanai, 
(2017); Isa, (2017); Makhlouf, Ali, and 
Ramli, (2017); Ferreira and Kirchmaier, 
(2013); Ammari, Kadria and Ellouze, 
(2014); Wintoki, Linck and Netter, (2012); 





Table 5.3 (Continued) 
Variable  Description Measurement   Sourced from 
BMEET Board 
meeting 
Number of times that the 
directors met in a year. 
Ntim, (2009); Sharma and Sharma, 
(2016); Noor,(2011); Brick and 
Chidambaran, (2010); Hu, Tam, and 
Tan, (2010); Ren, (2014); Alzahrani, 
(2014); Al-matari, (2014); Al-Daoud, 
Saidin, and Abidin, (2016); 
Makhlouf, Ali, and Ramli, (2017); 
Aryani, Setiawan, and Rahmawati, 
(2017). 
 





A dummy variable, give 
1 for companies that has 
internal audit 
department and zero if 
otherwise. 
Ayoub, (2014); Abdelsayed, (2010); 
Chalevas and Tzovas, (2016). 
IATRAIN Internal audit 
training  
Dummy variable equal 
to 1 for firms that have 
internal audit training 
and zero if otherwise. 
Ayoub, (2014); Abdelsayed, (2010) 
Ownership 
structure : 
   
MGROWN Managerial 
ownership 
The percentage of direct 
shareholdings held by 
executive directors and 
indirect shareholdings 
by the family 
executives. 
Kamardin, Latifa and Mohdb, 
(2016); Mutize, Aspeling, and 
Mugobo, (2016); Makhlouf, Ali, and 
Ramli, (2017); Uwuigbe and 
Olusanmi, (2012); Wahla et al., 
(2012); Ullah, Ali, and Mehmood, 
(2017); Fauzi and Locke, (2012); 
Saleh, Zahirdin, and Octaviani, 
(2017); Chen, Hou and Lee, (2012); 
















shares held by 
largest  individual 
shareholder. 
Aluchna and Kaminski, (2017); 
Moscu et al., (2015); Buallay, 
Hamdan, and Zureigat, (2017); Khan 
and Nouman, (2017); Leković, and 
Marić, (2016); Boone, Colombage, 
and Gunasekarage, 2011; Abbas, 
Naqvi, & Mirza, 2013; Isik and 





Percentage of company 
shares held by local 
institutional. 
Abdulsamad and Yusoff, (2016); 
Sharma and Sharma, (2016); Irina 
and Nadezhda, (2009); Uwuigbe and 
Olusanmi, (2012); Nuryanah and 
Islam, (2011); Tornyeva and 
Wereko, (2012); Balagobei and 










Table 5.3 (Continued) 






held by foreign 
institutional.  
Kamardin, Latifa and Mohdb, (2016); Sharma 
and Sharma, (2016); Abdulsamad and Yusoff, 
(2016); Chari et al., (2012); Uwuigbe and 
Olusanmi, (2012); Al Manaseer et al., (2012); 
Isa, (2017); Tornyeva and Wereko, (2012); 
Balagobei and Velnampy, (2017); Khan and 
Nouman, (2017); Pervan, Pervan and Todoric, 









The log of the 
amount paid as 
audit fees.  
 
Aryan, (2015); Hassan and Farouk, (2014); 
Sayyar et al., (2015); Martinez and Moraes, 
(2014); Moutinho et al., (2012). 
Control 
variables  
   
COYAGE Company 
age 
The number of 
years since the 
company was 
incorporated.  
Haniffa and Hudaib, (2006) 
COYSIZE Company 
size 
Measured by the 
log of total asset. 
Haniffa and Hudaib, (2006); Hussein, (2018) 
COYLEV Company 
leverage  
Total debt to 
equity.  
Haniffa and Hudaib, (2006); Hussein, (2018); 
Isik and Soykan, (2013); Boone, Colombage, 




Growth in sales. Haniffa and Hudaib, (2006); Hussein, (2018) 
 
5.9 Chapter Summary 
The chapter discusses the methods employed in achieving the objectives of this 
study and their supporting justifications. This study uses secondary data from the 
listed companies in ISX from 2012 to 2015 to examine the relationship between the 
dependent variable and independent variables. As highlighted, the research is a type 
of quantitative research. Thus, the model is tested by using a panel multiple 
regression analysis as the statistical techniques for the data analysis. The chapter also 
discusses the detailed procedure for data collection, population sample, sampling 





RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the result of data analysis on the relationship of corporate 
governance variables and firm performance by using the data from the sample. The 
analysis uses descriptive statistic to explain the data characteristics, and Spearman 
correlation analysis to assess the association between variables. The regression 
analysis is used to test if the hypotheses are supported. In this Chapter, Section 6.2 
reports on the descriptive statistics. On the other hand, Section 6.3 reports 
Spearman’s correlation. The panel regression result is presented in Section 6.4 and 
Section 6.5 shows model estimation regression result for firm performance. Section 
6.6 reports the discussion of the resultand Section 6.7 reports additional analysis. 
Last but not least, Section 6.8 presents the conclusion of the chapter.  
 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section discusses the descriptive statistic of the study based on the nature of the 
data (i.e. continuous variable and dichotomous variables). The descriptive statistics 
(include the number of observation, mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum number) with respect to the all the variables (i.e. Tobin, the board of 
directors characteristics, internal audit, ownership structure, and external audit 
quality). Moreover, the control variables include company size, company growth, 




Table 6.1 below presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the 
performance model and are divided into three panels (A, B, and C). Panel A of Table 
6.1 presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the dependent 
variable in the model. Panel B of Table 6.1 presents the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum, and maximum of the continuous variables. Panel C of Table 6.1 presents 
the descriptive statistics (percentage) for dummy variables.  
 
6.2.1 Dependent Variable 
Panel A of Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics relating to the performances 
of the listed companies as measured by Tobin’s Q from 2012 to 2015. From the 
descriptive analysis of Tobin’s Q, it revealed that 2014 has the highest mean value of 
4.62 between the minimum (Min) value of 0.421 and maximum (Max) value of 
70.44 from 192 observations. This is followed by 2012 with a mean value of 3.99 
between the minimum (Min) value of 0.342 and maximum (Max) value of 30.62. 
2015 has the least mean value of 2.91 between the minimum (Min) value of 0.331 
and maximum (Max) value of 24.64. On the other hand, 2013 has a mean value of 
3.93 between the minimum (Min) value of 0.423 and maximum (Max) value of 
34.56. The standard deviations for 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 were 5.96, 6.39, 10.68 
and 4.37 respectively. 
 
6.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
Panel B provides the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables used in the 
study. The mean proportion of non-executive directors (NON_NED) on board is 
47.244 with a minimum of the value of 0 and the maximum value of 88.889 directors 
on board. The mean number of a non-executive director is slightly above the mean 
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value of non-executive director reported by Mashhadani and Fatlawi (2012) in the 
sample of Jordan listed companies. The mean number of non-executive director 
reported by Mashhadani and Fatlawi (2012) is 31.53, whereas the reported mean 
value reported in the present study is 47.244. From the descriptive statistics, the 
board meets at least (BMEET) once during the financial year as the minimum value 
shows 1 and the maximum number of the meetings held during the year is 27. With 
respect to the mean number of the meeting held during the year, the mean number of 
meeting in the present study which is 9.072 is slightly above the mean value (7.4) as 
reported by Makhlouf et al. (2017) for a sample of 120 non-financial listed firms in 
Jordan.  
 
Themeans ownership is about 37.729, 2.011, 30.987 and 1.521 respectively with 
respect to managerial ownership (MGROWN), block shareholder ownership 
(BLOCKOWN), local institutional ownership (LOCAL_INSTIT) and foreign 
ownership (FOREIGN). Comparing the value of these ownership structures with 
other previous studies, in the study of Al-sraheen (2014), managerial ownership is 
slightly higher in the present study for the sample of 348 non-financial firms in 
Jordan with a mean value of 48. Nevertheless, the managerial ownership reported by 
Hasan and Mohsen (2016) for the sample of banks in Iraq indicated that managerial 
ownership in the banking sectors is very high with a mean value of 27.94. The mean 
of individual block ownership reported by Mashhadani and Fatlawi (2012) is high 
compared to the value reported in the present study with a value of 29.86. In the 
previous study, for local institutional and foreign ownership, the study of Al-sraheen 
(2014) showed the average value of foreign ownership to be 41.8 while the one 
reported in the current study is 1.521. On the other hand, as reported by Aldaoud 
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(2015), the average local institutional ownership is very close to the mean value of 
35 in a sample of 114 non-financial firms in Jordan. The mean of audit quality (AF) 
which was proxy by the log of audit fees is 7.107 and it ranges from 6 to 8. 049. 
 
Panel C gives the descriptive statistics of the dichotomous variables which are board 
size (BSIZE), CEO duality (CEO-DUAL), internal audit existence (INEXIST) and 
internal audit training (IATRAIN). From Panel C of Table 6.1, 52.08 % of the 
companies have big board size, 97.92 % of the companies have different individuals 
serving as the chairman and CEO,  68.23 % of the companies have internal audit 
department and 30.73 % of the companies trained the employees of internal audit 
department.  
 
6.2.3 Control Variables 
Company size (COYSIZE), company growth (COYGROW), company leverage 
(COYLEV) and company age (COYAGE) are the control variables adopted for this 
study. The descriptive statistics for the control variables revealed that the mean size 
of sampled companies (COYSIZE) is 9.738 with a minimum size of 8.363 and a 
maximum size of 12.557. On the mean, company growth is about 30.734. Panel B of 
Table 6. shows some companies recorded a negative growth of about -99.959, 
whereas some companies recorded growth as high as 1179.174 during the sample 
year. Company leverage ranges between -5.849 and 29.607 with a mean of 0.977. 
Besides, the mean age of the companies used in the study is 25.937 and the company 





 Descriptive Statistics from the Period 2012-2015 
Panel A Dependent Variable (Tobin’s Q) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2012 192 3.99 5.96 0.342 30.62 
2013 192 3.93 6.39 0.423 34.56 
2014 192 4.62 10.68 0.421 70.44 
2015 192 2.91 4.37 0.331 24.64 
Panel B Continuous Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
NON_NED 192 47.244 16.676 0 88.889 
BMEET 192 9.072 4.399 1 27 
MGROWN 192 37.729 20.284 2.326 82.530 
BLOCKOWN 192 2.011 5.055 0 27.073 
LOCAL_INSTIT 192 30.987 23.949 0 79.333 
FOREIGN 192 1.521 5.966 0 44.875 
AF 192 7.107 0.504 6 8.049 
COYSIZE 192 9.738 0.661 8.363 12.557 
COYGROW 192 30.734 140.349 -99.959 1179.174 
COYLEV 192 0.977 4.027 -5.849 29.607 
COYAGE 192 25.937 14.142 5 69 
Panel C Dichotomous Variables:  1 0 Total   





















IATRAIN  59 133 192  
  (30.73%) (69.27%) 100%  
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6.3 Analysis of Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Table 6.2 below presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the research variables 
included in the performance model. The correlation matrix examines the bivariate 
correlation among independent, control and dependent variables. Overall, all variables 
used in the performance model are not highly correlated. This multicollinearity is not a 
serious threat to the multivariate results since the correlation values are below 0.80 
thresholds (Gujarati, 2009). 
 
Table 6.2 above shows a positive significant correlation between board size and Tobin's 
Q. CEO duality has a strong positive significant correlation with company growth. The 
results suggested that non-executive directors have a negative and significant correlation 
with Tobin's Q and CEO duality. Board meeting shows mix direction in findings, as it is 
positiveand significant with company size, company growth, and company age 
respectively. Nevertheless, it is negative andsignificant with board size. 
 
Internal audit existence has a positive and significant correlation at 1% and 5% level of 
significance with company size, company age, Tobin's Q, return on equity, and board 
meeting. The internal audit existence is negatively correlated and significant with non-
executive directors. Nevertheless, the internal audit training is positively correlated and 
significant with company size, CEO duality, board meeting, and internal audit existence. 
 
Managerial ownership has a positive, negative and significant correlation with company 
size, company age, Tobin's Q, board meeting, internal audit existence, and company 
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leverage. The block ownership has a positive, negative and significant correlation with 
Tobin's Q, board size, board meeting, internal audit existence, managerial ownership, 
and non-executive directors. On the other hand, foreign ownership has a strong positive 
and significant correlation with company size, company growth, board meeting, and 
internal audit training. Apart from that, local institutional ownership has a positive and 
significant correlation company size, company age, Tobin's Q, board meeting, internal 
audit existence, managerial ownership, and individual block ownership. 
 
Last but not least, audit fees have a strong negative and significant correlation with 
company age, board meeting, internal audit existence, and managerial ownership. 
Nevertheless, audit fees are positively correlated and significant at 1% with board size 





Correlation Coefficient of Performance 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 1                
2 0.138 1               
3 0.174 
* 
0.065 1              
4 -0.067 -0.063 -0.205 
** 
1             
5 -0.162 
* 
0.019 0.124 0.024 1            
6 0.106 0.069 -0.022 0.011 0.156 
* 
1           
7 0.299 0.267 
** 
-0.008 -0.107 -0.015 0.069 1          













-0.051 -0.004 1        
10 0.396 
* 








1       
11 0.645 
** 



















0.106 1     





















-0.101 -0.102 1   
15 0.196 
** 












-0.141 1  















**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) and N=192.Where:1= COYSIZE; 2= COYGROW; 
3= COYLEV; 4= COYAGE; 5= TOBINQ; 6= BSIZE; 7= CEO_DUAL; 8= NON_NED; 9= BMEET; 10= INEXSIT; 11= IATRAIN; 12= MGROWN; 13= 
BLOCKOWN; 14= FOREIGN; 15= LOCAL_INSTIT; 16= AF 
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6.4 Panel Regression Result 
The panel regression is estimated under three regression estimation procedures (i.e. 
pooled model, fixed effects (FE) model and the random effect (RE) model. According to 
Gujarati (2006), the treatment regarding the presence of the individual effect and its 
treatment explain the difference in the three models hence the model selection. The 
individual effect captures the heterogeneity among individual’s firms. The pooled effect 
model ignores the individual effect. Thus, it treats all observations as homogenous and 
assumes that the error term is identical and independently distributed. In the FE model, 
the individual is time-invariant and assumed under the intercept. Therefore, Ui correlates 
with other regressors. On the other hand, the RE model assumes that the individual 
effect is independent of the regressors and that the intercept and slopes of the regressors 
are constant across individuals. Hence, the individual effect is always included in the 
composite error term. As such, some tests must be performed to determine which model 
is suitable for use. 
 
6.4.1 Pooled Effects vs. RE/FE 
The step of panel regression model is to determine whether either the pool regression 
model or the FE/RE model is appropriate for estimation purposes. Therefore, this study 
used the Lagrange Multiplier test that Breusch and Pagan (1980) introduced to select 
between the pool effect model and the RE/FE model to be the appropriate model. The 
Lagrange Multiplier test observes the presence of an unobserved effect in the effect 
models. The decision criterion is that, when the calculated value is greater than the 
critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. As such, the FE/RE model is more 
198 
 
appropriate. Table 6.3 shows that the Lagrange Multiplier test result for the three models 
are significant. Thus, the null hypothesis of no significant effect across companies is 
rejected. Conclusively, the random effect model is appropriate. 
 
Table 6.3 
The Result of Lagrange Multiplier Test 




6.4.2 FE Model vs. RE Model 
In a situation in which the pool effect model is inappropriate, a decision needs to be 
made between the RE and the FE models.  It is necessary to test whether the individual 
effect correlates with the independent variables to know the appropriate model. 
Hausman’s (1978) specification test observes the difference between random effects and 
fixed effects estimates. According to the null hypothesis, the error terms do not correlate 
with the explanatory variables. The rejection of the null hypothesis means that the FE 
model is appropriate. From Table 6.4, the Prob>chi2 for the TOBIN’S Q model is more 
than 0.05 and not significant. Hence, the random effect model is more appropriate.  
 
Table 6.4 
Hausman Specification Test  







6.4.3 Diagnostic Test Result 
The results of the two basic tests (i.e. heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation) are 
discussed in the next sub-sections. To successfully conduct a chosen model in the study, 
regression diagnostics tests were checked for all variables to verify that assumptions of 
multiple regressions were met and to avoid misleading results. 
 
6.4.3.1 Heteroscedasticity Result 
According to Hair et al. (2006), one of the common violations in regression analysis of 
cross-section data is the presence of non-uniform variance of the residual, known as 
heteroscedasticity. Heterogeneity assumption is a vital diagnostic test in panel data as 
the panel data assumed that the variance of the disturbance terms are homoscedastic and 
the serial correlation is constant through random individual effects (Baltagi, 2005). The 
OLS would not be efficient and no longer the best linear unbiased estimator since 
heteroscedasticity is a problem that can lead to bias value for a true variance. This might 
result in higher values of t and F where the null hypotheses may berejected. 
Nevertheless, the rejection is not necessary if the issue is addressed.  
 
Most of the times, the choice of the method is determined by the statistical package 
employed by the researchers for analysis. Several approaches are available in 
establishing if the disturbance terms are constant over time. Some available methods are 
the Park test, the Glejser test, Spearman’s rank correlation test, the Goldfeld-Quandt 
test, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test and the White general heteroscedasticity test. Since 
the present study used STATA statistical software, the modified Wald test for 
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GroupWise heteroscedasticity was used to assess the presence of heteroscedasticity 
(Greene, 2003). In the presence of a heteroscedasticity issue, a corrective action using 
the White heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors (otherwise called robust standard 
error) will be employed (Pong & Whittington, 1994; Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
Table 6.5 below explains Modified Wald test for GroupWise heteroscedasticity The 
result of the Modified Wald test for GroupWise heteroscedasticity for the model 
revealed a significant prob>chi2 at 0.01 level. Hence, the result indicated the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. The problems of heteroscedasticity are solved by using Panel 
Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) (Howard, 2001; Johnson, 2004; Hoechle, 2007; Hecht, 
2008; Baldwin, Borrelli, & New, 2011; Swamy, 2011; Sun, 2014; Isah, 2016; Nassar, 
Martinez, & Pineda, 2017).  
 
In the current study, the assumption of normality and linearity should not be a major 
concern based on three (3) reasons. First, the standard least squares assumptions are not 
applicable to the panel data model (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Second, most of the 
continuous variables have been converted into log form, square root form or ratio form 
(Turpen, 1990). Third, for a large sample size, even a deviation from normality will not 
make a substantive difference in the analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
 
Table 6.5 
Modified Wald Test for GroupWise Heteroscedasticity 







The next issue is regarding the problem of correlation between the disturbance term and 
the observation in time and space (Gujarati & Porter, 2009).  
 
The violation of the regression assumption, which states that the error terms are not 
correlated with one another either on the direction or on the size of a series of 
observations. Such violation is indicated by autocorrelation in time series and cross-
sectional data. Autocorrelation can be of two types: positive or negative. The 
consecutive errors are often with the same sign in a negative correlation. On the other 
hand, the positive residuals are often followed by positive residuals, whereas the 
negative residuals are probably followed by the negative residuals. Omission from the 
model, data manipulations and inertia are the main reasons for autocorrelation. Inertia is 
very common at various points in a time series. The error terms associated with them 
depend on each other while this occurs as a result of successive observations. When an 
important independent variable is omitted from a model, its effect on the dependent 
variable becomes part of the error term. A time series is created by accumulating the 
data and introducing a specific amount of smoothing by creating a yearly dataset. The 
yearly dataset is averaged and summarised over a month during data manipulations. 
This leads to the loss of some randomness in disaggregated data. This smoothing can 
lead to the possibility of autocorrelation from the systematic patterns in the error terms. 
 
The presence of autocorrelation will cause consistent but inefficient estimates of the 
regression coefficients and biased standard error. Wooldridge test for autocorrelation is 
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the method available for detecting autocorrelation. This test involves ascertaining the 
significance of the null hypothesis, showing that no idiosyncratic error of the linear 
panel data model is present. A significant F-value signifies the presence of 
autocorrelation. An autocorrelation error can be corrected by using a random effect 
model. Meanwhile, as the current study is a short panel, the issue of autocorrelation 
might not constitute a threat (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
The Wooldridge test for serial correlation using xtserial command was employed to 
examine the presence of serial correlation. The null hypothesis stated that no first-order 
serial correlation. The result of the autocorrelation test as displayed in Table 6.6 
indicated a significant probability F test for the three models. The t model (i.e. 
TOBINQ) is significant at 0.0482. Impliedly, the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between error terms is rejected and it suggests the presence of the first-order 
autocorrelation in the model. The problems of autocorrelation are solved in this study by 
using PCSE (Howard, 2001; Johnson, 2004; Hoechle, 2007; Hecht, 2008; Baldwin, 
Borrelli, & New, 2011; Swamy, 2011; Sun, 2014; Isah, 2016; Nassar, Martinez, & 
Pineda, 2017).  
 
Table 6.6 
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data 







There is the occurrence of multicollinearity when one or more independent variables are 
related to one another. A high multicollinearity in the regression variant affects the 
estimation and explanation of each independent variable (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
Multicollinearity does not pose a serious threat in panel regression analysis (Baltagi, 
2005). Nevertheless, the correlation coefficient between independent variables was 
computed to further examine the nature of the panel data analysis in the study. By using 
several examinations, data must be examined for the possible existence of 
multicollinearity. These examinations include the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and 
the correlation matrix test. The most obvious and simplest method of detecting 
multicollinearity is the correlation matrix through which all the independent variables 
are scanned to ensure there is no presence of high correlations. Statistically, any 
correlation of 0.9 or above indicates a serious problem in the analysis (Hair et al., 2006).  
 
The Pearson correlation result in Table 6.2 indicates that all the variables used in the two 
(2) performance models are not highly correlated. Thus, multicollinearity is not a serious 
threat to the multivariate results since the correlation values are below 0.80 thresholds. 
Gujarati and Porter (2009) provided a threshold of more than 0.80 as a sign of serious 
correlation. Overall, the variables of this study fall within the acceptable range. 




In addition, the VIF was employed to further confirm the absence of multicollinearity 
among the variables. The VIF result reported in Table 6.7 indicates the absence of 
multicollinearity since it falls below the threshold of 10 as suggested by Kenny (1992) 
as cited Eshleman and Guo (2014). Moreover, the value of the VIF is the amount of 
variability of the selected independent variable, which is explained by other independent 
variables. In contrast, the tolerance is the inverse of VIF (Hair et al., 2010). The VIF and 
the tolerance values cut-off points are 10 and 0.10 respectively, which indicates that VIF 
is closer to 1.00 represents little or no multicollinearity. Based on Table 6.7, VIF values 
range between 1.22 and 2.87, whereas tolerance values range between 0.35 and 0.82. 
Therefore, the results reported that there is no violation of multicollinearity assumption. 
 
Table 6.7 
Result of the Multicollinearity Test 
 VIF 1/VIF (Tolerance) 
BSIZE 1.35 0.74 
CEO_DUAL 1.33 0.75 
NON_NED 1.22 0.82 
BMEET 1.57 0.64 
INEXSIT 1.60 0.62 
IATRAIN 2.09 0.48 
MGROWN 2.75 0.36 
BLOCKOWN 1.41 0.71 
LOCAL_INSTIT 2.87 0.35 
FOREIGN 1.38 0.73 
AF 1.84 0.54 
COYSIZE 2.53 0.40 
COYGROW 1.33 0.75 
COYLEV 1.29 0.78 
COYAGE 1.46 0.69 




6.5 Model Estimation Regression Result for Firm Performance 
The preliminary diagnostic tests, the result revealed the presence of both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Hence, this informed the choice of study to 
employ the PCSE developed by Beck and Katz (1996), which robust the standard error 
against heteroscedastic and autocorrelation issues (Kristensen & Wawro, 2003; Hecht & 
Haye, 2008; Choi & Coffey, 2011;  Bailey & Katz, 2011; Abd Al-HameedQudah, 2016; 
Hossain, 2016; Barua, Khan, & Barua, 2017; Chinelo & Frdrick, 2017).  
 
Furthermore, all the t-values are robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
R-squared (R2) for the models Tobin's Q is 0.35. The R2 indicates that the variation in 
the firm performance proxy by TOBIN’S Q was explained by the independent variables. 
In addition, the (F) test result is < 0.05. This indicates that the model is appropriate. 
Hence, the coefficients in the model are different than zero. 
 
Apart from the above, the study discusses the results from estimating the relationship 
between firm performance and the selected corporate governance variables (i.e. board 
characteristics, internal audit, ownership structure, and audit quality) and the control 
variables (i.e. firm size, company growth, company leverage, and company age) that are 




6.5.1 Hypotheses Results 
In this study, there are four hypotheses developed from board characteristics, internal 
audit, ownership structure, and audit quality as dimensions and their respective 
relationship with firm performance.  
 
The hypotheses developed from board characteristics include: 
(i) H1a: There is a positive significant relationship between board size and firm 
performance. 
(ii) H1b: There is a negative significant relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance.  
(iii)H1c: There is a positive significant relationship between the proportion of non-
executive directors on board and firm performance.  
(iv) H1d: There is a positive significant relationship between a board meeting and 
firm performance.  
 
On the other hand, the hypotheses developed from internal audit and ownership 
structure include: 
(i) H2a: There is a positive significant relationship between internal audit existence 
and firm performance. 
(ii) H2b: There is a positive significant relationship between internal audit training 
and firm performance.  
(iii)H3a: There is a positive significant relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance.  
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(iv) H3b: There is a positive significant relationship between block shareholder 
ownership and firm performance.  
(v) H3c There is a positive significant relationship between local institution 
ownership and firm performance.  
(vi) H3d: There is a positive significant relationship between foreign institutional 
ownership and firm performance. 
 
The hypotheses developed from external audit include: 
(i) H4: There is a positive significant relationship between audit quality and firm 
performance. 
 
Table 6.8 below reports the significant effect of all the hypotheses. 
 
6.5.1.1 Result for Tobin’s Q 
       6.5.1.1.1 Result for H1A 
 
The TOBIN’S Q model suggested a positive relationship between board size (BSIZE) 
and firm performance. The coefficient for the BSIZE under the TOBIN’S Q model is 
significant and positive (coefficient= 2.818, t= 3.96). Hence, the finding supports 




6.5.1.1.2 Result for H1B 
The coefficient for CEO duality (CEO_DUAL) is positive and insignificant in the 
TOBIN’S Q model 2.143 (t= 0.80). Thus, the hypothesis is not supported in the 
TOBIN’S Q model. 
 
6.5.1.1.3 Result for H1C 
The finding of this study showed that board non-executive directors (NON_NED) are 
negative and significant in the TOBIN’S Q model -0.000(t= -5.21). Thus, the result does 
not support hypothesis H1C.  
 
6.5.1.1.4 Result for H1D 
The TOBIN’S Q model suggested a significant relationship between firm performance 
and board meeting (BMEET). The coefficient of BMEET in the TOBIN’S Q model is 
positive and significant with the value of 0.238 (t= 2.74). Hence, the finding supports 
the hypothesis with respect to the TOBIN’S Q model. 
 
6.5.1.1.5 Result of H2A 
In TOBIN’S Q model, the coefficient on internal audit existence (INEXSIT) revealed a 
positive and significant relationship between TOBIN’S Q and INEXSIT 3.120 (t= 4.42). 
This estimated result showed that the existence of an internal audit department improves 




6.5.1.1.6 Result of H2B 
Further, the findings showed that the coefficient on internal audit training (IATRAIN) 
with respect to TOBIN’S Q is positive and significant at 1% with the value of 
7.306(t=3.28). Thus, this suggested that the training which internal audit staffs undergo 
improves firm performance. Hence, the finding supports hypothesis 2b with respect to 
the TOBIN’S Q model. 
 
6.5.1.1.7 Result of H3A 
The coefficient of managerial ownership (MGROWN) in the TOBIN’S Q model 
revealed a positive and significant relationship of 0.039(t= 3.66), suggesting that equity 
participation of the manager improves firm performance. Hence, the finding supports 
hypothesis 3a with respect to the TOBIN’S Q model. 
 
6.5.1.1.8 Result of H3B 
The findings of the TOBIN’S Q model indicated that the coefficients on block 
ownership (BLOCKOWN) are negative and insignificant. The coefficient of 
BLOCKOWN in the TOBIN’S Q model is -0.034 with a t-value of -0.55. Hence, the 
finding does not support hypothesis 3b with respect to the TOBIN’S Q model. 
 
6.5.1.1.9 Result of H3C 
The coefficient on local institutional ownership (LOCAL_INSTIT) in the TOBIN’S Q 
model revealed a positive and significant relationship. In the TOBIN’S Q model, the 
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coefficient is 0.086 with t-value of 6.71. Hence, the finding supports hypothesis 3c with 
respect to the TOBIN’S Q model. 
 
6.5.1.1.10 Result of H3D 
Furthermore, the coefficient on foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is positive and 
significant for TOBINQ 0.134 (t= 4.23). Hence, the finding supports hypothesis 3d with 
respect to the TOBIN’S Q model. 
 
6.5.1.1.11 Result of H4 
The coefficient on audit quality (AF) with respect to TOBIN’S Q is positive and 
significant 2.485 (t= 3.93). Hence, the finding supports hypothesis 4 with respect to the 
TOBIN’S Q model. 
 
6.5.1.12 Result for Control Variables 
There are four control variables in the model and these control variables are company 
size (COYSIZE), company growth (COYGROW), company leverage (COYLEV), and 
company age (COYAGE). Past studies have empirically proven that these four variables 
are associated with company performance. The natural log of total asset (COYSIZE) 
proxy for company size is negative and significant with Tobin’s Q  model. The 
coefficient of COYSIZE in the Tobin’s Q model is -6.536 with a t-value of -5.12. The 
coefficient on COYGROW is positive and insignificant 0.000 with a t-value of 0.14. On 
the other hand, the coefficient on COYLEV is positive and significant with Tobin’s Q 
model. The coefficient of COYLEV in the Tobin’s Qmodel is 0.540 (t= 3.87). In 
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contrast, the coefficient on COYAGE revealed a negative and insignificant relationship 
in the Tobin’s Q model -0.001(t= -0.12). In summary, Table 6.8 presents the 
combinations of the results. Table 6.8 presents the PCSE results based on Tobin’s Q. 
 
Table 6.8 
Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Results Based on TOBINSQ 
 Coef. T value P>|t| 
BSIZE 2.818 3.96 0.000*** 
CEO_DUAL 2.143 0.80 0.422 
NON_NED -0.000 -5.21 0.000*** 
BMEET 0.238 2.74 0.006*** 
INEXSIT 3.120 4.42 0.000*** 
IATRAIN 7.306 3.28 0.001*** 
MGROWN 0.039 3.66 0.000*** 
BLOCKOWN -0.034 -0.55 0.580 
LOCAL_INSTIT 0.086 6.71 0.000*** 
FOREIGN 0.134 4.23 0.000*** 
AF 2.485 3.93 0.000*** 
COYSIZE -6.536 -5.12 0.000*** 
COYGROW 0.000 0.14 0.890 
COYLEV 0.540 3.87 0.000*** 
COYAGE -0.001 -0.12 0.903 
_cons 42.031 5.26 0.000*** 
R-Squared   0.35  
F test  0.000  
Number of observations  192  
Note: *, **, *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
6.6 Discussion of Result 
      6.6.1 Overview of Result (Tobin’s Q) 
 
The Table 6.9 below contains the summary of the regression analysis based on the 
objectives and the hypotheses of the present study. In addition, the Table shows that, the 
first objective has four sub-hypotheses. From the four sub-hypotheses, two hypotheses 
were supported under the Tobin’s Q model i.e. hypotheses H1a and H1d were supported 
under the Tobin’s Q model. The two other hypotheses were related to the second 
objective. In the first model (Tobin’s Q), all the two hypotheses were supported while 
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four hypotheses were developed in the third objective. Using the regression results, three 
of the hypotheses (H3a, H3c and H3d) were supported in the Tobin’s Q model. 
However, the fourth objective has one hypothesis, which is supported in the Tobin’s Q 
model. In summary, eight (8) hypotheses were supported under the Tobin’s Q model. 
 
Table 6.9 
Summary of Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Results 
 Hypotheses Tobin’s Q 
H1a There is a positive significant relationship between board size 
and firm performance. 
Supported 
H1b There is a negative significant relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance. 
Rejected 
H1c There is a positive significant relationship between the 
proportion of non-executive directors and firm performance. 
Rejected 
H1d There is a positive significant relationship between board 
meeting and firm performance. 
Supported 
H2a There is a positive significant relationship between internal audit 
existence and firm performance. 
Supported 
H2b There is a positive significant relationship between internal audit 
training and firm performance. 
Supported 
H3a There is a positive significantrelationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. 
Supported 
H3b There is a positive significantrelationship between block 
ownership and firm performance. 
Rejected 
H3c There is a positivesignificant relationship between local 
institution ownership and firm performance 
Supported 
H3d There is a positivesignificant relationship between foreign 
institutional ownership and firm performance. 
Supported 
H4 There is a positive significantrelationship between external audit 




6.6.1.1 Relationship between Board Characteristics and Firm Performance 
  6.6.1.1.1 Relationship between Board Size and Firm Performance (Hypothesis 1A) 
 
With respect to hypothesis H1a, the result revealed a significant positive relationship 
between Tobin’s Q and board size (2.818, t=3.96), suggesting that 2.818 increase in 
board size will lead to 2.818 % increase in the firm performance level. From the agency 
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theory perspective, this finding is congruent with the proposition that large board 
ensures right mix of individuals (with respect to the knowledge, expertise and 
capabilities) depending on the size of the company’s operation and extent of 
diversification (Farhat, 2014). Invariably, large board improves corporate performance 
as individuals with a wide range of experience who can make better decisions are 
readily available on board. Thus, it will be difficult for powerful CEOs to dominate the 
board (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006).  
 
In the same vein, the resource dependency theory suggests that critical resources, such 
as business contracts and finance are easier to be secured by a firm with a large board. 
This characteristic at the long- or short-run increases the firm’s opportunities to improve 
its operations (Goodstein et al., 1994; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Similarly, literatures like: 
Adams and Mehran (2005); Alsayanai (2017); Dwivedi and Jain (2005); Kiel and 
Nicholson (2003); and Sharma and Sharma (2016) reported a positive and significant 
relationship between board size and firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. The 
positive impact of large board size on the Iraqi firm performance can be traced to the 
fact that personal relationship is very important in Iraq when organizing business 
contracts and improving the connection between the firm and its environment, which 
subsequently enhance the firm performance (Adeyemi-Bello & Kincaid, 2012).  
 
6.6.1.1.2 Relationship between CEO Duality and Firm Performance (Hypothesis 
1B) 
 
The present study also hypothesized a negative significant relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance. The findings revealed an insignificant relationship 
214 
 
between CEO duality and firm performances (Tobin’s Q). The result indicates that CEO 
duality does not have any significant effect on firm performance. According to the 
agency theorist, the board of director is in charge of organizing and coordinating the 
management. In the same vein, the board ensures that the interest of shareholders is 
guided (Fama& Jensen, 1983). Hence, when the two positions are combined, the duty 
imposed on the board of director might be compromised (Lam & Lee, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, the findings of the study are positive but not significant. The insignificant 
result could be explained by the sample composition, which revealed that approximately 
2.08% of the companies in the population have CEO duality (see descriptive statistics 
Table 6.1). The findings are in accordance with the previous studies, such as: Al-Abbas 
(2009); Al-Matari et al. (2012); and Sharma and Sharma (2016) that reported an 
insignificant relationship between Tobin’s Q measure of firm performance and CEO 
duality. For example, Sharma and Sharma (2016) conducted their study in Indian by 
using a sample of firms operating in the manufacturing sector between 2001 and 2010. It 
was discovered that there is a positive and insignificant relationship between Tobin’s Q 
measure of firm performance and CEO duality. Similarly, a study conducted in Saudi 
Arabia by Al-Materi et al. (2012) used a sample of 135 Saudi listed companies and 
reported an insignificant positive relationship between Tobin’s Q measure of firm 






6.6.1.1.3 Relationship between Non-executive Directors and Firm Performance 
(Hypothesis 1C) 
 
The non-executive directors are the essential corporate governance mechanisms 
investigated in this study. The relationship between the presence of a non-executive 
director on the board and firm performance in Iraq was examined by using the market-
based measured (Tobin’s Q). The Tobin’s Q result revealed a significant negative 
relationship between the non-executive director on the board and firm performance. The 
Tobin’s Q measure of firm performance suggeststhat there is poor performance 
attributed with the firms having a non-executive director on board.  
 
Contrary to the agency theory, the representation of non-executive director on board 
does not improve board monitoring. Nevertheless, the finding is in line with other past 
studies like Garba and Abubakar (2014) and Sharma and Sharma (2016) which are 
conducted in other developing countries. For instance, Sharma and Sharma (2016) 
conducted a study on 20 listed Indian firms and reported a negative relationship between 
non-executive director and firm performance. On the other hand, Garba and Abubakar 
(2014) reported a negative relationship between firm performance (Tobin’s Q) and non-
executive director of 12 Nigeria-listed companies between 2004 and 2009. With the 
empirical evidences from other studies in developing countries, the negative findings 
from Iraq could be explained the fact why the Iraqi stock market is ineffective (Al-
Abdulhadi, Shetty & Alshamali, 2015).  
 
The Iraqi stock market is vulnerable to inherent market anomalies like many stock 
markets in developing countries, such as insider trading and price fixing. Such 
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anomalies hinder the capacity of market-shared measures, such as Tobin’s Q, to depict 
the true picture of the firm’s value (Al-Sahafi et al., 2015; Manawaduge, De Zoysa & 
Chandrakumara, 2010). Furthermore, Tobin’s Q focuses on investors and it captures the 
extent of the wealth created by the shareholders over a given long period of time. 
Therefore, the result is explained by the fact that the alignment of the managers and the 
shareholders are not clarified. In general, the findings of this study show that the high 
complexity of corporate governance goes beyond the agency approach. 
 
6.6.1.1.4 Relationship between a Board Meeting and Firm Performance 
(Hypothesis 1D) 
 
The hypothesis that a board meeting is related to firm performance is accepted. Table 
6.9 shows that the board meeting is positively related to firm performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q. Based on the Tobin’s Q model, the result indicates that board meeting 
improves firm performance in Iraq. The finding is in accordance with the agency theory, 
which suggests that board monitoring and advisory role improve with higher meeting 
frequency. Therefore, greater meeting frequency improves firm performance as more 
important and strategic issues of the firm can be discussed.  
 
All the cited studies found a positive relationship between a board meeting and firm 
performance. Thus, the findings of the present study are in accordance with the previous 
studies (Al Daoud, Saidin & Abidin, 2016; Al-Matari, 2014; Brick & Chidambaran, 
2010; Jackling & Johl, 2009; Sharma & Sharma, 2016). The board meeting frequency in 
Iraq improves the market participant perception about the firm and thus results to 
increase in Tobin’s Q. In a similar study conducted by Hu, Tam, and Tan (2010) in 
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China, the board meetings frequency was reported to lead to high firm performance. 
According to the regression results, hypothesis H1d suggested a positive relationship 
between a board meeting and firm performance. The regression analysis result is in 
accordance with the agency theory, where the market-based measures of firm 
performance are applied.  
 
6.6.1.2 Relationship between Internal Audit and Firm Performance 
        6.6.1.2.1 Relationship between Internal Audit Existence and Firm 
Performance (Hypothesis H2A) 
 
The hypothesis that the existence of an internal audit is significantly related to firm 
performance was supported. The study reported a positive significant relationship 
between internal audit existence and firm performance. The result suggested that 
internal audit existence have a significant relationship on firm performance in Iraq. The 
result also showed that internal audit existence is an important indicator of firm 
performance with respect to efficient profit generation and market perception of the firm 
in Iraq. In accordance with the agency theory, the result obtained in the present study 
suggested that internal audit resolves the agency problem by adding another layer of 
monitoring on management. The integrity and value of the financial reporting process of 
an organization could be improvedthrough the existence of an internal audit department 
(Ljubisavljević & Jovanovi, 2011). Therefore, the existence of an internal audit 
department facilitates the effective and efficient operation of the audit committee 




In addition, the result in relation to internal audit existence and firm performance is 
supported in prior studies. The theoretical postulation in support of this study was 
provided by Archambeault et al. (2008); Holt and Dezoort (2009);and Mercer (2004) 
who asserted that the internal audit existence improves stakeholder confidence when the 
governance disclosure is enhanced. Corem et al. (2008) documented that the existence 
of the internal audit department has the advantage of detecting fraudulent reporting 
arising from misappropriation of assets. This enhances stakeholder confidence and 
further promotes the firm’s reputation and profitability in the capital market. 
 
6.6.1.2.2 Relationship between Internal Audit Training and Firm Performance 
(Hypothesis H2B) 
 
The hypothesis that internal audit training has a significant relationship with the firm 
performance is accepted in the present study. Table 6.9 reports a positive and significant 
relationship between Tobin’s Q measure of firm performance and internal audit training. 
It also suggests that the training of internal audit staff promotes better results as it 
improves internal audit department efficiency. Therefore, there is a higher performance 
for firms in Iraq due to adequate internal audit training. The results are supported by 
both theoretical postulations and previous findings. Additionally, Thunaibat (2009) 
demonstrated that continuous education and training of audit staff on technology could 
assist the professional performance of internal audit staff. Also, theoretical postulation 
suggests that the practical experience and the education level of the internal audit team 
is an important prerequisite to enhance the professional competency of internal audit 
staff (Tamimi, 2012).  
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In Iraq, the internal audit department is created to promote the accountability by 
ensuring an effective internal control of the financial reporting process (Lin, 2011). The 
internal audit department performs an oversight function in the organization. This 
maximizes the value of the company to shareholders through profitability and increases 
the performance of share price. Furthermore, the professional standards suggest that 
effective and efficient internal audit department is affected by the competency of the 
internal audit department staff, the scope of its monitoring function and the extent of 
correction made to the issues raised by the internal audit department (Salehi, 2016). 
Therefore, it is important to provide the necessary resources, such as training to internal 
audit personnel, to further enhance the competence of the internal audit department.   
 
6.6.1.3 Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
       6.6.1.3.1 Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance             
                   (Hypothesis H3A) 
 
The result of the regression analysis provides supporting evidence that a positive and 
significant relationship exists between managerial ownership and firm performance. The 
finding is explained by the interest alignment hypothesis under the agency theory. 
According to the alignment hypothesis, the managerial ownership provides themanagers 
with asense of belonging, which affects them to make decisions that are in the interest of 
the shareholder (Bushman & Smith, 2003). This leads to an improvement in firm 
performance as the manager can think and reason like the shareholders by virtue of their 
equity participation.  
The above result in relationship to managerial ownership and firm performance in Iraq 
is supported by previous studies. For example, Makhlouf, Ali and Ramli (2017) used a 
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sample of 120 non-financial firms on the Amman Stock Exchange. The authors reported 
a positive relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership. Another 
past study that supports the finding of the present study is the one conducted by Ullah, 
Ali, and Mehmood (2017). The study was conducted on firms listed on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange; the author discovered and reported that managerial ownership has a 
significant and positive relationship with firm performance. Furthermore, a study 
conducted by Chen, Hou and Lee (2012) and Fauzi and Locke, (2012) also supported 
the above result, in relation to managerial ownership and firm performance.  
 
Moreover, a study conducted by Sing and Sirmans (2008) reported that managerial 
ownership reduces agency problem in a publicly traded corporation. The positive 
relationship established is consistent with the management alignment theory under the 
agency theory, which states that manager’s stake in the firm through managerial 
ownership aligns their interest with shareholders. Therefore, managers make more profit 
and refrain from self-serving behaviour since they have equal stake like the 
shareholders. In Iraq, managerial ownership is an important corporate governance 
mechanism that aligns the interest of the shareholders and managers.  
 
6.6.1.3.2 Relationship between Block Shareholder Ownership and Firm                                                
              Performance (Hypothesis H3B) 
 
Individual block shareholder is a variable of corporate governance that has an 
insignificant effect on firm performance in Iraq. The relationship between individual 
shares block holder and firm performance is negative but not significantly related to 
market-based measures of Tobin’s Q in this study. The agency theory suggested that 
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block shareholders are effective monitoring mechanisms as they have the financial 
strength to affect the board structure through voting rights. Nevertheless, the type-two 
agency problem extends the view to state that the controlling block shareholders could 
expropriate firm resources to benefit themselves at the expenses of minority 
shareholders. The poor performance will hide their expropriator’s activities.  
 
In accordance with the type-two agency theory, previous study and present study 
confirm an insignificant relationship between individual block shareholder and Tobin’s 
Q. The result of a study conducted by Buallay, Hamdan and Zureigat (2017) and Lai 
(2017) also reported a negative relationship between individual share block holding and 
firm performance measure of Tobin’s Q.  
 
6.6.1.3.3 Relationship between Local Institutional Shareholder and Firm  
              Performance (Hypothesis H3C) 
 
The current study also investigated the local institutional owners. The hypothesis that 
the local institutional shareholders have a significant relationship with firm performance 
when measured with Tobin’s Q is accepted. This study founds a positive significant 
relationship between local instructional ownership and firm performance. This implies 
that ownership concentration in the hands of local institutional investors who scrutinize 
the management leads to better firm performance. 
 
The above mentioned finding is in line with the agency theory. According to the agency 
theory, local institutional ownership affects corporate governance mechanisms when 
examining the excesses of the directors as they have a large investment stake in the 
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company and wealth. As such, this can be deplored to monitor the directors at little cost 
in comparison with them individual block holders (Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; Ping & 
Wing, 2011). Other previous studies that are in support of this current study include: 
Harjoto and Jo, (2008); Imam and Malik, (2007); Irina and Nadezhda, (2009); 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007); Nuryanah and Islam, (2011); Sharma and Sharma, (2016); 
and Ullah and Mehmood, (2017). These cited studies investigated and reported that local 
instructional ownership positively and significantly improves firm performance. For 
instance, the finding of the study revealed that the local institutional owners are efficient 
monitoring tools in Iraq. Sharma and Sharma (2016) focused on the sample of 20 listed 
firms in the manufacturing sector between 2001 and 2010 and discovered a positive 
relationship.  
 
6.6.1.3.4 Relationship between Foreign Institutional Shareholder and Firm  
              Performance (Hypothesis H3D) 
 
According to the regression results, hypothesis 3d suggested a positive relationship 
between foreign institutional shareholder and firm performance. This result is supported 
by Tobin's Q. The regression analysis result is in accordance with agency theory and 
resource dependency theory, where the market-based measures of firm performance are 
applied.  
 
This finding is supported by prior empirical and theoretical postulations. Concentration 
ownership in the hands of foreign institutional investors who scrutinize the management 
leads to better firm performance. According to the agency theory, foreign investors are 
important monitoring forces to ensure the decisions made by management are in line 
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with the interest of the shareholder. Furthermore, the resource dependency theory 
suggests that the foreign institutional shareholders could deploy their international 
wealth of experience and connection to assist the growth of the company. Several 
empirical studies discovered a result that is consistent with the present study findings 
and theoretical postulation. For instance, the result reported by: Anum Mohd Ghazali, 
(2010); Choi et al., (2007); Dwivedi and Jain (2005); Nakano and Nguyen, (2012): 
Oxelheim and Randøy, (2003); Sharma and Sharma, (2016); and Wellalage and Locke 
(2012) support the findings which stated that foreign institutional ownership positively 
affects firm performance.  
 
6.6.1.4 Relationship between External Auditing and Firm Performance (Hypothesis 
4) 
 
The external auditing is the last hypothesis being examined in the current study. 
External auditing is associated with firm performance. The hypothesis which states that 
external auditing has a significant relationship with the firm performance is supported. 
Table 6.9 provides the summary of findings that report a significant positive relationship 
for Tobin’s Q. 
 
The previous empirical findings on the relationship between external auditing and firm 
performance support the result. For instance, the result is in accordance with the 
findings of Sayyar et al. (2015) that discovered that audit quality has a strong positive 
relationship with Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, Martinez and Moraes (2014) also support the 
results reported in this study. Their findings reported that firm with quality external 
audit has high performance with respect to Tobin’s Q performance measure. The 
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positive relationship between external audit quality and firm performance is based on 
agency theory arising from the need to ensure accountability to the shareholders. The 
result shows that the external audit promotion of accountability has resulted in higher 
market value through Tobin’s Q. Therefore, the external audit quality is considered as 
an important component of corporate governance mechanism to increase the firm’s 
value in Iraq.  
 
6.7 Additional Analysis 
For further confirmation of the result reported in the study, the additional analysis was 
conducted to check whether the results are sensitive to the choice of the performance 
measure. As such, the present study model was adjusted by replacing the measure of 
performance i.e. Tobin’s Q by ROA and ROE which is an account based measure of 
performance but slightly reflects the shares of the firm reaction to thegood performance. 
All other variables remain as defined in the main model of the study. The result of the 
additional test was reported in Table 6.10 and Table 6.11. The regression result for both 
the explanatory variables and the control variables are closely similar with respect to the 
direction and significant level to the result of the main result reported in Table 6.10 and 
Table 6.11. The findings of the results are discussed below.  
6.7.1 Result for ROA 
         6.7.1.1 Result for H1A 
 
There exists a positive relationship between board size (BSIZE) and firm performance 
as suggested by the ROA model. Also, in the ROA model, the BSIZE coefficient has an 
insignificant but positive relationship (coefficient= 0.015, t= 0.68). Therefore, by using 
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the ROA performance measure as suggested by the result, BSIZE is not important to 
improve performance. Thus, considering the model of ROA, the hypothesis 1a is not 
supported by the findings.  
 
6.7.1.2 Result for H1B 
The relationship for the coefficient for the ROA model is insignificant and positive. The 
T values and coefficient are respectively 0.011 and 0.11. Thus, the ROA model does not 
support the hypothesis. In accordance to the CEO_DUAL, the ROA model’s result 
showed that there is no importance for a single individual to serve as the CEO and 
chairman for the firm performance.  Thus, with respect to the ROA model, the finding 
does not support hypothesis 1b.  
 
6.7.1.3 Result for H1C 
According to the ROA model, there is insignificant relationship for non-executive 
directors on the board (NON_NED) as shown by the study. In the ROA model, the 
coefficient for NON_NED is negative and insignificant (coefficient= -0.000, t= -1.39). 
Thus, the hypothesis H1C is not supported by the ROA result. It is shown by the result 




6.7.1.4 Result for H1D 
With the value of 0.002 (t= 0.47), BMEET’s coefficient is positive and insignificant in 
the ROA model. With respect to the ROA model, the hypothesis is not supported by the 
result. 
 
6.7.1.5 Result of H2A 
Under the ROA model and INEXIST and firm performance, the ROA model revealed a 
negative and insignificant relationship -0.008 (-0.37).  The result showed that there is no 
importance in the relationship between internal audit and firm performance. With 
respect to the ROA model, the hypothesis 2a is not supported by the findings.  
 
6.7.1.6 Result of H2B 
Similarly, the coefficient on internal audit training (IATRAIN) is insignificant and 
negative, -0.146 (t= -0.83) with respect to ROA as shown by the study. Therefore, with 
respect to the ROA model, the result does not support hypothesis 2b.  
 
6.7.1.7 Result of H3A 
In the model of ROA, there is a positive and significant relationship of 0.001 (t= 3.58) 
between coefficient of managerial ownership (MGROWN) and firm performance.  




6.7.1.8 Result of H3B 
The coefficient on block ownership (BLOCKOWN) is negative and significant 
according to the ROA model’s result. In the ROA model, the coefficient of 
BLOCKOWN is -0.011 with a t-value of -5.42. Thus, with respect to the ROA model, 
the hypothesis 3b is not supported.  
 
6.7.1.9 Result of H3C 
The results for the coefficient and t-value are -0.001 and -4.08 respectively in the ROA 
model. Also, in the ROA model, the coefficient of LOCAL_INSTIT is negative and 
significant. Therefore, with respect to the ROA model, hypothesis 3c is not supported by 
the findings. 
 
6.7.1.10 Result of H3D 
In the case of foreign ownership (FOREIGN), the coefficient is negative and 
insignificant for ROA -0.001 (t= -1.34).Thus, with respect to the ROA model, 
hypothesis 3d is not supported by the findings.  
 
6.7.1.11 Result of H4 
In the same vein, there is anegative and significant relationship -0.079 (-4.29) for the 
coefficient on AF with respect to ROA. Therefore, with respect to the ROA model, 





6.7.1.12 Results for Control Variables 
Summarily, 6.10 presents the combinations of the results and PCSE results based on 
ROA. Inthe ROA model, the company size is positive and insignificant. With a t-value 
of0.79in the ROA model, the coefficient of COYSIZE is 0.027. In the ROA model, the 
coefficient on COYGROW is positive and insignificant with coefficients of 0.000 and t-
values of 1.00. Inthe ROA model, the coefficient on COYLEV is negative and 
insignificant. Contrarily, in the ROA model, the coefficient for COYLEV is -0.000 (t= -
0.20). On the other hand, the coefficient on COYAGE showed a negative and significant 
relationship of -0.007 (t= -7.51) in the ROA model.  
Table 6.10 
Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Results Based on ROA 
 Coef. T value P>|t| 
BSIZE 0.015 0.68 0.494 
CEO_DUAL 0.011 0.11 0.908 
NON_NED -0.000 -1.39 0.164 
BMEET 0.002 0.47 0.642 
INEXSIT -0.008 -0.37 0.710 
IATRAIN -0.052 -0.83 0.405 
MGROWN 0.001 3.58 0.000*** 
BLOCKOWN -0.011 -5.42 0.000*** 
LOCAL_INSTIT -0.001 -4.08 0.000*** 
FOREIGN -0.001 -1.34 0.179 
AF -0.079 -4.29 0.000*** 
COYSIZE 0.027 0.79 0.427 
COYGROW 0.000 1.00 0.318 
COYLEV -0.000 -0.20 0.838 
COYAGE -0.007 -7.51 0.000*** 
_cons 0.465 1.32 0.188 
R-Squared  0.31  
F test  0.000  
Number of observations  192  





6.7.2 Result for ROE 
         6.7.2.1 Result for H1A 
 
The ROE model suggests a positive relationship between board size (BSIZE) and firm 
performance. The coefficient for the BSIZE has a positive but insignificant relationship 
in the ROE model (coefficient= 0.013, t= 0.17). Thus, the result suggested that BSIZE is 
not important to improve performance by using the ROE performance measure. Hence, 
the finding does not support hypothesis 1a with respect to the ROE model.  
 
6.7.2.2 Result for H1B 
The coefficient for the ROE model turns negative and insignificant. The coefficient and 
t value are -0.120 and -0.47 respectively. Thus, the hypothesis is not supported in the 
ROE model. The result of the ROE model with respect to CEO_DUAL indicated that 
having the same individual serving as the chairman and the CEO is not important for 
firm performance. Hence, the finding does not support hypothesis 1b with respect to the 
ROE model. 
 
6.7.2.3 Result for H1C 
The finding showed that non-executive directors on the board (NON_NED) is 
significant in the ROE model at 5% level of significance. The coefficient for 
NON_NED is positive and significant in the ROE model 0.000 (t= 2.20). Thus, the ROE 
result supports hypothesis H1C. The result indicated that the proportion of non-




6.7.2.4 Result for H1D 
The coefficient of BMEET in the ROE model is negative and significant with the value 
of -0.019 (t= -1.83). Hence, the finding does not support the hypothesis with respect to 
the ROE model. 
 
6.7.2.5 Result of H2A 
The coefficient on INEXIST under the ROE model revealed a positive and significant 
relationship 0.317 (2.98) between INEXIST and firm performance. Hence, this indicated 
that the existence of an internal audit improves firm performance. It also suggests that 
INEXIST does improve performance and the finding supports hypothesis 2a with 
respect to the ROE model. 
 
6.7.2.6 Result of H2B 
Furthermore, the findings showed that the coefficient on internal audit training 
(IATRAIN) with respect to ROE is positive and insignificant 0.146 (t=0.65). Hence, the 
finding does not support hypothesis 2b with respect to the ROE model. 
 
6.7.2.7 Result of H3A 
The coefficient of managerial ownership (MGROWN) in the ROE model revealed a 
negative and significant relationship of - 0.003 (t= -2.22). Hence, the finding does not 




6.7.2.8 Result of H3B 
The findings of the ROE model indicated that the coefficient on block ownership 
(BLOCKOWN) is positive and significant. The coefficient of BLOCKOWN in the ROE 
model is 0.006 with a t-value of 1.86. Hence, the finding supports hypothesis 3b with 
respect to the ROE model. 
 
6.7.2.9 Result of H3C 
In the ROE model, the coefficient is 0.000 with t-value of 0.08. The coefficient of 
LOCAL_INSTIT in the ROE model is positive and insignificant. Hence, the finding 
does not support hypothesis 3c with respect to the ROE model. 
 
6.7.2.10 Result of H3D 
Furthermore, the coefficient on foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is negative and 
insignificant for ROE -0.004 (t= -1.03). Hence, the finding does not support hypothesis 
3d with respect to the ROE model. 
 
6.7.2.11 Result of H4 
Nevertheless, with respect to ROE, the coefficient on AF shows a positive and 
insignificant relationship 0.000 (0.04). Hence, the finding does not support hypothesis 4 




6.7.2.12 Result for Control Variables 
In summary, Table 6.11 presents the PCSE results based on ROE. Company size is 
positive and insignificant in the ROE model. The coefficient of COYSIZE in the ROE 
model is 0.019 with a t-value of 0.19. The coefficient on COYGROW is positive and 
insignificant in the ROE model. The coefficients 0.000 with t-values of 1.51. The 
coefficient on COYLEV is negative and significant in the ROE model. On the contrary, 
the coefficient forCOYLEV in the ROE model is -0.021 (t= -3.60). The coefficient on 
COYAGE on the hand revealed a negative and insignificant relationship in the ROE 
model -0.021 (t= -0.40).  
 
Table 6.11 
Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Results Based on ROE 
 Coef. T value P>|t| 
BSIZE 0. .013 0.17 0.868 
CEO_DUAL -0.120 -0.47 0.639 
NON_NED 0.000 2.20 0.028** 
BMEET -0.019 -1.83 0.067* 
INEXSIT 0.317 2.98 0.003*** 
IATRAIN 0.146 0.65 0.515 
MGROWN -0.003 -2.22 0.026** 
BLOCKOWN 0.006 1.86 0.063* 
LOCAL_INSTIT 0.000 0.08 0.932 
FOREIGN -0.004 -1.03 0.301 
AF 0.000 0.04 0.969 
COYSIZE 0.019 0.19 0.847 
COYGROW 0.000 1.51 0.132 
COYLEV -0.021 -3.60 0.000*** 
COYAGE -0.021 -0.40 0.686 
_cons -0.148 -0.46 0.649 
R-Squared  0.12  
F test  0.000  
Number of observations  192  




6.7.2.13 Comparison of Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Results between 
Financial Firms only and both Financial and Non-financial Firms (Split Test) 
 
From the non-financial firms, the results from Table 6.8 showed that BSIZE, 
NON_NED, BMEET, INEXSIT, IATRAIN, MGROWN, LOCAL_INSTIT, FOREIGN, 
AF, COYSIZE and COYLEV are all significant at the level of 1%.  The only exception 
is in the cases of CEO_DUAL, BLOCKOWN, COYGROW and COYAGE with values 
of 0.422, 0.580, 0.890 and 0.903 respectively. This shows that only four variables are 
insignificant to firm performance for non-financial firms. However, in the case of the 
conjunction of both financial and non-financial firms in relation to firm performance in 
Table 6.12, the results showed that NON_NED (at the level of 5%), BMEET (at the 
level of 10%), BSIZE, INEXSIT, IATRAIN, BLOCKOWN, LOCAL_INSTIT, 
FOREIGN, AF, COYSIZE, COYLEV and COYAGE are all significant at the level of 
1%.  In contrast, CEO_DUAL, MGROWN and COYGROW are not significant in the 
case of relationship between both financial and non-financial firms and firm 
performance. From all indication of the both analyses, it can be deduced that both 
CEO_DUAL and COYGROW have no significant either on the non-financial firms as 











Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) results based on Tobin Q (financial and non-
financial firms) 
 Coef. T value P>|t| 
BSIZE 1.342 4.02 0.000*** 
CEO_DUAL 3.501 1.51 0.130 
NON_NED -0.000 -2.44 0.015** 
BMEET 0.097 1.76 0.078* 
INEXSIT 2.066 4.77 0.000*** 
IATRAIN 3.117 3.43 0.001*** 
MGROWN 0.008 1.18 0.239 
BLOCKOWN -0.091 -5.24 0.000*** 
LOCAL_INSTIT 0.098 7.84 0.000*** 
FOREIGN 0.019 2.79 0.005*** 
AF 1.528 4.09 0.000*** 
COYSIZE -2.750 -5.55 0.000*** 
COYGROW 0.001 0.51 0.612 
COYLEV 0.346 3.23 0.001*** 
COYAGE -.0417 -3.20 0.001*** 
_cons 16.206 5.51 0.000*** 
R-Squared   0.30  
F test  0.000  
Number of observations  276  
Note: *, **, *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
6.8 Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter presents the result of the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
firm performance by using the empirical model. Such an empirical model is developed 
in chapter four. The chapter begins with the introduction section, followed by a detail 
explanation of the descriptive statistic of the data employed in the study. The next 
section discusses the procedure of panel data analysis technique by explaining the 
procedures and the necessary steps in choosing between the random effect (RE) and 
ordinary least square (OLS) models by using the LM test and between the fixed effect 
model (FE) and the Random effect model (RE) by using the Hausman specification test. 
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Next, the results of the diagnostic test for multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and 





DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of seven sections. Section 7.2 gives an overview of the research 
objective and hypotheses. Section 7.3 discusses the contribution of the current study and 
Section 7.4 explains the implications of the present study. Section 7.5 outlines the 
study’s limitation and recommendation for the future research, followed by conclusions 
in Section 7.6.  
 
7.2 Overview of the Study 
The motivation of the present study lies in the urgent need for the Iraqi government to 
improve its investment climate. Such improvement is needed at the instance of the 
devastating political instability witnessed in the history of the country and dwindling oil 
revenue, which highly contributes to the GDP of the country. Nevertheless, the absence 
of corporate governance principles codes that will guide the activities of managers and 
majority shareholders greatly challenges the revamp of the Iraqi economy. The 
shareholders mostly appoint the managers. Hence, the managers act under the influence 
of the majority shareholders. Unfortunately, the non-existence of the corporate 
governance code has empowered the managers to decide which rule to apply and when 
such rule is at the detriment of the minority shareholders. As a result, this has a negative 




Therefore, this present study examines how the corporate governance mechanisms of 
some listed companies affect firm performance. The objectives of this study are divided 
into four specific objectives. Thus, the study is to examine:  
(i) the relationship between the board of directors’ characteristics and firm 
performance among Iraqi listed companies;  
(ii) the relationship between internal audit and firm performance among Iraqi 
listed companies;  
(iii) the relationship between of ownership structure and firm performance among 
Iraqi listed companies; and 
(iv) the relationship between external audit and firm performance among Iraqi 
listed companies. 
 
Past studies have documented that board structure affects firm performance. For 
instance, studies have documented that corporate governance mechanisms affect the 
monitoring ability of the board of director. Hence, such mechanisms reduce the severity 
of the agency problem in the listed firms (Alsayanai, 2017; Isa, 2017; Nawafly & 
Alarussi, 2016). Some other studies also provide evidence that CEO duality (Latif et al., 
2013; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006); board non-executive directors (Alsayanai, 2017; Isa, 
2017; Makhlouf, Ali, and Ramli, 2017); and board meeting (Mangena & Tauringana 
2006; Sharma & Sharma, 2016; Al-matari, 2014) affect firm performance. As such, four 
main hypotheses were formulated to test the relationship between the board of director 
characteristics, internal audit, ownership structure, external audit and firm performance. 
Specific corporate governance components were tested under some of the main 
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constructs (variables) and thus resulted in total fourteen hypotheses tested in this present 
study (11).  
 
All the hypotheses of variables and the control variables used in the present study were 
adopted from the prior literature on corporate governance. Four control variables 
adopted in the regression model were used in the present study. Financial and non-
financial information were hand collected from the annual reports of Iraqi listed 
companies. The annual reports were obtained from the ISX and the final sample 
comprised 192 observations for a period of four (4) years. The observations were 
analyzed by using the Panel Corrected Standard Error estimation technique to ensure 
that the residual of the analyzed data is free from the heteroscedasticity, 
multicollinearity and autocorrelation issues. 
 
7.3 Contribution to the Current Study 
The present study contributes to the literature by documenting evidence that large board 
size among Iraqi firms results in higher firm performance compared to the firms with 
small board size. Thus, this evidence also supports the agency theory and resource 
dependence theory that large board size could pool their wealth of experience together 
to improve the performance of their organization. Likewise, frequent board meeting 
could enhance firm performance. This study also documents that corporate governance 
mechanisms, in the form of internal audit existence, internal audit training, institutional 
ownership (local and foreign) are associated with high firm performance. Therefore, this 
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study contributes to the increasing literature relating to firm performance and corporate 
governance.   
 
Recently, Iraq has little to non-legal control. Therefore, the present study provides 
valuable evidence relating to the effect of governance mechanisms on firm performance 
in an unstable political clime. The current study contributes to existing literature on firm 
performance and corporate governance by examining data from a developing country 
i.e. Iraq, where institutional governance has a weak and unstable political climate. Thus, 
the current thesis is among the early studies to examine corporate governance and firm 
performance beyond the scope of developing countries with stable political and 
economic structure. The study extends the model of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) study on 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
highlights that their findings are only applicable to the context of the study, and may not 
necessarily hold for countries that are lack of protection for minority investors and have 
the unstable political environment. Prior studies Claessens et al. (2002) have established 
that ownership structure determines the nature and severity of agency problem. In a 
developed market or emerging market where corporate governance study might have 
conducted, the expropriation of minority interest is limited by existing market control. 
Therefore, it is difficult to use the data entirely and finding of another regulatory setting, 
especially those settings with different features as examining in the current study. 
 
This study is among the earliest study that examines the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance in Iraq after it experiences relative 
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stability in its political structure and tries to restore the rule of law. Compared to other 
governance studies in Iraq (Abdul-Zahra, 2011; Jazrawi & Khudair, 2014; Bakheet, 
2013), the study employs a large data set in analyzing the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. Specifically, Jebouri (2007), Mashhadani (2009) and 
Rashid (2009) investigated the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance by using a sample of the Iraqi banking sector. The cited studies reported 
mixed findings regarding the relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance mechanism. Furthermore, the results of these studies are subject to critics 
due to the relatively small sample and short periods. By using a relatively large sample 
over a long period, this study provides new and robust evidence on the association 
between firm performances, corporate governance mechanisms in Iraq after it obtains 
peace and attempts to encourage rule of law.  
 
Conclusively, the evidence provided in this study could provide a valuable insight to 
regulators considering corporate governance and regulatory reforms, minority 
shareholders and management who are interested in the firm performance. 
 
7.4 Implications of the Study 
The introduction of Iraqi companies relating to firm performance is one of the important 
contributions of this study. The results from the empirical evidence revealed that 
researches on the effect of corporate governance on firm performance have not received 
much attention in Iraq. Thus, this study serves as an additional literature on corporate 
governance in the Middle East. Therefore, this study includes variables that reflect 
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corporate ownership and regulatory environment in the Iraqi context. The implications 
are discussed under two headings i.e. theoretical and practical implications.  
 
7.4.1 Theoretical Implications 
This study clearly investigated the effect of the board of directors, internal audit, 
ownership structure, external auditing and control variables, (i.e. company leverage, 
company grow, company size, the companyon firm performance) in Iraqi listed 
companies. As such, this study added value to the existing literature by providing further 
evidence on the corporate governance attributes that enhance the firm performance of 
listed firms in Iraq.  
 
The board of director’s characteristics should be considered as a necessary component 
of an effective functioning in any companies or firms. This study illustrated that board 
size and board meeting, internal audit establishment and internal audit personal training 
have a significant and positive relationship in the context of firm performance. The 
result suggests that internal audit existence have a significant relationship on firm 
performance in Iraq. Apart from that, the internal audit existence creates in with internal 
audit department that provides an independent assessment of the internal control 
mechanisms in the organization. The internal audit training enhances the competency of 
the internal audit department staff. Such training includesenhancing the reporting quality 
by correcting identified weakness in the internal control system. The above claim is 
supported by the result that internal audit training had a significant relationship with 
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firm performance. The results serve as theoretical blueprints to the existing literature on 
how to govern corporate firm.  
 
This study proves that agency problem varies with the nature and type of ownership 
structure. For instance, the present study documents the managerial ownership to 
improve firm performance through realignment of shareholders and directors interest. 
Furthermore, individual block shareholding based on the findings revealed the 
possibility of minority shareholder expropriation, which indicated the presence of type 2 
agency problem. Nevertheless, the study discovered and reported the significant 
monitoring role played by institutional owners (local and foreign) in ensuring that 
directors’ performance according to the interest of shareholders. These findings exposed 
the important corporate governance mechanisms that could improve firm performance 
and also those that require further regulatory attention.  The mechanism of external audit 
provides the investors with a sense of reliance as they believe they can prevent and 
detect fraud. The support from the relationship between external auditing and firm 
performance is a proof. This is instrumental to audit quality and the likelihood of auditor 
detecting financial conjectures in the financial statements. Last but not least, this 
research shows that the effective intervening functions of the control variables, such as 
company leverage, company size, company age and company growth, in the association 




7.4.2 Practical Implications 
The present study contributed to both knowledge and practice in the reality of corporate 
governance. The findings of this study have important implication for regulators of ISX, 
academic and management in the field of corporate governance. The study also has 
implication on corporate governance effective as revealed in the findings that board of 
directors, internal audit, ownership structure, external auditing and control variables (i.e. 
company leverage, firm growth, company size, company age) have a practical effect on 
the firm performance through corporate governance in Iraq. 
 
The prior literature supported the result reported in this study and suggested that good 
corporate governance is an important factor that improves firm performance. Business 
failure around the globe is partly attributable to the board in efficiency to establish 
sound corporate governance practice in their organisation. The ISX needs to pay 
adequate attention to reforms relating to board structure, especially those relating to the 
decision-making process to ensure high performance in the face of a changing the 
environment. Therefore, the governance structure in Iraq must be reformed and 
redesigned to enhance board monitoring. The implementation or rather compliance with 
established governance structure by listed companies as enshrined in the Iraqi 
Companies Law can lead to high firm performance.  
 
As revealed in the current findings, sound corporate governance practices have a 
positive effect on the firm market performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. Nevertheless, 
the study further revealed actions that ought to be taken to improve firm performance. 
244 
 
For instance, the current findings on CEO duality are supported by agency theory, which 
emphasises the importance of this corporate mechanismonboard performance. The study 
empirical findings suggested that CEO duality reduce board-monitoring effectiveness, 
hence increases firm performance. Therefore, the ISX needs to ensure that firms strictly 
comply with the companies laws relating to the separation of the two roles. The firms 
must report compliance with this requirement in the disclosure section and provide a 
reason for non-compliance as the case may be. Furthermore, the non-executive director 
is significant but negative contradicting the agency theory. As mentioned above, the 
possible explanation for the negative relationship could be explained by the fact that the 
non-executive director could not truly be independent as acclaimed. In many instances, 
directors in public listed companies with concentrated ownership are appointed with the 
influence of controlling shareholders. Thus, a further regulatory initiative ensures the 
true independence of the non-executive director. Furthermore, the individual block 
holder could not provide the necessary monitoring as predicted under the agency theory. 
The result could be an existence of type 2 agency problem as raised in the present study. 
It provides valuable insight to regulators about the possibility of minority shareholder 
exploitation by the controlling shareholders despite the relationship between Tobin’s Q 
and block shareholding remain insignificant.  
 
Finally, the regulators should promulgate the laws that can further enhance corporate 
governance. The empirical studies have shown that board of director, internal audit, 
ownership structure and external audit are useful in improving firm performance. Thus, 
it is crucial not to overemphasize the importance of the board of directors, internal audit, 
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ownership structure and external audit as they all have an impact on firm performance. 
In addition, policymakers should also be aware that the company growth, company age, 
company leverage and company size are connected with the corporate governance 
mechanism. 
 
7.5 Limitations and Future Studies 
This section discusses a few limitations associated with this research. Despite the use of 
the Iraqi data provides a new insight into corporate governance research, the findings of 
this study should be applied cautiously to other countries due to dissimilarities in 
regulation, practices and economy. In any case, the findings are very much applicable in 
settings that are peculiar to that of Iraq. 
 
The data from the annual report were retrieved from the website of ISX. Besides, the 
data from those companies annual report were collected and thus some companies were 
excluded due to non-availability of data. As a result, the findings are only applicable to 
listed companies. As such, future studies can try to expand the sample to encourage 
generalizability. 
 
Since the studies have adopted the panel approach, the future studies may adopt a more 
sensitive analysis technique, which may better capture the individual and unique 
behaviour of the data set. This study only examines managerial ownership, block 
ownership, local institutional ownership and foreign institutional ownership. Therefore, 
the future research may consider examining other forms of ownership that might affect 
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performance. For example, the other structures, such as government and private 
ownership, could also affect the value of the firm.  
 
Middle East countries can conduct comparative studies among themselves to provide 
more robust findings that can be generalized across countries. This study used Tobin's Q 
as a market measure of performance, and ROA and ROE as accounting measure of 
performance. Thus, the future studies could do a factor analysis where all the drivers are 
combined as one or new performance measures besides those used in the current study. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Chapter 7 summarizes all the chapters contained in the current study, starting from the 
chapter that introduces the issues that led to the present study discussion and ending 
with chapter 4 that presents the findings of this study. The present study shows various 
governance mechanisms that influence firm performance. Accordingly, the findings 
reported in this study extend the knowledge relating to firm performance. Overall, eight 
hypotheses were supported in the Tobin’s Q model. This study has contributed to the 
idea of how internal audit and external audit affects the firm performance as a corporate 
governance mechanism. This study is unique as it investigates various practices under 
corporate governance as mentioned in the previous chapters. Furthermore, their effects 
on firm performance is a benefit to the academics and policy-makers/decision-makers to 
expand to improve the existing knowledge. This study on the market value and on the 
profitability of the firms in the volatile region also reveals the nature and direction of the 
relationships. In addition, this study provides an accurate picture of how a turbulent 
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region can successfully implement corporate governance. Theoretically, the findings of 
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